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THE PREISER PUZZLE: CONTINUED FRUSTRATING
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND
HABEAS CORPUS REMEDIES FOR STATE PRISONERS
Martin A. Schwartz*
Fifteen years ago in Preiser v. Rodriguez' the United States Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the potential overlap in federal remedies that are
available to state prisoners. Constitutional claims asserted by state prisoners
against state prison officials fall within the literal terms of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (section 1983),2 yet may also fit within the congressional grant
of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by
state prisoners.' As a result, federal courts must often determine whether a
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1. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) [hereinafter section 1983]. The statute in its present form
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
3. Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction covering attacks upon state and federal custody is
granted by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). Specific habeas corpus jurisdiction covering attacks
on state court judgments is also granted by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 508 n.9 (1982). While section 2254 may
apply to only post-trial attacks on state court judgments, pre-trial habeas petitions "are properly
brought under . . . 28 U.S.C. section 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of
whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case
pending against him." Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). Accord
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 503-04 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (section 2254 applies only to an individual who is in custody pursuant to a conviction
in state court, while section 2241(c)(3) allows the federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus
before judgment is given).
Section 2254(a) is the provision typically overlapping with section 1983 and provides that:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
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state prisoner's claim may be asserted under section 1983 or only in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding after state remedies have been exhausted. 4 Preiser
resolved that claims seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement
could only be brought as habeas corpus proceedings, while other types of
prisoner claims might be brought under section 1983.
The resolution of this issue is important to state prisoners, their attorneys,
the states, and the state and federal judicial systems. Because state prisoners
must exhaust state remedies before commencing a federal habeas corpus
proceeding 5 but not a section 1983 action, 6 the Supreme Court in Preiser
4. The issue may also arise in the context of constitutional claims asserted by persons in
state custody other than state prisoners, such as those confined pursuant to a judgment of civil
contempt, mental patients, and juvenile delinquents. See infra notes 478-99 and accompanying
text. Federal prisoners in federal custody may not seek relief against federal prison officials
under section 1983 because these officials do not act under color of state law within the meaning
of section 1983. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATIONS: CLAIMS, DEFENSES
AND FEES § 5.6 (1986). The issue may arise, however, whether a federal prisoner must proceed
pursuant to the grant of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal prisoners, under
section 2241, or whether relief may be sought pursuant to another remedial device, such as a
mandamus proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982), or a declaratory judgment action, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1982). See, e.g., Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1987) (federal prisoner's
claim to expunge disciplinary sanction is within habeas corpus where objective is to enhance
prospects for parole); Dees v. Murphy, 794 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (federal prisoner must
exhaust federal habeas corpus remedies before bringing a civil rights action under section 1983
attacking conviction); In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(federal prisoner is not restricted to habeas corpus relief when his claim that parole action was
unconstitutional will not automatically alter his sentence); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044
(7th Cir. 1982) (validity of prisoner's habeas petition is dependent upon determination, on
remand, that disciplinary proceedings are reasonably likely to lengthen his imprisonment);
Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 54i F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976) (prisoner who is challenging
the duration of a sentence may not bring a claim under section 1983, nor may she seek release
by a writ of mandamus; the sole remedy is habeas corpus). See also Monk v. Secretary of
Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (if the effect of a declaratory judgment is to release a
prisoner or affect a new trial, the action will be construed as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus even if release was not requested). Because these decisions typically analogize to the
principles established by Preiser and its:progeny, they are appropriately referred to in the
context of analyzing federal remedies for state prisoners.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) provides that:
An Applicant for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to thejudgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
cirucumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the pris-
oner.
Id. See infra notes 71-102 and accompanying text discussing the comparative exhaustion rules.
6. The section 1983 versus federal habeas corpus issue has generated considerable com-
mentary. See Flannery, Habeas Corpus Bores A Hole in Prisoners' Civil Rights Actions-An
Analysis of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 104 (1973) [hereinafter Flannery,
Habeas Corpus]; Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of Habeas Corpus": The Supreme Court and
the Limitations on a Prisoner's Right to Sue; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 518 (1973)
[hereinafter Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of Habeas Corpus'"; Schwartz, Challenging State
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recognized that this issue has "considerable practical importance." '7 The issue
took on added significance when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 1976,8 which authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees
in section 1983 actions. There is, however, no similar congressional authority
for judicially awarded fees in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 9
Due to the increase in civil rights filings by state prisoners,10 federal courts
have been faced with the civil rights-habeas corpus issue in myriad and
novel contexts. The lower federal courts, however, have received insufficient
guidance from the United States Supreme Court. Preiser, the only Supreme
Court decision to extensively analyze the issue, is ambiguous and leaves open
more questions than it answers." Additionally, the Supreme Court has
resolved only two other section 1983-habeas corpus disputes. 2 Those de-
cisions are also incomplete and in significant respects unclear. 3 The lower
Convictions After Completion of Sentence; The Availability of Section 1983, 20 CIuM. L. BULL.
285 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Challenging State Convictions]; Note, State Prisoner's Suits
Brought on Issues Dispositive of Confinement: The Aftermath of Preiser v. Rodriguez and
Wolff v. McDonnell, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 742 (1977) [hereinafter Note, The Aftermath of
Preiser and Wolff]; Comment, New Barrier to Federal Court Review: The Habeas Corpus
Exhaustion Requirement As Applied to Prisoners' Conditions of Confinement, 9 NEW ENO. L.
REv. 615 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, New Barrier to Federal Court Review]; Note, Federal
Courts-Bradford v. Weinstein: The Federal Courts Reopen the Door to Prisoners' Civil Rights
Claims, 54 N.C.L. Rv. 1049 (1976); Note, A Comparison of Section 1983 and Federal Habeas
Corpus in State Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1315 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
A Comparison]; Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. § 1983-Habeas Corpus-State Prisoner
Challenging in Federal Court the Fact or Duration of His Confinement Limited to Remedy of
Federal Habeas Corpus, Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 307
(1974) [hereinafter Comment, Section 1983-Habeas Corpus]; Comment, State Prisoners' Suits:
Proper Forum, Choice of Remedy, and Effect of Judgment, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1364
(1973) [hereinafter Comment, Proper Forum]; Note, Habeas Corpus, Section 1983, and State
Prisoners'Litigation: Preiser v. Rodriguez In Retrospect, 4 U. ILL. L. F. 1053 (1977) [hereinafter
Note, Preiser v. Rodriguez In Retrospect].
7. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 122.
10. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners Under Section 1977e of
the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935 (1986) ("the number of section 1983 cases
brought by state prisoners has swelled the federal court dockets .... ). In 1978, state prisoners
filed approximately 2,030 civil rights actions and that number increased to 11,195 in 1979. For
the twelve month period ending June 30, 1985, however, state prisoners filed 19,448 civil rights
actions. Id. at 935 n.3 (citing Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 1985 Table C2, at A-7). See also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193,
210-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("18,856 [Bivens and section 1983 prisoner] suits
were filed in federal court in the year ending June 30, 1984, as compared to just 6,606 in
1975." (citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director
143, Table 24 (1984))). "Prisoner rights cases occupy a significant percentage of the time of
federal courts, particularly of the United States district judges." I. SENSENICH, COMPENDIUM
OF THE LAW ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS 10 (1979).
11. See infra notes 236-57 and accompanying text.
12. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.6 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1975).
13. See Note, A Comparison, supra note 6, at 1316.
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federal court decisions are not surprisingly in disarray, with jurists frequently
bemoaning the difficulties and frustrations they encounter in attempting to
solve Preiser puzzles.14
This Article organizes and reviews the extensive decisional law that has
developed during the fifteen years since Preiser, with the hope of adding
clarity to this difficult area. It attempts to determine the preferred approach
with regard to the many instances where the case law is conflicting. A good
deal of groundwork must be laid before specific issues are addressed. Part
I commences with an overview of the section 1983 civil rights and federal
habeas corpus remedies. Part II analyzes the distinctions between the two
remedies. Part III undertakes an analysis of the Supreme Court precedent.
Part IV discusses three fundamental issues that the Supreme Court has failed
to resolve. Part V discusses the relationship between the Preiser issue and
Younger v. Harris5 abstention.
The remainder of the Article focuses on specific issues that arise in Preiser
analyses. Part VI categorizes various areas where the Preiser issue has arisen
and analyzes the responses of the lower federal courts. Part VII reviews the
major procedural issues that arise out of the section 1983-federal habeas
corpus overlap, such as res judicata questions and statute of limitation
problems. The Article concludes with observations concerning the vast body
of law in this area.
I. SECTION 1983 AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: AN
OVERVIEW
Section 1983's major purpose is to provide a remedy to enforce the
fourteenth amendment.' 6 Section 1983 complaints must allege that a person
14. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1257 (8th Cir. 1987) ('ambiguous borderland"'); Serio
v. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 197) ("difficult to answer
... "; "the circuit courts have struggled to establish clear standards .... "); Boudin v.
Thomas, 737 F.2d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring in denial of rehearing)
("considerable controversy and difficulty"); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir.
1984) (distinction may "be difficult to draw"); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir.
1983) ('ambiguous borderland'(citing McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054, 1056 (lth Cir.
1982))); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 33 (4th Cir. 1981) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) ("difficult
enough"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150 (2d Cir.)
("not . . . an easy one"), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Christianson v. Spalding, 593
F. Supp. 500, 502 (E.D. Wash. 1983) ("difficult task of harmonizing Preiser ... with Wolff
.... ); Haymes v. Regan, 394 F. Supp. 711, 712 (S.D.N.Y.) ("the very interesting but
troublesome question of the Supreme Court's holding in Preiser..."), aff'd as modified, 525
F.2d 540 (2d Cir 1975); Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 69 (W.D. Wisc. 1971) (the
"recurrent riddle"). See also Note, A Comparison, supra note 6, at 1315. ("In the last two
decades, federal courts have struggled to delineate the boundaries of each remedy and to
establish their proper roles.").
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the demarcation line between civil rights actions
and habeas corpus petitions is not always clear." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579
(1974). See also I. SENSENICH, supra note 10, at 19 ("The determination of whether an action
is habeas corpus or civil rights can be difficult.").
15. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
16. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), rev'd in part by Monell v. New York
[Vol. 37:85
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acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right. 7
The statute grants an injured party the right to sue in an action at law or
in equity and it provides a basis for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief."8
The Congress that adopted the 1871 Act decided that a federal remedy
for constitutional deprivations was necessary because state authorities were
either unwilling or unable to control the widespread violence of the Ku Klux
Klan against blacks and their supporters.19 Section 1983 did not provide a
remedy against the Ku Klux Klan itself, but against those persons representing
a state who were unable or unwilling to enforce the state law.2 0 More
City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) ("overruled insofar as [Monroe] holds
that local governments are wholly immune from suit under section 1983"). The original version
of the Act was adopted by the 42nd Congress in 1871 as Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871 and was entitled, "An Act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." (citing 17 Stat. 13 (1871)). See
S. NAHMOND, CIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIEs LITIGATION § 1.03, at 4 (2d ed. 1979) (citing
17 Stat. 13 (1871)). There was "only limited debate" on the 1871 statute. Monell, 436 U.S. at
664.
17. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 does not itself create or establish any rights but
fulfills an essentially procedural or remedial role by providing authorization for judicial en-
forcement of rights created by the United States Constitution or by federal statutes other than
section 1983 itself. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277-79 (1985) (respondent sought damages for
deprivation of constitutional rights allegedly caused by an unlawful arrest and brutal beating
by a police officer); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815-17 (1985) (respondent
was allegedly deprived of his life "without due process of the law" in violation of the fourteenth
amendment); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (respondent claimed that unlawful
detention in jail deprived him of liberty without due process of the law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment). When a section 1983 claim is based upon an alleged violation of the
United States Constitution, federal court jurisdiction may be based upon either 28 U.S.C.
section 1331 or 28 U.S.C. section 1343(3). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) (1982). While the state
courts have jurisdiction to hear section 1983 claims, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1
(1980) (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980)), a large percentage of
section 1983 actions are in fact filed in federal court. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKIN, supra note
4, § 1.7, at 16 (1986).
19. "The specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the campaign of
violence and deception in the South, formented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent
citizens their civil and political rights." Wilson 471 U.S. at 276. Other Supreme Court decisions
detailing the legislative history of section 1983 include Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (examines the debate regarding the proper scope of federal protection of individual
rights under section 1983).
20. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76.
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specifically, congressional debates show that the section 1983 remedy was
strongly motivated by a grave concern that state courts were deficient in
protecting federal rights. 2'
Congress's distrust for state fact finding processes impacts significantly
upon the Supreme Court's contemporary interpretation of section 1983. This
distrust underlies the Supreme Court's related rulings in Monroe v. Pape12
that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted in order to commence a
section 1983 action and that unconstitutional conduct by state and local
officials is redressable under section 1983, even if the same conduct violates
state law for which a state court remedy exists.23 Section 1983 supplements
the state remedy, and the latter need not be sought first and refused prior
to invoking a section 1983 claim.24 That same distrust for state fact finding
processes provided a significant basis for extending the Monroe holding in
Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents.25 In Patsy, the Court stated that Congress
did not intend that state administrative remedies be exhausted before a
person could commence an action under section 1983.
The Monroe decision in 1961 provided the initial impetus for the modern
explosion of section 1983 litigation in general, and of state prisoner actions
under section 1983 in particular. 26 Until the early 1960's, the lower federal
courts had applied the "hands-off" doctrine to prisoner grievances. 27 Cooper
21. Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99.
22. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
23. Id. at 183. See also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 491 (1980) ("This
court has not interpreted section 1983 to require a litigant to pursue state judicial remedies
prior to commencing an action under this section."); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33
(1975) (dictum) ("we have long held that an action under § 1983 is free of that requirement");
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (dictum) ("we have not required exhaustion
.... recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect
constitutional rights"). Resjudicata or collateral estoppel would bar almost all federal section
1983 actions if it was necessary to exhaust state judicial remedies. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). For the principles
governing the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel of state court judgments that
precede federal section 1983 actions, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75 (1984); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
24. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961).
25. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). The Patsy rule applies to federal and state court section 1983
actions. Felder v. Casey, 56 U.S.L.W. 4689 (U.S. June 22, 1988). See infra notes 72-97 and
accompanying text. If one in fact exhausts state administrative remedies before a federal section
1983 action is brought, administrative res judicata may attach to the agency's findings of fact.
University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986) (state agency quasi-judicial fact finding
is entitled to same preclusive effect in federal section 1983 action as it would receive under
state law).
26. While only 270 civil rights actions were filed in 1961, over 30,000 were filed in 1981.
Of these 30,000, 15,639 were section 1983 actions. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 533 n.20 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). See M. ScHwARTz & J. KiRKLIN, supra note
4, at vii (foreward by George C. Pratt) ("After Monroe, civil rights litigation against state and
[Vol. 37:85
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v. Pate,28 decided in 1964, marked the end of the hands-off approach and
began a new wave of prisoners' constitutional rights litigation. 29 Since Coo-
per, prisoners have asserted a wide variety of constitutional claims under
section 1983 that test virtually every aspect of prison life under the Consti-
tution. 10
While section 1983 developed into a meaningful remedy for state prisoners,
federal habeas corpus rights were also expanded." The habeas corpus writ
has ancient common law roots as a device designed to provide "swift judicial
review of alleged unlawful restraints of liberty. ' 32 Congress extended federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners in 1867.13 Habeas corpus is a
local governmental officials began to flow into the federal courts."). Other legal developments
that contributed significantly to the tremendous increase in section 1983 litigation include
Congress's authorization in 1976 of attorneys' fee awards in 1983 actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982), and the Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978), which overruled Monroe on municipal immunity and therefore subjected
municipalities to section 1983 liability.
27. See Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment
of the Younger Doctrine From A Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 31, 56 (1985)
(under the "hands-off" doctrine, "[slome courts held that they lacked jurisdiction; others held
that their hearing prison cases would improperly interfere with the internal administration of
state prisons."); Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1365-66.
28. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). The state prisoner in Cooper alleged "that solely
because of his religious beliefs, he was denied permission to purchase certain religious publi-
cations and denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners." Id. The district and circuit
courts held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Supreme Court ruled that "the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error to dismiss
it." Id. (citations omitted).
29. Zeigler, supra note 27, at 56-57; Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1370.
30. See Lay, supra note 10, at 936 n.4. "Prisoner grievances relating to conditions of
confinement, food, privacy, heat, mail, hair length, work details, segregation from the prison
population, religious practices, and rehabilitation have all become issues of federal litigation
under section 1983." Id. See generally I. SENSENICH, supra note 10 (surveys constitutional
claims arising under section 1983 which tested aspects of prison life under the Constitution).
While the Supreme Court no longer takes the position that an "iron curtain" separates prisoners
from the United States Constitution, it also takes the position "that imprisonment carries with
it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
523-24 (1984) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)). Moreover, Supreme Court
prisoners' rights decisions frequently stress that "[pirison administrators, therefore, should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institu-
tional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) and cases cited therein. See also
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984) (jail's blanket prohibition on contact visits is a
reasonable, nonpunitive response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with the fourteenth
amendment). To a significant extent the hands-off approach has been replaced by a standard
of broad deference.
31. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Accord Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (referring to "the extraor-
dinary expansion of the concept of habeas corpus effected in recent years").
32. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 63 (1968). The writ of habeas corpus is "of immemorial
antiquity .... Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting Secretary of State for Home
19881
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controversial remedy because of the tension and friction that results when
federal courts review state court convictions.14 The language of the congres-
sional grant of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners
has not changed significantly since its original enactment, but the judicial
interpretation of this jurisdiction continually undergoes change." Early in
this century habeas corpus was available only to challenge the sentencing
tribunal's jurisdiction 6.3  Habeas corpus is now available to anyone in state
custody who asserts that his confinement violates any provision of the United
States Constitution.3 7 The doctrine was narrowed somewhat in Stone v.
Affairs v. O'Brien (1923) A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.)). The writ was inscribed in English law in the
17th century. Flannery, Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 107. For a discussion of the history
of the writ see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4261, at 588 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]; Developments in the Law,
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1042-45 (1970) [hereinafter Developments].
The writ is given explicit recognition and protection in the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). It was
incorporated into the first congressional grant of federal court jurisdiction. Fay, 372 U.S. at
400 (citing Act of September 24, 1789, C.20, § 14, Stat. 81-82). While the Supreme Court
typically describes the writ in lofty terms, see, e.g., Fay 372 U.S. at 400 ("the most celebrated
writ;" "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England .... ");
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) ("There is no higher duty than to maintain it
unimpaired."); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1869) ("only sufficient defense of
personal freedom"); Ex parte Bollman and Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) ("that
great writ"), not all agree, with some describing it as the "Greatly Abused Writ." Galtieri v.
Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 365 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Hill, J., specially concurring), quoted
in Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985
Term, I1l F.R.D. 265, 266 (1986).
33. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); Fay, 372
U.S. at 409. Today, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners is specifically provided
for in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See supra note 3.
34. "There is an affront to state sensibilities when a single federal judge can order discharge
of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a state." WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4261, at 600; C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 53, 344 (4th ed. 1983). See also Robbins, supra note 32, at 266 (discussing the controversy
over the writ of habeas corpus); Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991
(1985) (theorizes that the writ of habeas corpus is better explained as providing a federal forum
in which to enforce federal rights that may be unpopular with the states).
35. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4261, at 597.
36. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 446 (1986) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
475 (1976)).
37. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)
(fourteenth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979) (claim of racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979) (claim of lack of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). While section 2254(a)
of Title 28 is not limited to federal constitutional claims but encompasses any violation of
federal law, federal statutory claims asserted by state prisoners in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding are exceedingly rare. "Few situations can be imagined in which a state prisoner has
a federal nonconstitutional claim, and the problem has been virtually unlitigated in recent
years." Developments, supra note 32, at 1070. Federal habeas corpus is available only for
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Powell,3" which excluded fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims from
the scope of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Stone, however, was
based in part upon the majority's view that the exclusionary rule is "not a
personal constitutional right" but instead, "a judicially created remedy." 3 9
The increased availability of section 1983 claims in the early 1960's coin-
cided with the Supreme Court's expansion of the parameters of federal
habeas corpus in three 1963 decisions, Jones v. Cunningham, Fay v. Noia,41
and Townsend v. Sain.4 2 In Jones, the Supreme Court liberalized the re-
quirement that the federal habeas corpus petitioner be "in custody" by
holding that a person released on parole is "in custody" for the purpose of
federal habeas corpus. 43 The Court reasoned that while parolees are not
physically confined, parole restrains one's liberty in a way not shared by the
public." Following the Jones decision, courts broadened the "in custody"
definition to include prisoners released on probation 45 or on one's own
recognizance,46 and in situations where a detainer has been imposed.4 7 Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court has stated that a person serving consecutive
sentences is "in custody" under both sentences and may challenge either the
sentence presently being served 4 or the subsequent sentence.49 While the
claims based upon federal law. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (federal courts have
no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct
"wrongs of constitutional dimension").
38. 428 U.S. 465, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
39. Id. at 486. Justice Brennan expressed the fear in his dissenting opinion in Stone that
the Court's decision would extend beyond exclusionary rule claims. Id. at 516-19 (Brennan, J..,
dissenting). These fears have "not been realized." Robbins, supra note 32, at 292. See Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
40. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
41. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
42. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
43. 371 U.S. at 236-43 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982)).
44. Jones, 371 U.S. at 240.
45. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring) (citations
ommitted); United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 218 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970); Hahn v.
Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
46. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). Release on bail constitutes sufficient
custody. See Reimnitz v. State's Attorney, 761 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1985); Delk v. Atkinson,
665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); Capler v. City of Greenville, Miss., 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1970); Zeigler, supra note 27, at 94-95 n.319; Developments, supra note 32, at 1075 n.26.
("The conditions attached to the release on ball should be the determinant.").
47. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 n.4 (1973); Rose v.
Morris, 619 F.2d 42, 43 (9th Cir. 1980); Gregory v. New York Parole Comm'n, 496 F. Supp.
748, 749 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
48. Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1036 (1968).
49. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968) (overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131
(1934)). Cf. Ward v. Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1984) (one who is incarcerated on an
unrelated charge is not in custody for the purpose of challenging a previous sentence already
served, since liberty is not restrained by the prior sentence), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
One need only be in custody when the habeas corpus proceeding is commenced. Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1968); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4262, at
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Court has not entirely dispensed with the custody requirement,50 Jones
marked a new era of "in custody" interpretation.
608. See also Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1984) (where probation expired before the
habeas corpus proceeding was commenced, petitioner was not in custody and could not challenge
a delinquency adjudication in the habeas corpus proceeding). Habeas proceedings will not be
held moot when the habeas petitioner is unconditionally discharged from custody after com-
mencement of the habeas proceeding if statutory collateral consequences flow from the convic-
tion being attacked. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38. Accord Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) (a state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until his release
and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it has prevented him
from doing). Cf. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (unconditional release mooted pro-
ceeding where petitioners attacked only their sentences and alleged only nonstatutory collateral
consequences). Carafas is based in part upon the fact that release is not the sole remedy that
may be granted by a federal habeas corpus court. 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) refers to "release
from custody or other remedy." See Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 239.
50. Federal courts consistently hold that federal habeas corpus may not be relied upon to
challenge a "fine only" conviction because the imposition of a fine does not place one "in
custody." See, e.g., Lillios v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1986) (fine and suspension
of driver's license is not custody); Battieste v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 732 F.2d 439, 441
(5th Cir. 1984) (fine is not custody); Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 804 (lst Cir. 1984) (dicta)
("habeas is not available as a remedy for fine-only convictions .. "); Spring v. Caldwell, 692
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1982) (fine followed by issuance of warrant of arrest to compel payment of
fine not custody); Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483, 485 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (fine only conviction
is not custody), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404,
407 (7th Cir.) (fine only conviction is not custody), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Russell
v. City of Pierre, S.D., 530 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir.) (fine is not custody), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 855 (1976); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1970) (fine and revocation
of driver's license is not custody). Accord Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (parties not "incarcerated or otherwise restrained" cannot meet the habeas corpus
custody requirement). See also Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1984) (one year suspension
of driver's license is not a severe enough restraint on liberty to constitute custody). Cf. United
States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970) (incarceration for refusal to
pay fine; habeas proceeding considered on the merits), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). Even
severe collateral consequnces do not constitute "custody." Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20
(1st Cir. 1987) (revocation of medical license is not custody); Ginsberg v. Abrams, 702 F.2d
48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (petitioner's removal from the bench, revocation of his license to practice
law, and disqualification as a real estate broker or insurance agent did not place him in custody);
Hanson, 591 F.2d at 407 (collateral consequences from a fine only convinction are "not severe
enough to put the convicted person in custody .... "); Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 546 F.2d
1100, 1102 (3d Cir. 1977) (custody requirement not met if habeas corpus petition filed after
petitioner had been unconditionally released). But see Connor v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587
(5th Cir. 1977) (implying that collateral consequences may be sufficient to satisfy the custody
requirement); Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339, 443 (2d Cir.) (dictum) (imposition
of fine may be sufficient to satisfy custody requirements if there are possible collateral
consequences), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974). The Supreme Court cases relied upon in
Connor and Thistlethwaite deal with mootness, not custody. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 787-88 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579-80 n.3 (1969); Sibron, 392 U.S. at
51-58; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38; Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 633-34 n.2 (1968).
See Hanson, 591 F.2d at 406-07. One difficult issue discussed in Part VI, infra, is whether,
given the unavailability of federal habeas corpus to test a fine only or expired sentence
conviction, such convictions may be attacked under section 1983. See infra notes 318-44 and
accompanying text.
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Fay v. Noia51 simplified the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement
for state prisoners. Originally, the exhaustion requirement was imposed so
that relations between the federal and state courts would not be unnecessarily
disturbed. 2 The exhaustion requirement, codified by Congress in 1948,
effectuates federal-state comity." The statute now requires a prisoner to
exhaust state remedies which are not "ineffective" in protecting the prisoner's
rights.5 4 This policy affords state courts the initial opportunity to correct
51. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
52. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). This doctrine required exhaustion of "all
state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts. Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944).
53. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973); Picard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 392, 418 (1963).
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c) (1982). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434 (1963). See also
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (district court must dismiss habeas petitions which
contain both unexhausted and exhausted claims); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)
(respondent failed to exhaust state remedies when highest court had no fair opportunity to
consider and act upon equal protection claims); Irwin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 405 (1959)
(section 2254 does not bar resort to federal habeas corpus if petitioner obtains a decision on
constitutional claims from highest state court); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238 n.1 (1949)
(section 2254 presupposes the existence of adequate state law remedies).
Section 2254(b) provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted
on behalf of a state prisoner, i.e., "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court," unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1982). Under subdivision (c) of section 2254, available state remedies have not been exhausted
if the habeas petitioner "has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1982). The statutory exhaustion
requirement presupposes the existence of an adequate state remedy, Young, 337 U.S. at 239,
and does not require one to exhaust futile state remedies, as where the highest court in the
state previously rejected petitioner's contention. WRIGHT, M.LER & COOPER, supra note 32, §
4264, at 648; Thompson v. Reivitz, 746 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103
(1985). The mere claim that the state courts will not be sympathetic to a petitioner's constitutional
claim will not excuse exhaustion, because one significant assumption behind the exhaustion
requirement is that the state courts are as "equally bound to guard and protect rights secured
by the Constitution" as the federal courts. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1981) (citing
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)). This is consistent with the Supreme Court's view
that the state courts are as competent to decide federal constitutional claims as the federal
courts. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 n. 37 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624,
637 (1884). Many strongly believe, however, that federal courts are "more likely to apply
federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts." Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting AL, Study of Division of Juris-
diction Between State and Federal Courts, 166 (1969)); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION,
TENSIONS IN TE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL POWER 2-3 (Bobbs-Merril 1980); Neuborne, The Myth
of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). Competing authorities on the issue are discussed and
analyzed in Yackle, supra note 34, at 1022-24.
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constitutional errors55 and balances federalism interests against the need to
preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a federal remedy in all cases of restraint
or confinement in violation of federal law.5 6
Fay compromised some federalism interests in favor of making federal
habeas corpus available to state prisoners. The Fay Court held that the
exhaustion requirement does not encompass state remedies that a petitioner
could have had but failed to pursue,5 7 and are no longer available when the
federal petition was filed, unless the petitioner had "deliberately by-passed"
the available state remedies."' The ruling in Fay was a rough counterpart to
the holding in Monroe v. Pape59 that the existence of a state judicial remedy
does not defeat a section 1983 claim for relief.60
55. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam) (citing Fay, 372 U.S. at
438). The Court has described "comity" as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country
is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Younger also refers to the principle of comity as
"Our Federalism." Id. "Considerations of finality, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and preventing
disruption of custody also support comity." McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc). The federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement envisions "only the post-
ponement, not the relinquishment of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction .... Fay, 372 U.S.
at 418.
56. Braden, 410 U.S. at 490 (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien,
(1923) A.C. 603, 609 (HL)). A leading article describes the interests protected by the exhaustion
requirement in more detail:
The significant interests protected by the exhaustion requirement are of two types.
First, exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and
enforcement of federal law. Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings
would tend to remove federal questions from the state courts, isolate those courts
from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality
to federally protected interests. Second, exhaustion preserves orderly administration
of state judicial business, preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal
habeas proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts,
which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most effectively
supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.
Developments, supra note 32, at 1094 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 497 n.13 (1973); Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-91. See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
518 (1982) ("The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state court's role in
the enforcement of federal law .....
57. Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
58. The Court in Fay ruled that "deliberate bypass" refers to a decision made by the
petitioner rather than petitioner's counsel. Id. at 439. Fay also reaffirmed the holding in Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953), that a state court ruling does not
preclude a federal court habeas determination, and ruled that the exhaustion requirement does
not require that one seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Fay, 372 U.S. at 422.
59. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
60. See Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1367. The analogy between Monroe and
Fay is not perfect because, unlike Monroe, Fay did not eliminate the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement from federal habeas corpus but rather gave the requirement a liberal
interpretation.
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Townsend v. Sain 6 also de-emphasized the significance of state remedies
The Townsend Court held that even where the state court made a factual
determination, the federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding may receive
evidence and make findings of fact. 62 Furthermore, the Townsend Court
held that where a factual dispute exists, an evidentiary hearing must be held
by the federal habeas court if the applicant did not, either at the time of
trial or in a collateral proceeding, receive a full and fair hearing in state
court 63
Of these three 1963 Supreme Court decisions, Fay had the greatest impact
upon federal habeas corpus proceedings, although this impact was short
lived. Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 decided in 1977, rejected Fay's sweeping lan-
guage and, while Wainwright did not explicitly overrule Fay, it rendered Fay
nearly obsolete. 65 Nevertheless, Jones, Fay, and Townsend opened federal
habeas corpus proceedings to state prisoners. Following these three decisions
large numbers of habeas corpus petitions were filed by state prisoners.6
The enhanced availability of section 1983, the demise of the hands-off
doctrine, and the liberalization of federal habeas corpus set the stage for
the 1973 confrontation in Preiser v. Rodriguez.67 These legal developments
encouraged prisoners to file section 1983 civil rights actions and federal
habeas corpus proceedings in increasing numbers. Inevitably, controversies
arose over whether or not the prisoner had selected the proper remedy.
Before proceeding to Preiser, however, a comparison of section 1983 and
61. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
62. 372 U.S. at 318.
63. Id. at 312. Townsend listed circumstances in which federal evidentiary hearings are
mandatory. Id. at 313. These were codified by Congress in 1966 in modified form by 28 U.S.C.
section 2254(b) (1982). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, § 53, at 333-39.
64. 433 U.S. 72, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
65. See United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
("[tihe rumors of [Fay v. Noia's] death are not greatly exaggerated."); C. WRIGHT, supra note
34, § 53, at 342 ("The doctrine announced in Fay was decisively changed in 1977 in Wainwright
v. Sykes." (footnote omitted)). Wainwright held that where a state prisoner fails to assert a
claim properly in state court, that claim is precluded in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
absent a showing of cause for not complying with the state procedural rule and actual prejudice
from an inability to litigate the claim. 433 U.S. 72 (1971). On the questions of cause and
prejudice, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986);
Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, reh'gs denied, 456 U.S. 1001, 457 U.S. 1141 (1982).
66. W. MCCORMACK, FEDERAL COURTS § 10.04, 503 (1984) ("[H]abeas corpus petitions
grew in astronomical numbers during the late 1960's and early 1970's."). See also Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1042
(1977) ("Fay certainly increased the number of claims brought in federal court .... ). Between
1961 and 1970, "state prisoner petitions, including both those seeking release and those
complaining of maltreatment, increased from 1,020 to 11,812, or 1,158%." H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 16 (1973) (citing A.O. Ann. Rep., Table 16, at 121
(1970)). Additionally, "[b]etween 1961 and 1970, civil rights actions grew from 296 to 3,985,
or 1,346%." Id. (citing A.O. Ann. Rep., Table C2, at 238 (1961) and Table C2, at 232 (1970)).
67. 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
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federal habeas corpus remedies is needed to evaluate what is at stake when
a court is called upon to determine the proper remedy.
II. SECTION 1983 VERSUS FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS-THE
STAKES
Since a violation of federally protected rights by a state or local official
is within the "literal terms" of both section 1983 and federal habeas corpus,
there is a potential overlap in the two remedies. 68 This hardly means that
they are fungible. On the contrary, several significant differences in the
remedies render the resolution of a Preiser v. Rogriguez"9 puzzle by a federal
court of crucial importance.
The custody and exhaustion requirements that state prisoners must satisfy
in order to commence a federal habeas corpus proceeding are not applicable
to section 1983 claims. The custody requirement, however, is relatively
insignificant because of the Supreme Court's liberalized definition of cus-
tody.70 In addition, the section 1983-habeas corpus issue normally arises in
cases brought by confined state prisoners who are clearly in custody.
The exhaustion requirement under the federal habeas corpus doctrine lies
at the heart of the section 1983-habeas corpus conflict. In a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, the petitioner must exhaust all state judicial and admin-
istrative remedies before bringing suit; there is no such prerequisite under
section 1983.71 The section 1983 remedy exists, in part, because of congres-
sional mistrust for the "factfinding processes of state institutions." 72 Con-
gress believed that federal courts were less susceptible than state courts to
local prejudice and defects in the fact finding processes. 71 Congress also
wanted to provide immediate access to the federal judicial system despite
state laws to the contrary.74
To assess the significance of state remedies in relation to the section 1983
remedy requires consideration of both Congress's 1980 amendment to the
Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 7" and the doctrine
of Parratt v. Taylor.76 In Patsy, the Supreme Court partially relied upon the
1980 CRIPA amendment to reject the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement.7 7 CRIPA created a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for
68. Id. at 488.
69. Id. at 475.
70. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
71. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
72. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 504.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982).
76. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), rev'd in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 330-31 (1986).
77. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507-16.
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section 1983 actions brought by adult state prisoners. The courts have
discretion to continue an action for up to ninety days if the Attorney General
or the court determines that a "plain, speedy, and effective" system of
admininstrative review exists in a particular jurisdiction and that exhaustion
is "appropriate and in the interests of justice.""8 Congress found that the
largest group of section 1983 suits were prisoner actions79 and the limited
exhaustion requirement was adopted, therefore, to relieve the burden on
federal courts by diverting some of these suits back through state and local
institutions.8 0 The Court in Patsy found that CRIPA would have been
unnecessary had there been a general exhaustion requirement in section 1983
actions,, and that in enacting this specific provision for adult state prisoners,
Congress had created an exception to the no-exhaustion rule. sl
The limited exhaustion requirement delineated in CRIPA has not signifi-
cantly altered the general no-exhaustion rule established by Monroe and
Patsy. CRIPA does not require that state prisoners who assert proper claims
for relief under section 1983 first exhaust either state judicial or administrative
remedies. CRIPA instead allows a court discretion to continue an action for
no more than ninety days pending resort to administrative remedies that
satisfy the statutory criteria. 2 Thus, CRIPA intrudes into the section 1983
no-exhaustion rule in a small way. Moreover, CRIPA is apparently invoked
infrequently, given the relatively few decisions discussing the statutory pro-
vision.83 This is partly due to the fact that the provision may be invoked
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982). The Supreme Court has described section 1997e as an
"extraordinarily detailed exhaustion scheme." Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-10. "[A]n inmate must
not only commence the grievance procedure but must appeal the grievance within the ninety-
day period to the highest level available to him within said ninety-day period." Mavlick v.
Central Classification Bd., 659 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D. Va. 1986). The provision authorizes only
a continuance, not a dismissal. Francis v. Marquez, 741 F.2d 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1984); Kennedy
v. Herschler, 655 F.2d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The court may dismiss, however,
if the prisoner fails to make reasonable, good faith efforts to pursue administrative remedies
following the continuance of the action. Lay v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988); Rocky
v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1987). Section 1997e is limited to actions by adults
convicted of a crime and thus does not cover juvenile delinquents. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510 n. 10;
S. REP. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 16, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADXN.
NEws 832, 840-41. While the legislataive history of the Act refers at times to federal court
actions, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 897 supra, at 15, the statute itself is not so limited and has been
applied by at least one state court. Ode v. Smith, 118 Misc. 2d 617, 461 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
79. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 515.
80. Id. at 509. See Lay, supra note 10, at 936.
81. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 515.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)-(a)(2) (1982).
83. One court, however, which frequently invoked the "CRIPA stay provision," found that
during 1983, the year in which it began to continue section 1983 actions so that administrative
remedies might be exhausted, the number of such complaints filed by inmates decreased by
35% and that "approximately 92 percent of all grievances filed were resolved within the
institution." Burt v. Mitchell, 589 F. Supp. 186, 190 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 83
(4th Cir. 1986). In Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1982), the court, in an opinion
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only when the Attorney General has certified, or the court finds, that a
particular state's inmate grievance procedures are plain, speedy, and effec-
tive. 4 In addition, few states have adopted procedures that comply with the
CRIPA statutory requirements."
The doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor86 is also an important factor to consider
when assessing the significance of state remedies in section 1983 actions. In
both Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer&7 the plaintiff prisoners asserted due
process claims in federal court section 1983 actions.88 The Supreme Court
ruled in both cases that when one is deprived of property from a "random
and unauthorized act," rather than the enforcement of an "established state
procedure," due process is satisfied if the state provides an adequate post-
deprivation state court remedy. 9
While the parameters of this doctrine are not definitively settled, circuit
courts have confined the doctrine to claims of procedural due process, 9A If
by Chief Judge Lay, urged "the State of Iowa to adopt a prisoner grievance procedure"
because, "[s]uch a procedure would provide prisoners with a more accessible and quicker
remedy and remove a significant number of cases from the federal docket." Id. at 706. Iowa
apparently followed Judge Lay's suggestion and adopted a procedure that has been certified in
compliance by the Attorney General. Lay, supra note 10, at 942 n.41.
84. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554-55 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Johnson
v. King, 696 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1983); Owen v. Kimmel, 693 F.2d 711, 713-15 (7th Cir. 1982);
Ode v. Smith, 118 Misc. 2d 617, 621-22, 461 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
85. Lay, supra note 10, at 937. The Justice Departmant has promulgated minimum standards
for inmate grievance procedures. 28 C.F.R. § 40 (1986). See also 42 U.S.C. 1997e(b)(2) (1982).
The only states which have inmate grievance procedures certified in compliance with the statute
and regulations are the District of Columbia, Iowa, Wyoming, and Virginia. Mavlick v. Central
Classification Bd., 659 F. Supp. 24, 26 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1986); Lay, supra note 10, at 942. Chief
Judge Lay concluded that largely because of the statutory requirement that prison employees
and inmates have an advisory role "in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the
[grievance) system ... most states feel that obtaining federal approval is either too burdensome
or an unrealistic means of resolving grievances within prison walls." Id. at 937.
86. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
87. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
88. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520. The prisoner in Hudson also asserted
a fourth amendment claim. 468 U.S. at 521 n.4, 522-30.
89. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Compare Parratt and Hudson
(random and unauthorized deprivations) with Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982) (deprivation pursuant to an established state procedure). The part of the decision in
Parratt which holds that negligent conduct may give rise to a due process claim has since been
overruled. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). "[W]e . . . overrule Parratt to the extent
it states that mere lack of due care by a state official may 'deprive' an individual of life,
liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31. See also
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment is not
implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or
property). Daniels and Davidson leave open whether or not something more than negligence
though "less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is enough to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Daniels, 477 U.S. at 344 n.3. Thus, after
Daniels and Davidson, the Parratt-Hudson doctrine still applies to random and unauthorized
intentional deprivations of property.
90. See Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1986); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774
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Parratt and Hudson are applied to substantive constitutional claims, the
doctrine would overturn the holding in Monroe v. Pape,91 that the federal
section 1983 remedy is independent of any available state remedies. 92 The
Parratt-Hudson doctrine is reconciled with Monroe when the doctrine is
limited to claimed violations of procedural due process.
When one's procedural due process claim is rejected by a federal court
because of the availability of an adequate state court remedy, the claim is
defeated on the merits rather than for failure to exhaust state remedies. 93
This is because Parratt and Hudson neither eliminate nor limit the right to
commence a federal section 1983 action without exhausting state judicial
remedies. Rather, these cases hold that having properly commenced the
action, a procedural due process claim may be without merit under those
circumstances where the available state judicial remedies provide due process.
Thus, the Parratt-Hudson doctrine has not altered the strong no-exhaustion
rule that governs section 1983 claims.
Unlike section 1983, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction requires state pri-
soners to exhaust adequate state remedies before bringing a habeas corpus
proceeding. 94 Contrary to Congress's mistrust for state fact finding that
F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (lth Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Conway v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 758 F.2d
46, 48 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 390 (1986); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d
329, 338 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 541 n.4 (1984) (Justices
Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part) (join the
opinion of the Court upon the understanding that the Court's holding does not apply to conduct
that violates a substantive constitutional right).
91. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
92. This is a result not intended by the Parratt court. See Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322,
329 (5th Cir. 1984).
93. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
193 (1985) (dicta); Signet Construction Corp. v. Borg, 775 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1985); L&H
Sanitation v. Lake City Sanitation, 769 F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1985); Vicory v. Walton, 721
F.2d 1062, 1064 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982). Given the fact that the habeas corpus exhaustion
requirement is rooted in principles of comity, the requirement is characterized as a "doctrine
of abstention," Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963), and is not "jurisdictional." Id. at 434-
35. Accord Granberry v. Greer, 107 S. Ct. 1671, 1673 (1987) ("[F]ailure to exhaust state
remedies does not deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas
corpus application."); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (while the exhaustion
requirement is "to be strictly enforced, [it] is not jurisdictional"), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984); Bradburn v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("the requirement
of exhaustion is not jurisdictional but is merely a matter of comity" (quoting McGee v. Estelle,
722 F.2d 1206, 1210 (5th Cir. 1984))), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 167 (1987). Where the state does
not raise petitioner's failure to exhaust in the district court and raises it for the first time in
the court of appeals, the appellate court must "exercise discretion .. .to decide whether the
administration of justice would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or by reaching the
merits of the petition forthwith." Granberry, 107 S. Ct. at 1673. See, e.g., Brown v. Fauver,
819 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Granberry in a Preiser context; exhaustion required even
though not raised by defendants in district or circuit courts). "The appellate court is not
required to dismiss for nonexhaustion notwithstanding the state's failure to raise it, and the
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
underlies the section 1983 no-exhaustion rule, 95 the habeas corpus exhaustion
requirement reflects congressional respect for state remedies and a belief that
state authorities should be given the first opportunity to correct constitutional
errors.96 The Supreme Court requires strict enforcement of the exhaustion
requirement in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 9 A petitioner must present
the substance of his claim in state court9" and seek review in the highest
court in the state. 99 In Rose v. Lundy7 " the Supreme Court adopted the
complete exhaustion rule. Pursuant to this rule "mixed petitions," that is
those containing exhausted and unexhausted claims, must be dismissed unless
a petitioner relinquishes the unexhausted claims.10' While the Court recog-
nized that the mixed petition problem was not covered by the federal habeas
corpus statute, and that in all likelihood Congress had never considered the
problem, the Court required complete exhaustion to further the policies of
the exhaustion rule. 0 2 The complete exhaustion rule will not only reduce
piecemeal litigation, but will also give state courts more opportunities to
resolve constitutional questions. 03 The Rose Court thus viewed the rule as
a way to promote the principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion
requirement.
court is not obligated to regard the state's omission as an absolute waiver of the claim."
Granberry, 107 S. Ct. at 1674. The court in Peterson v. Murante, 673 F. Supp. 664, 670
(W.D.N.Y. 1987), neglecting Granberry, improperly treated the Preiser issue as one of "subject
matter jurisdiction."
95. See supra notes 72-74.
96. See supra notes 53-56.
97. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684. See also Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238 (1949)
("scrupulous adherence"). In fact a large number of state prisoner federal habeas corpus
petitions are dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Pagano, Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners: Present and Future, 49 ALB. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (1984).
98. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76
(1971).
99. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953). Exhaustion does not
require a state prisoner to seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 436 (1963).
100. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
101. The Court, however, acknowledged that by deleting unexhausted claims, a petitioner
could risk forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims under the abuse of the writ rule
set forth in 28 U.S.C. section 2254 Rule 9(b) (1982). Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21. The Rose
decision "gives petitioners the option either of going back to state court to exhaust the claims
not previously presented to that forum before returning to federal court, or of resubmitting a
new petition to the federal court containing only exhausted claims." Rosenberg, Constricting
Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINOS CONST. L.Q.
597, 628-29 (1985).
102. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19. "A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage
state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving the courts the first
oppurtunity to review all claims of constitutional error." Id.
103. Id. at 519. This will enable the state courts to become more familiar and perhaps more
"hospitable toward federal constitutional issues." Id.
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The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus proceedings typically
means that a significant delay will occur before there is review of federal
claims. While time itself is very important for a prisoner, it is not the only
factor involved. A state prisoner who has been unsuccessful in the state
court system must institute a federal habeas corpus proceeding encumbered
by the adverse state court determinations. While res judicata and collateral
estoppel do not apply to federal habeas corpus proceedings,'04 federal habeas
courts are required to give substantial deference to state findings of fact.
Federal courts presume the state findings of fact are correct and set them
aside only if they are "not fairly supported by the record."105 The effect of
a combined reading of the exhaustion and deference rules is that, in most
cases, if an issue was not raised in state court a prisoner cannot obtain
federal court jurisdiction and, in many cases, if an issue was decided in the
state court, the decision is given great weight and the prisoner is unable to
obtain federal habeas corpus relief.'01
Even if deference to state fact finding was not required, the exhaustion
requirement places a federal habeas corpus petitioner at a tremendous stra-
tegic disadvantage. A federal court grant of the writ in a particular case
constitutes an implicit statement that the state court system has been a less
vigilant enforcer of the Constitution than the federal court. This is contrary
to the Supreme Court's assumption that state courts are as competent and
sensitive in interpreting the United States Constitution as the federal courts. 07
The negative state fact finding and adverse legal determinations inherent in
federal habeas corpus proceedings are responsible for the fact that very few
federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners are granted.108 The
small percentage of writs granted, °9 the fact that many of the petitions filed
are frivolous pro se petitions," 0 and the sensitive and controversial nature
104. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-23
(1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
105. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) ("state court findings of fact
are to be accorded the presumption of correctness"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981)
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(8) (1982)). The federal habeas corpus court has the
power to receive evidence and try the facts anew. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-12
(1963). The court will do so, however, only if the habeas petitioner "did not receive a full and
fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral
proceeding.' Id. at 312-13. Townsend sets forth guidelines for determining whether a full and
fair hearing was provided in state court, and these guidelines were substantially codified by
Congress in 1966 in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) (1982). Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.
106. Robbins, supra note 32, at 276.
107. See supra note 54.
108. A leading authority estimates from available studies that no more than 4% of the
federal habeas corpus petitions are granted. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3261,
at 601. See alsoPagano, supra note 97, at 32 ("the success rate for habeas petitions is fairly
low .... ").
109. See supra note 108.
110. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4261, at 588; Yackle, supra note 34, at
1010 ("habeas petitions often lack merit .... "); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The
1988]
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of the writ contribute to the burdens facing state prisoners who petition for
habeas corpus relief. Justice Jackson, for example, acknowledged that the
infrequent meritorious application is prejudiced by being buried with the
usual worthless claims because "[h]e who must search a haystack for a
needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the
search.""' Judge Friendly referred to federal habeas corpus as "a gigantic
waste of effort" because the remedy produces no result in the overwhelming
majority of cases and a good result only rarely. 12
Judicial attitudes like these place a federal habeas corpus petitioner at a
disadvantage compared to a section 1983 claimant. This attitudinal factor
should be considered in evaluating the distinction between the availability of
a section 1983 remedy as compared to a federal habeas corpus remedy. So
as not to overstate the difference in this regard, there has been wide concern
over the huge increase in section 1983 filings generally and by prisoners
specifically,'1 3 which include a large number of frivolous pro se complaints." 14
While some complain that section 1983 has already exceeded its historical
bounds,"5 state prisoner section 1983 claims do not come to federal court
with the same negative connotations as the federal habeas corpus petitions
filed by state prisoners. Section 1983 was enacted in part because of Con-
gress's distrust for the adequacy of state fact finding," 6 thereby creating a
type of de facto presumption in favor of federal court review of state action
that is allegedly unconstitutional. Moreover, these claims need not come to
federal court burdened by adverse state court fact findings and legal rulings
because exhaustion of state remedies is not required to commence a section
1983 action.
Another major distinction between section 1983 and federal habeas corpus
is the potential relief awarded in each proceeding. Release from custody lies
at the heart of the habeas corpus remedy. That relief, however, is not
available in a civil rights action."17 On the other hand, while damages are
Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 298
n.4 (1978) ("the feeling that there are too many frivolous petitions .... ).
111. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (Jackson, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 345 U.S.
946 (1953).
112. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142, 148 (1970), quoted in WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4261, at 603.
Several present Justices have "complained bitterly" about federal habeas corpus. Yackle, supra
note 34, at 993.
113. See supra note 10 (statistics indicating increase in section 1983 filings).
114. "[l]t is generally agreed that most prisoner rights cases are frivolous and ought to be
dismissed under even the narrowest definition of frivolity." 1. SENSENICH, supra note 10, at
10.
115. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Kostivk v. Riv-
erhead, 570 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
116. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
117. See Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 1984); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451
F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
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an important section 1983 remedy,' they are not available in federal habeas
corpus proceedings." r9 Hence, habeas corpus
does not even attempt to compensate for past sufferings; rather the habeas
remedy begins where the section 1983 remedy leaves off. By releasing a
defendant from custody, habeas corpus can prevent only future injury.
Thus, the habeas corpus and section 1983 damages remedies do not overlap
.... They are mutually exclusive, yet complementary remedies that to-
gether operate to render the injured party whole.' 2
Additionally, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act of 1976, which added court ordered attorneys' fees to the list of remedies
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ; United States ex. rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441
F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1972) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Preiser, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Peinado v. Adult Auth. of Dep't
of Corrections, 405 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); Johnson v.
Walker, 317 F.2d 418, 419-420 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Fast v. Wead, 509 F. Supp. 744, 745
(N.D. Ohio 1981) (where state prisoner challenged his physical imprisonment on constitutional
grounds, his sole remedy was a writ of habeas corpus, and not a suit for relief under section
1983).
118. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980).
Damages are viewed as a "vital component" of the remedies available under section 1983
because they provide compensation for past constitutional violations and "serve as a deterrent
igainst future constitutional deprivations." Id. See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,
.)0-91 (1978) (policies which underlie section 1983 include compensation as well as the prevention
of abuses of power by those acting under the color of state law); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 256-57 (1978) (Congress intended section 1983 awards to compensate and deter deprivations
of constitutional rights).
119. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980) (purpose of habeas corpus is "not to redress
civil injury, but to release applicant from unlawful physical confinement .... ); Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) ("In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not
an appropriate or available federal remedy.") (emphasis in original); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d
377, 383 (5th Cir. 1976) (Tuttle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[N]o one
has ever obtained damages by a petition for habeas corpus."), aff'd, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc); See also Note, Preiser v. Rodriguez in Restrospect, supra note 6, at 1081
(Supreme Court agreed that habeas remedy did not provide for monetary recovery); Note, The
Aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, supra note 6, at 768 (damages are not considered a traditional
habeas corpus remedy nor are they a remedy under federal habeas corpus law); Comment,
Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1399 (damages unavailable in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
The habeas corpus statute "does not deny the federal courts power to fashion appropriate
relief other than immediate release." Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66 (1968). 28 U.S.C. section
2244(b) (1982) reads: "release from custody or other remedy" while 28 U.S.C. section 2243
(1982) requires the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Carafas v.
LaValle, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968). The most common remedy is for the prisoner to be "ordered
discharged unless the prisoner is retried within a reasonable time which may be specified in the
order." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4268, at 714. "[T]he writ is available as
well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487.
120. Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect to be Given State-Court Judgments in Federal
Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 1471, 1495 (1980) [hereinafter Comment,
Collateral Estoppel]. See also Zeigler, supra note 27, at 81. ("Moreover, reversal of a conviction
does not act directly on the officials whose behavior the court wishes to change.").
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available in civil rights actions.' By contrast, there is no statutory author-
ization for awarding attorneys' fees in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 22
This distinction is substantial. Congress authorized fee awards in section
1983 actions because a "vast majority of victims of civil rights violations
cannot afford legal counsel . . . [and therefore] are unable to present their
cases to the courts."123 Consistent with this statutory purpose, there is a
strong presumption that a prevailing plaintiff should recover a fee. 124 Thus,
a prevailing section 1983 plaintiff recovers an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances render an award unjust.' 21
Section 1983's no-exhaustion rule and statutory fee authority are the two
major distinctions between the two remedies and generally render section
1983 more desirable than federal habeas corpus to state prisoners. Other
121. "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See Evans v. Jeff
D., 475 U.S. 717, reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986). See also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561 (1986) (fee award under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 may exceed award of damages).
122. Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107,
1114 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (1984). See also Rutledge v. Sunderland, 671 F.2d
377, 382 (10th Cir. 1982) (petitioner was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees in a successful
habeas corpus suit absent statutory authority for such an award). When a suit, nominally
brought under section 1983, terminates in a consent decree providing available relief only in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the proceeding will be treated as a habeas corpus proceeding and
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 is inapplicable. Larsen v. Sielaff, 702
F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
123. H.R. REP NO. 1158, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The mandate that counsel be
assigned to indigent federal habeas corpus petitioners when "an evidentiary hearing" is required,
28 U.S.C. section 2254 (1982), somewhat mitigates the lack of statutory fee authority in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, although in fact, hearings are held infrequently. See infra note 129.
Discretionary authority for appointment of counsel in civil actions, which of course encompasses
section 1983 actions, is provided for in 28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) (1982). Under this provision,
"[b]road discretion lies with the district judge ...." Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58,
60 (2d Cir. 1986). For an analysis of the pertinent factors see, e.g., Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d
885 (7th Cir. 1981). Some courts hold that in section 1983 actions counsel should be appointed
only in exceptional circumstances. Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982).
124. See Annunziato v. The Gan, 744 F.2d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 1984) ("a presumption in
favor of fee awards .... ). While the prevailing plaintiff standard for a section 1988 fee
award applies to prisoners, fees are not available under section 1988 to pro se litigants. See,
e.g., Smith v. DeBartoli, 769 F.2d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff not entitled to attorneys'
fees where there was no indication that plaintiff was an attorney), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1067
(1986); Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d, 311, 312 (3d Cir. 1982) ("the legislative history of section
1988 supports the position that Congress did not intend to award non-lawyer, pro se litigants
an equivalent of attorneys' fees"); Wright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1982) (state
prisoner alleging the existence of a civil rights violation due to the deprivation of his right to
vote, was prohibited from recovering attorneys' fees under section 1988); Cofield v. City of
Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981) (section 1988 is not intended to compensate a worthy
advocate, as in the case of a successful pro se litigant, but rather to enable a wronged person
to retain an attorney).
125. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
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advantageous aspects of the section 1983 remedy include the right to trial
by jury on legal claims, the potential availability of a broad spectrum of
relief, including class action relief and money damages, and the applicability
of the federal discovery rules. 126 On the other hand, federal habeas corpus
has some advantages over section 1983. While res judicata fully applies to
section 1983 actions, 27 traditional principles of res judicata do not apply to
federal habeas corpus proceedings.12 Additionally, the relative simplicity of
the federal habeas corpus proceeding, a summary proceeding with infre-
quently held hearings, 129 has obvious advantages for pro se habeas corpus
petitioners.130 While federal habeas corpus law is not simple, given the various
nuances of such concepts as custody, exhaustion, and presumption of cor-
rectness of state fact finding, federal habeas corpus is less complex and more
contained than the multi-dimensional section 1983 litigation. State prisoners
who litigate section 1983 claims typically must address several complex issues,
including the distinction between state law wrongs and federal constitutional
torts, proximate cause, the meaning of municipal custom or policy, common
law immunities, the eleventh amendment, resjudicata and collateral estoppel,
abstention doctrines, and the computation of damages for violations of
constitutional rights.' 31
The following chart contains a summary of important distinctions between
section 1983 and federal habeas corpus remedies.
126. These and other distinctions are set forth on the annotated chart on infra pages 108-11.
127. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 193-96. The
Supreme Court has held that administrative res judicata applies to section 1983 claims to the
extent that "federal courts must give the agency's fact-finding the same preclusive effect to
which it would be entitled in the State courts." University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220,
3227 (1986).
128. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 495 (1973); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,
7-8 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458, reh'g
denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
129. "Of 8,534 petitions filed in the statistical year ending June 30, 1985, only 114 habeas
cases proceeded to a hearing, with 102 of the hearings lasting one day or less." Robbins, supra
note 32, at 266 (citing Annual Report to the Director of the United States Courts 1985 at 149,
328 (1985)).
130. But see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 530 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Court's
rule of complete exhaustion "will serve to trap the unwary pro se prisoner who is not
knowledgeable about the intricacies of the exhaustion doctrine.
131. See S. NAHMOND, supra note 16; M. SCHWARTZ & J. KnIKLIN, supra note 4.
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SECTION 1983 HABEAS CORPUS
Assigned Counsel: Only at the discretion of "[Clounsel. must be ap-
the court.' pointed for qualified in-
digents when a hearing is
required; the court may
appoint counsel at an
earlier stage if it deems
appointment desire-
able.""
Attorney Fees: Statutory authorization No statutory authoriza-
to award fees to a pre- tion.' 35
vailing party."'
Class Actions: The federal class action The federal class action
rule applies.'36  rule apparently does not
apply but the court in
narrow circumstances
may order class habeas
relief by applying an
analogous representative
procedure. '
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1986) (in making decision whether or not to appoint counsel, court should consider certain
factors, such as substance of the indigent's claim); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1981) (district courts have broad discretion to appoint counsel for indigents, and will not be
reversed without a showing of fundamental unfairness which would impinge upon due process
rights). However, some courts appoint counsel only in special or exceptional circumstances.
See, e.g., Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (inmate failed to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances in his case concerning denial of proper medical care and access to
the law library to justify appointment of counsel); Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("only upon a showing of special circumstances . . ."); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d
264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (while appointment of counsel not required absent exceptional circum-
stances, decision cannot be based upon the unavailability of counsel).
133. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60 (citing Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts, Rule 8(c) and Advisory Committee Notes). It is more difficult for an indigent
prisoner to secure counsel in a civil rights action than in a habeas corpus proceeding. I.
SENSENICH, supra note 10, at 23. While 28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) (1982), which authorizes the
assignment of counsel to indigents, contains no provision for compensating assigned counsel,
compensation is available to assigned counsel in habeas corpus proceedings under the Criminal
Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. section 3006A(g) (1982).
134. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 122.
136. S. NArnoND, supra note 16, at 32.
137. See, e.g., Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta) ("[A] class
action may lie in habeas corpus."); Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1982) (class
action suits are permissible in habeas corpus proceedings), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
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FEDERAL
SECTION 1983 HABEAS CORPUS
Damages: Available."'3  Not available.'39
Exhaustion: Generally not required Stringent exhaustion of
except for limited, spe- state remedies require-
cific requirements under ment.' 4
CRIPA.'"0
Federal Rules of Civil Applicable. 142  Not applicable.
43
Procedure:
Institutional Law Re- The major vehicle of Not well suited for insti-
form Litigation: prisoners' rights litiga- tutional reform litiga-
tion. '4 tion. ' 41
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975)
(FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 does not apply to habeas corpus proceeding); United States ex.rel. Sero
v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1126 (2nd Cir. 1972) (while precise provisions of Rule 23 are not
applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, an analogous procedure may be employed), cert.
denied, 421 UL.S. 921 (1975). See also Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir.
1973) (class action suit may provide appropriate method to litigate a group of claims where the
class would avoid duplication of judicial effort); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (9th
Cir. 1972) (prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be treated as a class action
where relief sought is of an immediate benefit going to a large and amorphous group); Faheem-
El v. Klincar, 600 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (habeas corpus claims may be maintained
as representative actions even though they may be restricted in scope and availability); Adderly
v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 400 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (appropriate to petition for a writ as a
class action even though the Supreme Court has not yet decided this issue). The Supreme Court
has never determined whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to habeas corpus
proceedings. Schall, 467 U.S. at 261 n.10; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979);
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 30 (1976); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5, reh'g
denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969).
138. See supra note 118.
139. See supra note 119.
140. See supra notes 71-93.
141. See supra notes 94-103.
142. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 213; S. NAHMOND, supra note 16, at 28.
143. Browder v. Director, 11. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
1089 (1978). See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (Congress never contemplated that
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply to habeas corpus
proceedings), reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
in federal habeas corpus proceedings only "to the extent that the practice in such proceedings
is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice
in civil actions." FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(2). Rule 81(a)(2) recognizes the supremacy of the federal
statutory habeas corpus procedures over the Federal Rules. Browder, 434 U.S. at 267-68.
144. Blackmun, supra note 19, at 21.
145. See Zeigler, supra note 27, at 81 (reversal of a conviction under habeas corpus acts
indirectly rather than directly on prison official's treatment regarding prisoner's rights).
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SECTION 1983
Jury Trial:
Pendent Claim Jurisdic-
tion:
Plenary v. Summary
Proceeding:
Pre-Trial Discovery:
Available when "legal
relief" sought.'l
May be asserted in ac-
cordance with general
principles of pendent ju-
risdiction.'4 8
Plenary action. 5
Discovery rules are ap-
plicable."'
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HABEAS CORPUS
Not available. 47
"[S]tate law claims or-
dinarily cannot be pen-
dent to federal habeas
claims."'19
"[Tihe federal habeas
corpus statute provides
for a swift, flexible and
summary determina-
tion.""'
Discovery rules are inap-
plicable and discovery is
available only with the
court's permission.'53
146. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KiRKLIN, supra note 4, at 289-90.
147. 28 U.S.C. section 2243 (1982) provides that: "[t]he court shall summarily hear and
determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Id.
148. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (a claim may be pendent to non-
insubstantial constitutional claims). However, a state law claim that is pendent to a section
1983 claim when asserted against the state or state officials, may be defeated by the eleventh
amendment. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121-23 (1984).
149. Mosley v. Moran, 798 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Hoover v.
Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 445 (7th Cir. 1982).
150. Section 1983 authorizes the imposition of liability "in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
151. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 495 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982). A flexible approach is used for taking evidence in a habeas corpus
proceeding by utilizing oral testimony, depositions, affidavits, or written interrogatories. 28
U.S.C. § 2246 (1982). See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025
(1969). The federal habeas corpus petitioner has no absolute right to a hearing in federal court;
"[wlhere the record of the application affords an adequate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency
of the allegations and the evidence, and no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing are
presented, a repetition of the trial is not required." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463, reh'g
denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953). The Preiser court observed that section 1983 actions are "frequently
longer than a federal habeas corpus proceeding .... " Preiser, 411 U.S. at 496.
152. Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1114 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Inmates of Unit 14 v.
Rebideau, 102 F.R.D. 122, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Federal policy favors broad discovery in
civil rights actions."); Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Franken-
hauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
153. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969). In Harris, the
Court found that the discovery rules as written are ill suited to habeas corpus proceedings. Id.
at 296. Courts often disallow discovery in habeas corpus proceedings. Zeigler, supra note 27,
at 83.
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FEDERAL
SECTION 1983 HABEAS CORPUS
Release from Confine- Not available. 4  Available and is the es-
ment: sence of habeas cor-
pus. 155
Res Judicata and Collat- Applicable." 6  Not applicable.'
eral Estoppel:
Simultaneous Litigation Permitted."8s  Not permitted; full ex-
of Exhausted and Unex- haustion required." 9
hausted Claims:
chart shows that in any given case section 1983 or federal habeas corpus
may each present relative advantages and disadvantages. From an overall
standpoint, however, state prisoners and their attorneys view section 1983
as the preferred remedy. In the typical Preiser battle the prisoner advocates
the availability of section 1983, while the state claims that habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy after state claims are exhausted. '60 These battle lines
reflect that whatever advantages federal habeas corpus presents in a particular
case, they pale by comparison because of section 1983's no-exhaustion rule
and statutory fee authorization. Indeed, even though there was no fee
authority when Preiser v. Rodriguez 6' was decided, the exhaustion rule itself
caused the plaintiff prisoners to demand the availability of section 1983,
while the state urged habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: PREISER, WOLFF, AND
GERSTEIN
Despite the crucial significance of the section 1983-habeas corpus dis-
tinction, the Supreme Court has analyzed the issue in only three cases.' 62 Of
154. See cases cited in supra note 117.
155. Preiser, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
156. See supra note 128.
157. Id.
158. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499 n.14. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying test. The distinction between section 1983
and habeas corpus with respect to simultaneous litigation of exhausted and unexhausted claims
is observed in Faheem-El v. Klincar, 600 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
160. Occasionally, however, a party takes a contrary position. See, e.g., Brennan v. Cun-
ningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiff prisoner sought to employ habeas corpus while
defendant warden claimed section 1983 was proper remedy); Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150,
153 n.6 (1st Cir. 1984) (Commonwealth advocated use of section 1983 rather than a habeas
corpus petition). In Brennan, the use of habeas corpus could have protected the plaintiff from
the preclusive effect of an adverse state court judgment.
161. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
162. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1975);
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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those three cases, the Court has given it plenary consideration only once, in
Preiser v. Rodriguez.163 Preiser, however, is filled with ambiguities and
unresolved questions.
Two pre-Preiser decisions began a trend toward unclear and confusing
Supreme Court precedent in this area. In Johnson v. Avery,' 64 a prisoner
alleged in federal court that he had been transferred to a maximum security
building for violating a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from
assisting in the preparation of another inmate's legal papers. The district
court treated the prisoner's motion for law books and a typewriter as a
petition for habeas corpus, held the prison regulation void, and ordered the
prisoner released from disciplinary confinement. 65 The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, held the regulation valid and reversed the judgment of the district
court. 1 The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the state
regulation was inconsistent with the right of prisoners to petition a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court said nothing about the section
1983-habeas corpus issue and its disposition of the case stated only that
"[tihe judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."' 6 7 By not disagreeing
with the district court's procedural treatment of the case, the Supreme Court
seemed implicitly to accept its treatment of the case as a habeas corpus
proceeding.
In Wilwording v. Swenson,' 6 a prisoner challenged the living conditions
and disciplinary measures he was subjected to while he was confined in
maximum security.' 69 In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated only that
these claims are "cognizable in federal habeas corpus, ' ' 70 as well as under
section 1983, and that "[s]tate prisoners are not held to any stricter standard
of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs."',7' Neither Johnson nor
Wilwording provided assistance to lower courts to help reconcile the section
1983-habeas corpus overlap.
By the time Preiser was litigated in the lower federal courts, the section
1983-federal habeas corpus conflict had become an increasingly important
163. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
164. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
165. Id. at 484 (citing 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)).
166. Id. at 485 (citing 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967)).
167. Id. at 490.
168. 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
169. Id.
170. 404 U.S. at 251 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
171. Id. at 251 (citing Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)). The Court in Houghton
did not discuss the section 1983-federal habeas corpus issue, but assumed that a prisoner's
claim based upon the confiscation of his legal materials was a proper section 1983 claim for
which exhaustion of state remedies was not necessary. The Preiser Court, after noting that
conditions of confinement could be tested under section 1983, stated that "[tihis is not to say
that habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison conditions." 411 U.S.
at 499 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971)). See infra notes 369-96 and accompanying text.
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and recurring issue. 172 In 1971 the Second Circuit stated in Preiser that
"[s]tate prisoners are increasingly resorting to the Civil Rights statutes in
order to circumvent the [exhaustion] requirements of [the habeas corpus
statute]."' 71 When the case was reheard by the Second Circuit en banc,
Judge Mansfield lamented that "state prisoners' habeas petitions have been
dressed up in a [section] 1983 suit of clothes.' 1 74 Judge Lumbard, dissenting,
continued the play on words, stating that "it is becoming the fashion for
state prisoners to bring these [section 1983] suits.' 7 Given these concerns,
it was not surprising that the Supreme Court chose to review the issue in
Preiser.
Preiser was a case consolidated from three separate individual actions. In
two of the cases, plaintiffs Rodriguez and Kritsky claimed that they had
been deprived of good-time credits in violation of procedural due process. 76
In the third suit, plaintiff Katzoff challenged the deprivation of his good-
time credits on substantive constitutional grounds. 7 7 In each case, the district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordered the good-time credits restored,
and ordered each plaintiff released because restoring these credits had entitled
the plaintiff to immediate release. 78 After consolidating the three district
court cases and rehearing them en banc, the Second Circuit affirmed the
judgments of the district courts and found the utilization of section 1983 a
proper means of relief in each case.1 79
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, reversed the judg-
ment of the appellate court.8 0 The Court acknowledged that whether state
prisoners can utilize section 1983 "even though the federal habeas corpus
statute . . . clearly provides a specific federal remedy" is "of considerable
172. The pre-Preiser history of the section 1983-habeas corpus issue is described in Note,
Preiser v. Rodriguez in Retrospect, supra note 6, at 1054-65; Note, The Aftermath of Preiser
and Wolff, supra note 6, at 743-44; Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1365-91.
173. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971).
174. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (Mansfield, J., concurring),
cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972), rev'd sub nom. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
175. Id. at 86 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
176. Plaintiff Rodriguez alleged "that he had received no notice or hearing on the charges
for which he had ostensibly been punished. Thus, he contended that he had been deprived of
his good-conduct-time credits without due process of law." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 478. Similarly,
plaintiff Kritsky alleged "that his summary punishment had deprived him of his good-time
credits without due process of law." Id. at 481.
177. Plaintiff Katzoff claimed that he had been unconstitutionally deprived of good-time
credits for making derogatory comments about prison officials in his diary. Preiser, 411 U.S.
at 480.
178. The district court proceedings in the three cases are summarized in Preiser, 411 U.S. at
477-88.
179. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc). The Second Circuit relied
upon Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) for its conclusion that section 1983 applied
to plaintiffs' claims.
180. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined.
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practical importance" because of the different exhaustion rules attached to
the two remedies. I'l The Court then described the specific issue to be resolved:
may state prisoners who have challenged the duration of their confinement
on grounds of an unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, where
restoration of those credits would result in their immediate or speedier release,
seek equitable relief pursuant to section 1983, or are they limited to the
specific remedy of habeas corpus?'82 The Court ruled that when state pri-
soners challenge the very fact or duration of their imprisonment, seeking the
determination that they are entitled to immediate or speedier release from
that imprisonment, their sole federal remedy is habeas corpus. 83 Thus, the
Court held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy when a state prisoner
(1) challenges the fact or duration of confinement and (2) seeks immediate
or speedier release.
The Preiser Court reasoned that when a claim comes within the literal
terms of both section 1983 and federal habeas corpus, Congress must have
intended that the "specific" federal habeas corpus statute would control
over the "general" section 1983 remedy and become the "exclusive" federal
remedy. 84 According to the Court, this furthers congressional intent by
preventing state prisoners from circumventing the federal habeas corpus
exhaustion requirement by the simple expedient of labeling a claim under
section 1983 that is actually within the scope of habeas corpus.,85
Given this analysis, the critical determination is whether or not the state
prisoner's claims are within the scope of federal habeas corpus. The Preiser
Court, however, did not definitively resolve this issue, but limited its dis-
cussion primarily to claims that come within the "essence," "core," or
"heart" of habeas corpus. 8 The essence of habeas corpus, as the Court
saw it, is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody,
and the writ's traditional function is to secure release from that illegal
custody. 8 7 Under this formulation, the claims of the plaintiffs in Preiser fell
squarely within the "core" of habeas corpus because, by contesting the
181. Id. at 477.
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 500.
184. Id. at 489. This aspect of Preiser is cited frequently for the principle of statutory
construction that where two statutes are in potential conflict the more specific statute controls
over the more general. See Block v. North Dakota ex ret. Bd. of Univ. and School, 461 U.S.
273, 285 (1983); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 n.77 (1980); Busic v. United States,
446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978); Brown v. General
Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976).
185. Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A primary concern underlying
the Preiser decision is the prevention of 'end-runs' around the requirement that state prisoners
exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.").
186. 411 U.S. at 484, 489, 498.
187. Id. at 484. The Preiser Court stated that while there are several forms of habeas corpus,
it was concerned only with the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is
the writ used to inquire into the legality of detention in order to determine whether the petitioner
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deprivation of good-time credits, the prisoners had attacked the legality of
their custody and claimed entitlement to release from confinement."'8 The
plaintiffs were thus required to proceed pursuant to the federal habeas corpus
statute which required that they exhaust the adequate state remedies available
in state courts.18 9
In Preiser, the plaintiffs were contesting administrative, not judicial, ac-
tion. The issue thus became whether or not the prisoners were required to
exhaust their state administrative remedies before they sought relief in federal
court. While the state argued that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
required,190 the plaintiffs countered that the statutory exhaustion requirement
had generally been construed by courts to apply to attacks on state court
convictions in order to avoid friction with state judicial systems, not admin-
istrative systems) 9' The Court rejected that contention and concluded that
the exhaustion requirement extended to state administrative challenges 192 and
required that both "the state prison administration and the state courts" be
given "the opportunity to correct the errors committed in the State's own
prisons . . . ."191 Strong considerations of comity require giving a state
judicial system the first opportunity to correct its own errors. These consid-
erations also require giving states the first opportunity to correct errors made
in the internal administration of prisons.'9 States have a strong interest in
should be released. Id. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 393 n.5 (1963) (habeas corpus has
other functions besides inquiry into illegal detention in order to seek a prisoner's release and
Blackstone names four such functions: habeas corpus ad respondendum; ad satisfaciendum; ad
prosequendum, testificandum, deliberendum; ad faciendum et recipiendum). The Court gave
several examples of the use of the writ to challenge the legality of detention:
whether the petitioner's challenge to his custody is that the statute under which he
stands convicted is unconstitutional, as in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)
... ; that he is unlawfully confined in the wrong institution, as in In re Bonner,
1451 U.S. 242 (1894), and Humphry v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); that he was
denied his constitutional rights at trial, as in Johnson v. Zerbst, [304 U.S. 458
(1938)]; that his guilty plea was invalid, as in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708
(1948); that he is being unlawfully detained by the Executive or the military, as in
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); or that his parole was unlawfully revoked,
causing him to be reincarcerated in prison, as in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972)-in each case his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical
restraint, and in each case habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument
to obtain release from such confinement.
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486.
188. 411 U.S. at 487.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1982) (applicant has not
exhausted his state court remedies if he has right under state law to raise question presented).
190. Brief for Petitioners at 30-32, 41, Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972).
191. Brief for Respondents at 12-13, Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972).
192. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
193. Id. at 497.
194. Id. at 492. The lower courts read Preiser as to require the exhaustion of state admin-
istrative remedies. Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085
(1981); Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979);
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administering their prisons, and because most potential litigation involving
state prisoners arises out of daily occurrences in state prisons, those claims
may be most efficiently and properly handled by state administrative bodies
and state courts. State agencies and courts are, for the most part, familiar
with the grievances of state prisoners and, according to Preiser, are better
able to deal with those grievances, both physically and practically.195
The Preiser Court's determinations that habeas corpus is the appropriate
vehicle to seek restoration of good-time credits, and that the exhaustion
requirement encompasses administrative remedies, were sufficient to resolve
the controversies before the Court. Had the Court stopped there, much of
the later ambiguity may have been avoided. The Court, however, went
further and in dicta discussed several other issues. Those statements, while
incomplete and in some respects unclear, have had considerable influence
on the lower federal courts in five recurring situations.
(1) Requests for speedier release: The Court observed that even if the
petitioners had not been entitled to immediate release, but only to shorter
terms of confinement in prison, habeas corpus would have been the appro-
priate and exclusive remedy because their claims would still be "within the
core of habeas corpus in attacking the very duration of their physical
confinement itself."' ' A prisoner's attack on either the fact or the duration
of confinement is within the "core" of habeas corpus because the attack
goes directly to the constitutionality of his or her physical confinement and
seeks either immediate release or the shortening of the confinement.197 This
dicta in Preiser became law in the Court's subsequent decision in Wolff v.
McDonnell. 9
McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 361 n.l (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980).
The Fifth Circuit construed Preiser to mean that "not only state habeas remedies but federal
ones as well must be exhausted before a Section 1983 action based upon them may proceed."
Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986); Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983);
Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 1981). Neither section 2254 nor Preiser,
however, requires the exhaustion of federal remedies.
195. 411 U.S. at 492. The Court observed that "[w]hat for a private citizen would be a
dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his
banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State." Id. States have argued that, in
most instances, state judicial facilities are closer to the state prison where the prisoner is confined
than the nearest federal court is. Therefore, the state court is in a better position to insure
greater cooperation by state personnel, such as sheriffs and prison officials, than the federal
courts. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring). See also id. at 86 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (hearing in state court is less expensive
than in federal court because prisoners are not moved as far and there is less risk of escape).
196. 411 U.S. at 487-88. The Court relied in part upon the holding in Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54 (1968) "that a prisoner may attack on habeas the second of two consecutive sentences
while still serving the first." 411 U.S. at 487.
197. 411 U.S. at 489.
198. 418 U.S. 539, 553-54 (1974). See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Wolff.
[Vol. 37:85
THE PREISER PUZZLE
(2) Challenges to convictions and sentences: Plaintiffs' counsel conceded
in Preiser that state prisoners challenging their convictions and sentences on
federal constitutional grounds are limited to a habeas corpus proceeding,
following exhaustion of adequate state remedies, and that section 1983 cannot
be utilized.199 The Court accepted that concession, stating that a challenge
to a conviction is at the "core of habeas corpus . . . . 20 Although the
Preiser Court stated that a challenge to a conviction or sentence that seeks
either immediate or speedier release may be made only in a habeas corpus
proceeding, it did not specifically discuss, nor did it ever resolve, whether a
challenge to a conviction or sentence may be made in a civil rights action
when a prisoner does not seek immediate or speedier release from confine-
ment, as where a prisoner seeks damages for an unconstitutional conviction
or sentence.
201
(3) Challenges to conditions of confinement: The Preiser Court stated that
a section 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who makes a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of prison life, but not to the fact
or length of his or her custody. 20 2 Other than providing four examples of
cases involving challenges to prison conditions, 20 3 the Court provided no
guidance to help lower courts define what a condition of prison life is. For
example, does a challenge to a condition of prison life include an alleged
denial of a hearing procedure? 2°4 Is a claim that a prisoner is confined in
the wrong institution a challenge to prison conditions? 205 The Court's failure
to define a challenge to prison conditions has contributed to the difficulties
in resolving some of the section 1983-habeas corpus conflicts.
(4) Claims for damages: The Court indicated that a prisoner's claim for
damages would be within the scope of section 1983 because a state prisoner
seeking damages is attacking something other than the fact or length of the
confinement, and is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy
release. 2°0 Habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy
199. 411 U.S. at 489.
200. Id. See also id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (similarly, where prisoners allege that
deprivation of good conduct time will cause them to be in confinement past conditional release
date, claim falls within "core" of habeas corpus).
201. The issue was left open in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). See also Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court has never expressly
decided whether and in what circumstances § 1983 can be invoked to attack collaterally criminal
convictions."). The issue has generated a good amount of lower court litigation. See infra notes
291-317 and accompanying text.
202. 411 U.S. at 499.
203. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (solitary confinement; damages sought); Wil-
wording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (living conditions and disciplinary measures while in
maximum security); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (confiscation of legal materials);
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (claimed right to purchase religious publications).
204. See infra notes 421-35 and accompanying text discussing prisoner procedural due process
claims.
205. See infra notes 397-420 and accompanying text.
206. 411 U.S. at 494.
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for damages. 20 7 Thus, Preiser states that a state prisoner's damages claim
may be brought under section 1983 without any requirement that the prisoner
exhaust state remedies. 20 1
Preiser, however, does not resolve whether all state prisoner damage claims
may be brought under section 1983, including those that grow out of the
fact or duration of confinement, or only those based upon challenges to the
conditions of confinement. The Preiser Court, for example, left open whether
or not a section 1983 claim for damages may be based upon an unconsti-
tutional conviction or sentence 2°9 or the denial of good-time credits. 210 More-
over, Preiser does not resolve the fundamental issue of whether or not the
nature of a prisoner's claim, the relief sought, or both, determine whether
a claim may be asserted under section 1983. The Supreme Court's failure to
determine this issue leaves a major deficiency in its decisional law and is a
prime reason for the lower courts' frustrations. 211
(5) Multiple claims: The Preiser Court stated that when a state prisoner
asserts multiple claims, one or more of which are properly within section
1983, the prisoner may assert the section 1983 claim in federal court at the
same time he or she exhausts state remedies on the habeas corpus claim.
The Court provided the following example:
If a prisoner seeks to attack both the conditions of his confinement and
the fact or length of that confinement, his later claim . . . is cognizable
only in federal habeas corpus, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion
of state remedies. But . . . that holding in no way precludes him from
simultaneously litigating in federal court, under [section] 1983, his claim
relating to the conditions of his confinement. 2'2
The Supreme Court applied this dicta in Wolff v. McDonnell'3 and it
generally has been followed by the lower federal courts. When a state prisoner
alleges "simultaneous claims," the federal courts typically allow litigation
of the section 1983 civil rights claim, while dismissing or continuing the
habeas corpus claim because this claim requires a prisoner to exhaust state
remedies. 1 4
207. Id. (emphasis in original).
208. Id.
209. See supra note 201, and infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 14.
212. 411 U.S. at 499 n.14. See also id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under [the
majority's] approach, state correctional authorities have no added incentive to withdraw good-
time credits, since that action cannot, standing alone, keep the prisoner out of federal court.").
213. 418 U.S. 539, 553-54 (1974). See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
214. Faheem-El v. Klincar, 814 F.2d 461, 465 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird
Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1984); Moorish Science Temple of Am.
v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1982); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. Unit
A June 1981) ("The failure to exhaust state remedies provides a proper basis for dismissing
some, but not all, of Tarter's claims."); Delaney v. Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir.
Unit A Jan. 1981); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
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Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Preiser criticized the Court for
creating "a perplexing set of uncertainties and anomalies." 215 The decision,
Brennan stated, was unmanageable because the "new-found" concept of
"core of habeas corpus" is essentially "ethereal. ' 216 Moreover, the majority's
holding that the federal habeas corpus statute required exhaustion of state
administrative remedies, in addition to the exhaustion of state judicial rem-
edies, ignores the fact that the principle of federalism embodied in the habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement is designed to protect the orderly administra-
tion of state judicial systems.2 17
Justice Brennan predicted that the Court's decision would result in "ex-
treme inefficiency" because many prisoners' claims would be under simul-
944 (1977); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d
385, 386, adhered to, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Shaw v.
Briscoe, 526 F.2d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); Henderson v.
Secretary of Corrections, 518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1975); Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381
(10th Cir. 1975); Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Faheem-El. v. Klincar,
600 F. Supp. 1029, 1033-34 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (N.D.
Iil. 1981); Godbolt v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Servs., 524 F. Supp. 21, 22-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Winsett v. McGinnes, 425 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1976). See also Wiggins v.
New Mexico Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1981) (fact that plaintiff did
not combine section 1983 claim for damages with federal habeas corpus proceeding does not
mean he cannot raise damages claim in independent section 1983 action), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
840 (1982). But see Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1986) (no abuse of
discretion for district court to stay action pending final resolution in state court of attack on
conviction and sentence where the complaint set forth "a confusing congeries of claims .... );
Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 571 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985) ("When
challenge is made to a conviction in a criminal case, even though accompanied by civil rights
claims, exhaustion of remedies is required."); Doe v. Russotti, 503 F. Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (entire action dismissed where section 1983 claim found "incidental" to attack on guilty
plea; dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted);
Wallace v. Hewitt, 428 F. Supp. 39, 42 n.7 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (limiting footnote 14 of Preiser
to cases in which the legality of confinement could not be litigated in state court). For the
simultaneous claim doctrine to apply, at least one of the prisoner's claims must, of course, be
a proper section 1983 claim. Difficulties are thus presented when a claim for damages does not
arise from the conditions of confinement but relates to the fact or duration of confinement.
Compare Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (damages claim may not
be litigated as simultaneous claim when it grows out of conviction) with Harper v. Jeffries,
808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986) (where prisoner seeks release from confinement and damages,
damages claim should not be dismissed but should be stayed until state remedies exhausted).
On the question of whether the appropriateness of utilizing section 1983 should depend upon
the nature of the claim or the nature of the relief, see infra notes 237-48 and accompanying
text. On the general question of whether dismissal or continuance is the proper disposition
when a court requires exhaustion of state remedies, see infra notes 552-58 and accompanying
text.
215. 411 U.S. at 506 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The decision in Preiser has provoked wide-
spread criticism. Flannery, Habeas Corpus, supra note 6; Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of
Habeas Corpus", supra note 6; Comment, New Barrier to Federal Court Review, supra note
6; Note, A Comparison, supra note 6; Comment, Section 1983 - Habeas Corpus, supra note
6; Comment, State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 6.
216. 411 U.S. at 506 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 519-22 (emphasis added).
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taneous consideration in two forums, even though the same questions of
fact and law are involved in both proceedings. 218 This in turn would have
serious res judicata consequences, 2 9 the ramifications of which the majority
failed to consider. In addition, Brennan believed the decision created an
"anomaly":
If the prisoner is confined in an institution that does not offer good-time
credits, and therefore cannot withdraw them, his prison-conditions claims
could always be raised in a suit under [section) 1983. On the other hand,
an inmate in an institution that uses good-time credits as reward and
punishment, who seeks a federal hearing on the identical legal and factual
claims, would normally be required to exhaust state remedies and then
proceed by way of federal habeas corpus. The rationality of that difference
in treatment is certainly obscure. Yet that is the price of permitting the
availability of a federal forum to be controlled by the happenstance (or
stratagem) that good-time credits are at stake. 220
Justice Brennan believed that the federal habeas corpus exhaustion re-
quirement was limited to those instances in which a prisoner's claim related
to the conviction or sentence or would otherwise "interrupt a state proceeding
or jeopardize the orderly administration of state judicial business." '22' By
contrast, prisoners' attacks on state administrative actions were "the stereo-
typical situation in which relief under [section] 1983 is authorized. '222
The Supreme Court further addressed the section 1983-habeas corpus
issue in Wolff v. McDonnell. 23 The plaintiffs in Wolff raised a number of
legal claims, but the one that provoked discussion of the Preiser issue was
the prisoners' claim that due process required certain procedures in prison
disciplinary cases that could result in the forfeiture of good-time credits.
The complaint was filed under section 1983 and sought the following relief:
(1) restoration of good-time credits; (2) submission of a plan by prison
authorities for hearing procedures under the due process clause whenever
the possibility of withholding or forfeiture of good-time credits existed; and
(3) damages for civil rights deprivations resulting from the use of the allegedly
unconstitutional procedures .224
The Court analyzed each form of relief separately. The section 1983 claim
for the restoration of good-time credits sought speedier release and was thus
"foreclosed under Preiser.' z22  The claim for damages, however, could be
asserted under section 1983 because "Preiser expressly contemplated that
claims properly brought under § 1983 could go forward while actual resto-
218. Id. at 511.
219. Id. Justice Brennan observed that a ruling in either the state or federal court proceeding
might be binding in the other. Id. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974).
220. 411 U.S. at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at 521.
222. Id. at 522.
223. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
224. Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).
225. Id. at 554.
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ration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. ' 226 While some
lower courts and commentators have expressed confusion as to whether the
prisoner was seeking damages for the denial of good-time credits or for the
denial of procedural due process rights, 227 the decision states that the damages
were sought for the "deprivation of civil rights resulting from the use of
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures' 228 and that the damages claim
"required determination of the validity of the procedures employed for
imposing sanctions, including loss of good time .. *229
After recognizing that Preiser would not bar a declaratory judgment
regarding the procedural due process requirements as a predicate to a dam-
ages award, 230 the Wolff Court moved to the plaintiffs' claim for prospective
equitable relief. The Court concluded that Preiser would not preclude a
section 1983 litigant "from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise
proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison
regulations." ' 23' This sentence is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be
read as a relatively narrow rule pursuant to which a claim for prospective
relief enjoining an invalid procedural prison regulation lies under section
1983, provided that the claim is considered ancillary to (presumably) a claim
for monetary relief. On the other hand, the sentence could be read as broadly
announcing that when a claim for prospective relief is ancillary to a claim
for monetary relief, prospective relief may be sought under section 1983 to
enjoin the enforcement of any invalid prison regulation, and not just those
that violate procedural due process requirements.
Both the limited and broad aspects of the Court's pronouncement seem
unwarranted. First, there was no reason to limit the holding regarding
prospective relief to ancillary claims. Under the Preiser analysis, if an
inmate's claim is not within the core of habeas corpus and is within the
scope of section 1983, it may be asserted under section 1983 regardless of
whether it is "ancillary" to another section 1983 claim. Second, it was
inappropriate for the Wolff Court to broadly sanction the use of section
1983 to enjoin all invalid prison regulations, because at this point in its
opinion the Court was concerned only with the plaintiffs' attack on prison
regulations on procedural due process grounds. Moreover, read literally, the
226. Id. At this point, the Court cited to footnote 14 in Preiser, dealing with the simultaneous
litigation of section 1983 claims while state remedies are being exhausted on habeas claims. The
Court stated in its own footnote that "[olne would anticipate that normal principles of res
judicata would apply in such circumstances." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554 n.12.
227. See infra note 367 for competing authorities.
228. Wolff 418 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). Damages may be awarded for procedural due
process violations in accordance with the principles set forth in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978).
229. 418 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added). Most lower federal courts have read Wolff to
authorize a section 1983 damages claim for a procedural due process violation. See infra cases
cited in note 297.
230. 418 U.S. at 555.
231. Id.
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Court's holding would encompass even those prison regulations that affect
the fact or duration of confinement and thereby sanction the use of section
1983 in cases that the Preiser Court determined to be within the core of
habeas corpus.
The Wolff Court, therefore, should have refrained from interjecting the
concept of "ancillary claims" into the opinion and should have ruled spe-
cifically and clearly that section 1983 is available when a prisoner seeks to
enjoin allegedly invalid prison regulations on procedural due process grounds
and seeks neither immediate nor speedier release. There is some indication
that this is what the Court in fact intended. The Court stated that it was
proper for the lower courts to determine the validity of procedures revoking
good-time credits and fashion appropriate remedies for any constitutional
violations, "short of ordering the actual restoration of good-time already
cancelled.' '232
The only other Supreme 'Court decision to resolve a Preiser issue is the
Court's 1975 decision in Gerstein v. Pugh.233 In that case, the plaintiffs were
pre-trial detainees who claimed, under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments, that they could not be detained without a judicial determination of
probable cause and an opportunity to contest that determination. They
sought injunctive and declaratory relief. In a terse footnote the Court, citing
Preiser and Wolff, ruled that these claims were within the scope of section
1983:
[Plaintiffs]-respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even
as an alternative remedy. They asked only that state authorities be ordered
to give them a probable cause determination. This was also the only relief
that the District Court ordered for the named respondents. Because release
was neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.21,
Gerstein thus seems to be consistent with a reading of Wolff that allows a
prisoner to contest under section 1983 the procedures that are required by
the United States Constitution, so long as neither immediate nor speedier
release is sought.
The Supreme Court decisions in Preiser, Wolff, and Gerstein surprisingly
resolve few issues regarding the section 1983-federal habeas corpus conflict.
A combined reading of the three decisions leads to the following conclusions
when state prisoners assert federal constitutional claims: (1) requests for
immediate or speedier release may be asserted only in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding after adequate state remedies are exhausted; (2) conditions of
confinement may be contested under section 1983; (3) at least some claims
for damages may be asserted under section 1983; (4) at least some procedural
due process claims that seek relief other than immediate or speedier release
may be asserted under section 1983.
232. Id. (footnote omitted).
233. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
234. Id. at 107 n.6 (citation omitted).
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IV. THREE UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Preiser, Wolff, and Gerstein left many specific issues unresolved. Given
the variety of prisoners' claims before the federal courts, 235 this is not
unusual. What is unusual is that fifteen years after Preiser, many funda-
mental aspects of the relationship between section 1983 and federal habeas
corpus still remain unresolved. This is unfortunate because lower courts need
guidance on the fundamental issues in order to untangle many of the specific
nuances 236
The most critical issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court is whether
the section 1983-habeas corpus issue should be resolved on the basis of the
nature of a prisoner's claim, the specific relief requested, or both. The great
weight of authority, following the Fifth Circuit's lead, holds that the pro-
priety of utilizing section 1983 may not be determined solely on the basis of
the relief sought, and that habeas corpus is the exclusive initial remedy where
the cause of action contests the validity of a prisoner's confinement. 237 In
the most prevalent application of this principle, courts commonly hold that
a claim for damages based upon an allegedly unconstitutional conviction
may not be asserted under section 1983 without satisfying the state exhaustion
235. See generally I. SENSENICH, supra note 10.
236. See infra notes 268-531 and accompanying text for discussion of the specific issues.
237. The Fifth Circuit cases include Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The relief sought by the prisoner or
the label he places upon the action is not the governing factor."); Williams v. Dallas County
Comm'rs, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Richardson v.
Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
Unit A June 1981); Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Delaney v.
Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir. 1979); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Richardson, 556 F.2d
332 (5th Cir. 1977); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1977); Grundstrom v. Darnell,
531 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d. 385 (5th Cir.). adhered to, 550
F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). In its most recent decision
on this issue, the court stated that because the Preiser issue "cannot be determined on the basis
of the relief nominally sought," the Fifth Circuit has focused on the "'scope of the relief'
actually sought." Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.
1987). Other cases reaching this result include Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987);
Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1986); Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986); McKinnis v. Mosley, 693
F.2d 1054 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 911 (1982); Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The district court
correctly focused on the nature of the complaint rather than the relief sought .... "); Johnson
v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1979); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash.
1983); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984); Thibadoux v. Jones, 505 F. Supp.
1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980).
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requirement. As a corollary principle, "habeas corpus is the exclusive initial
cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of
the state court conviction. 2 3
The focus on the nature of the claim rather than on the relief sought is
a result of the courts' desire to prevent state prisoners from circumventing
the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. 239 If courts were to de-
termine the proper course of action by focusing solely on the type of relief
the plaintiff requested, state prisoners would be able to attack their convic-
tions or sentences under section 1983 without exhausting state remedies by
simply seeking a form of relief other than release from confinement, such
as damages.214 A favorable federal court ruling on the damages claim could
then be used to obtain release in a collateral state court proceeding because
the state court would be bound by the federal ruling under normal principles
of res judicata. 24' 1 This stratagem would undermine the federal habeas corpus
exhaustion requirement. 24 2
There are a few decisions that either explicitly or implicitly focus on the
specific relief requested rather than on the nature of the prisoner's claim. 243
238. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc). See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
239. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982);
Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F.
Supp. 1144, 1147-48 (W.D. Va. 1980).
240. See Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911
(1982) ("Indeed, to hold otherwise [,i.e., allow the nature of the relief sought to control] would
be to substantially undermine the exhaustion of remedies requirement, for anyone who could
state a viable civil rights claim could subvert it by postponing a claim for release until his
substantive rights had been adjudicated in a federal forum.").
241. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F.
Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D.N.J. 1981).
Federal court judgments are entitled to preclusive effect in the state courts and "the decisions
that focus directly on the effects of federal question judgments leave no doubt that federal
rules measure at least most res judicata questions." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468, at 656 (1981). "There would be no authority under
which a person serving a term in a prison resulting from the criminal conviction could be
retained in custody under that conviction once there was an authoritative determination that
the conviction could not stand." Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 157 (5th Cir. Unit
A Mar. 1981). See also Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 533 (1988) (White, J., concurring)
("A judgment in the federal damages action may decide several questions at issue in the state
criminal proceeding.").
242. Note, The Aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, supra note 6, at 763. Another reason that
has been given for not focusing on the relief requested is that "[a] federal court has the inherent
power to fashion appropriate relief" and "is not constrained by the pleader's request for
relief." Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982).
While this principle is generally correct, FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c), it has little relevance in the
present context since a federal court has no power to order release under section 1983. See
supra note 117 and accompanying text.
243. Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1171
n. 1 (11th Cir. 1985) (although plaintiff complained about manner in which conviction was
obtained, section 1983 was proper because plaintiff "d[id] not ask for reversal of his conviction
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The main justification for relying upon the relief requested is that Preiser,
Wolff, and Gerstein appear to take this approach. 2" Even putting aside the
fact that allowing the form of relief to control would enable prisoners to
sidestep the exhaustion requirement, there is a pragmatic difficulty in fo-
cusing on the specific relief requested. The great majority of section 1983
prisoner cases are brought pro se.245 Many pro se complaints are unclear
and confusing 2" and it is not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to
determine what relief a prisoner is seeking. 2417 In one case, for example, the
district court upon considering a prisoner's confusing pro se complaint stated:
."); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984); Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 694
F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982), subsequent history, 769 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1065 (1986) (section 1983 found proper because plaintiff did not ask for release); Love v.
Black, 597 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Coleman v. Stanziani, 570 F. Supp. 679, 682-84
(E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal dismissed, 735 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984);
Robinson v. Commissioner of Jurors, 419 F. Supp. 1189, 1190 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also
Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 34-36 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., dissenting) (Preiser's rule of
exhaustion of remedies inapplicable where plaintiff brings action for damages), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 911 (1982). Despite the decisions in Lumbert and Walker, which appear to focus on
the relief sought, later Seventh Circuit decisions "decline ... to determine the applicability of
Preiser solely by reference to the relief sought rather than by reference to the nature of the
claim." Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). See also
Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must first exhaust state court remedies
when core of claim for damages concerns the fact or duration of confinement).
244. See Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 33-36 (4th Cir. 1981) (Winter, J., dissenting ),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Coleman v. Stanziani, 570 F. Supp. 679, 682-84 (E.D. Pa.
1983), appeal dismissed, 735 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
245. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits In the Federal
Courts, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 610, 617 (1979).
246. A federal magistrate has observed that "inmates commonly file suit in manuscript on
strange paper." D. Bagwell, "Prisoner Petitions [sic]" in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits:
Substance and Procedure in §1983 and §2254 Cases Brought by Inmates, 4 (1983) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Bagwell].
247. Magistrate Bagwell has observed that "[demands for relief in prisoner §1983 cases are
notoriously unlawyerlike (one in my court once demanded: 'Let me out and give me a ticket
to California!'). It is usually impossible to tell from the demand for relief whether the case
seeks legal or equitable relief .... Bagwell, supra note 246, at 26. See Serio v. Members of
Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 506
(5th Cir. 1986); Moorish Science Temple of Am. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1982); Richards
v. New York, 597 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1066 (1986); Thibadoux v. Jones, 505 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(memorandum decision). In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court observed that
"U]ails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are
totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence
is limited." Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). Undoubtedly, at least in part because of this sad
reality, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule that prisoner pro se complaints are held "to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers .... Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972). Accord Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10
(1980) ("Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.").
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[Tihe best judgement I can make ... is [that] the plaintiff is seeking a
declaration of an earlier determination of his jail term, and although he
alleges he is entitled to damages for false imprisonment, it seems clear the
plaintiff actually seeks an earlier release from confinement. 14
The second major issue the Supreme Court decisions leave unresolved is
whether section 1983 may be used to attack a conviction when federal habeas
corpus is not available because, for example, the individual commencing the
proceeding is not in custody. The issue arises most frequently in cases
involving "fine only" convictions and in cases where a state criminal defen-
dant's sentence has expired by the time the federal proceeding is com-
menced . 9 Lower court decisions conflict on whether section 1983 may be
utilized when habeas corpus is unavailable. Some courts have held that
Congress intended habeas corpus to provide the exclusive federal remedy for
those seeking to attack state court judgments of convictions. Therefore,
"convictions not subject to question in habeas are immune from collateral
inquiry by the federal courts. ' 250 Other courts, however, have held that
Preiser was based upon the necessity of reconciling competing, overlapping
remedies. Further, when federal habeas corpus is not an available remedy,
a claim may be asserted under section 1983 if the claim comes within its
contours. 25' While the issue is one of congressional intent, there is no
indication that Congress actually considered the issue when either the federal
habeas corpus statute or section 1983 were enacted. 252
248. Thibadoux v. Jones, 505 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (memorandum decision). In
a case involving "a confusing congeries of claims laid in one complaint," the Fifth Circuit
"perceive[d] no obligation on the part of the busy trial judge to pick through such a mass of
ambiguous matter, sorting out one type of claim from the other, and in effect acting as counsel
for the pro se litigant in tailoring his claims, some for disposition, some for abeyance or
dismissal." Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1986).
249. See infra notes 319-45 and accompanying text.
250. Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979).
Accord Waste Management of Wis. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1060 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981) (habeas corpus is the exclusive federal route to
collateral attack of state court convictions).
251. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d
70 (4th Cir. 1983); Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 909 (1982); Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Brown v. Nutsch,
619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980) (section 1983 may be employed to attack extradition). Some
support for this position may be gleaned from the Supreme Court's statement in Preiser that
in the cases cited by the dissenting opinion dealing with section 1983 challenges to administrative
action, namely Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), "[N]o other, more specific federal
statute was involved that might have reflected a different congressional intent." 411 U.S. at
492-93 n.10. By contrast, the Court observed that the prisoners' claims in Preiser "fell squarely
within the traditional purpose of federal habeas corpus, and Congress has made the specific
determination in § 2254(b) that requiring the exhaustion of adequate state remedies in such
cases will best serve the policies of federalism." Id.
252. Pueschel v. Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Conn. 1974) (referring to the "absence
of helpful legislative history").
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A third major issue the Supreme Court has failed to resolve is whether
habeas corpus and section 1983 might both be available in some instances.
Preiser and Wolff establish that when a prisoner's claim is within the "core"
of habeas corpus, because he seeks immediate or speedier release, habeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy. But the Court has not considered the import
of finding a prisoner's claim within the scope, though not necessarily at the
core, of habeas corpus. Will the availability of habeas corpus always preclude
resort to section 1983? If the Court's primary concern is to insure that the
federal habeas exhaustion requirement is not circumvented, section 1983
should be unavailable whenever a claim comes within federal habeas corpus.
Nevertheless, there is dicta in Preiser indicating that both remedies might be
available to contest conditions of confinement.25 3 In addition, the Wolff
Court stated that there are circumstances where the same violation of con-
stitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief. 254
In prison condition cases, courts have established that section 1983 is
available to contest conditions of confinement, but whether habeas corpus
is also available is less clear.2 51 In this situation, therefore, the question is
not whether the availability of federal habeas corpus precludes resort to
section 1983, but simply whether federal habeas corpus is an alternative
remedy to section 1983 .256 The issue of dual remedies also arises in prison
transfer cases, though not in the same manner as the prison condition cases.
In this situation, the decisions establish that habeas corpus is available when
an inmate contests a prison transfer or seeks transfer to a different institution,
but it is unclear whether section 1983 is available as well. 257
The Supreme Court's failure to resolve the three fundamental issues
discussed in this section has contributed significantly to the difficulties that
lower courts continue to experience in attempting to resolve many of the
specific Preiser issues. Before turning to the specific issues, however, a
discussion of the relationship between the federal habeas corpus exhaustion
requirement and the doctrine of Younger v. Harris25s abstention is necessary.
Each of these doctrines relies heavily upon similar principles of federalism
and comity. Because of this connection, federal courts asked to resolve
difficult section 1983-habeas corpus questions, for which Supreme Court
253. 411 U.S. at 499. The availability of section 1983 "is not to say that habeas corpus may
not also be available to challenge such prison conditions." Id.
254. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579. Following this sentence, the Court cited three cases preceded
by the signal "Cf.", namely Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972), and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
See also Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 204 (7th Cir. 1986) (claim that the reasons given
for parole denial are too broad "may be raised in 1983 litigation as well as habeas corpus").
255. See infra notes 384-96 and accompanying text.
256. Justice Brennan has taken the position that a state prisoner who attacks the conditions
of confinement may utilize section 1983 or federal habeas corpus. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 504-08
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. See infra notes 397-420 and accompanying text.
258. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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precedent is either non-existent or ambiguous, often rely upon a combined
reading of the principles and rationales of Preiser and Younger.259
V. THE YOUNGER-PREISER CONNECTION-DOUBLE BARREL
COMITY
The Court made clear in Preiser that comity, which requires a "proper
respect for state functions," underlies both the exhaustion rule in state
prisoner federal habeas corpus proceedings and the Younger abstention
doctrine. 260 The Younger doctrine generally forbids a federal court from
granting relief that interferes with a pending state court criminal proceed-
ing. 261 Underlying the doctrine is the federalism notion that national govern-
ment will fare best if states are allowed to carry out their judicial functions
free from federal court interference. 262 Younger abstention assumes that a
federal constitutional claim may be litigated as effectively in the pending
state court proceeding as it would be in a federal court proceeding. This
assumption is made because state courts are obligated to enforce the United
States Constitution and are presumed to be as competent as the federal
judiciary to do So. 2 63
In the typical Younger situation, the federal court plaintiff seeks injunctive
or declaratory relief against a pending state criminal proceeding. The Su-
preme Court has determined that the Younger doctrine also applies when
state court proceedings have been completed and the relief sought in federal
court would overturn the state court judgment. In these circumstances "an
entire trial has already taken place" and federal relief would be a "direct
aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts. ' 264
259. See infra note 265.
260. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). See also
Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 551, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1982) (state may therefore waive the
exhaustion requirement).
261. The doctrine is fully applicable in federal court section 1983 actions. Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972). The Supreme Court has not limited the reach of Younger abstention to
state court criminal proceedings and has applied it to a variety of state court civil proceedings
where the state was either a party or had important interests. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 107 S.
Ct. 1519 (1987); Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423
(1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, reh'g denied, 421 U.S.
971 (1975). The Court recently extended the Younger doctrine to quasi-judicial state adminis-
trative proceedings that implicate important state interests. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986). While there are exceptions to the Younger doctrine,
they are quite narrow. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at § 12.9. For an extensive
criticism of the Younger doctrine, see Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in
Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987.
262. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
263. See supra note 54.
264. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975). See
also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). Of course, once the state criminal
proceeding goes to judgment, res judicata or collateral estoppel may bar a federal section 1983
claim. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See supra note 127.
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The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether the Younger doctrine could
also serve to bar a section 1983 action for damages for alleged constitutional
violations arising out of a state criminal proceeding.2 61
In attempting to resolve section 1983-federal habeas corpus conflicts,
federal courts commonly rely upon the principles and rationale underlying
the Younger doctrine or upon a combined reading of Preiser and Younger.266
They do this largely because many state prisoner claims, even if they could
be said to be outside the scope of federal habeas corpus and within section
1983, are defeated by application of the Younger doctrine if the relief
requested involves federal court intrusion into state criminal proceedings.
267
The potential interplay between the principles and rationale of Preiser and
Younger must thus be kept in mind in order to determine the appropriate
disposition of many of the difficult section 1983-federal habeas corpus
controversies.
VI. THE SPECIFIC ISSUES-PREISER IN THE LOWER COURTS
The lower court Preiser cases are difficult to classify. The section 1983-
habeas corpus issue arises in such varied contexts that not all cases fit neatly
into discrete compartments. Moreover, the Supreme Court's failure to de-
termine whether the dispositive factor is the nature of the claim or the nature
of the relief sought, and the disagreement and confusion on this point in
the lower courts, 26 make it impossible to group the cases solely by reference
to these factors.
265. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523 (1988); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923-
24 (1984) ("We therefore have no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court should abstain
from deciding a section 1983 suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction."); Ellis
v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court has never expressly
decided whether and in what circumstances section 1983 can be invoked to attack collaterally
state criminal convictions."). The lower court decisions are in conflict on this issue. See M.
SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 254 n.80. See also infra notes 302-11 and accompanying
text. In Deakins, the Supreme Court recently ruled that a "District Court has no discretion to
dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the [pending]
state proceeding." 108 S. Ct. at 529.
266. Feaster v. Miksch, 846 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1988); Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1400
n.6 (7th Cir. 1986); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1985); Parkhurst v. Wyoming,
641 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir. 1981); Hansen v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 410-11 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1976);
Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381, adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Guerro
v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251-54 (1st Cir. 1974); Schauer v. Burleigh County, 626 F. Supp.
61, 63 (D.N.D. 1985); Richards v. Giscome, 597 F. Supp. 40, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985) (table); Flaherty v. Nadjari, 548 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Matos v. Quealy, 524 F. Supp. 15, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ringenberg v. Cox, 524 F. Supp. 112
(E.D. Va. 1981); Doe v. Russotti, 503 F. Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Derrow v. Shields,
482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980).
267. See Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 849 (1st Cir. 1978) ("This case dramatically
diagrams the pitfalls that snare or nearly snare litigants and courts alike when a constitutional
claim is brought in federal court that involves an ongoing state prosecution.").
268. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
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We have attempted to solve the classification problem in the following
manner. First, categories have been established for the most recurring and
significant issues. In addition, we will follow the majority view, which focuses
upon the nature of the claim rather than the specific relief requested, and
discuss the specific issues initially by reference to the nature of the claims
asserted. After all of the specific claims are discussed, we will separately
discuss the significance of the form of relief requested. Finally, separate
treatment is given to the applicability of Preiser to the state courts.
The lower court decisions are organized in the following fashion:
A. Nature of the Claim:
1. Challenges to convictions and sentences-generally
(a) claims for damages for unconstitutional conviction or sen-
tence when a prisoner is in custody;
(b) "fine only" and expired sentence convictions.
2. Challenges to pre-trial custody, probation, parole, and good-
time credit determinations.
3. Challenges to conditions of confinement.
4. Challenges to the place of confinement.
5. Procedural due process claims.
6. Challenges to post-conviction review proceedings.
7. Challenges to extradition.
8. Challenges to detainers.
9. Other confinements: civil contempt, juvenile delinquents, and
mental patients.
B. Nature of the Relief Requested:
1. Declaratory relief.
2. Expungement.
3. Class relief.
C. Preiser in the State Courts
A. Nature of the Claim
1. Challenges to convictions and sentences-generally
The Preiser opinion contains dicta that a state prisoner's challenge to a
conviction or sentence "is limited to habeas corpus" and is within "the core
of habeas corpus .... -269 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion agreed that
attacks on the validity of a conviction or sentence are plainly directed at the
fact or duration of confinement and prisoners, therefore, can proceed only
on a habeas corpus petition. 210 These statements reflect the undisputed
proposition that a state prisoner's request for immediate or speedier release
based upon the unconstitutionality of the conviction or sentence may be
269. 411 U.S. at 489.
270. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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made only through a federal habeas corpus proceeding following exhaustion
of state remedies. 2 1 The lower federal courts have faithfully adhered to this
principle and have found federal habeas corpus to be the exclusive remedy
to attack a conviction or sentence with respect to a wide variety of claimed
constitutional errors.
272
A prisoner's complaint might not explicitly attack the constitutionality of
the conviction. Upon analysis, however, courts might find that the nature
of the claim asserted in fact constitutes such an attack and prayer for
release. 273 In this situation, as in the case of an express prayer for immediate
or speedier release, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. In Robinson v.
Richardson,27 4 for example, the Fifth Circuit found that a prayer for an
injunction against discrimination in jury selection was at the core of habeas
corpus because "resolution of the plaintiff's claims in his favor will result
in a finding that his conviction is constitutionally invalid, and his release
from prison will necessarily follow from such a finding. ' 275
271. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) ("Indeed, if any of the [plaintiffs]
were then serving an assertedly unlawful sentence, the complaint would inappropriately be
seeking relief from or modification of current, existing custody."). O'Shea also demonstrates
that one who challenges an allegedly threatened prosecution faces serious standing and at times
Younger abstention problems.
272. United States ex rel. Villa v. Fairman, 810 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1987) (attack on length
of sentence); Feeney v. Auger, 808 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1986) (attack on habitual offender
statute); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 573 (7th Cir. 1985) (attack on conviction
based upon evidence in prisoner's "street files"); Borning v. Cain, 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1985) (denial of adequate access to law library resulting in alleged denial of effective appeal);
Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1985) (illegal search and seizure and use of perjured
testimony); Coleman v. Turpin, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1982) (effective assistance of counsel);
Williams v. Dallas County Comm'rs, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982) (discriminatory imbalances
in composition of grand and petit juries), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Ellison v. De La
Rosa, 685 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1982) (ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel);
Caldwell v. Line, 679 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1982) (state trial judge without jurisdiction to try
case); Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1978) (challenge to plea of nolo contendere),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979); Edwards v. Joyner, 566 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1978) (use of
perjured testimony, coercive police interrogation, and withholding by prosecutor of evidence
favorable to defendant); Robinson v. Richardson, 556 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1977) (claim of
discrimination in jury selection process); Mathis v. Clerk of the First Dep't, 631 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (failure to provide appellate counsel with transcripts of criminal trial to take
appeal); Green v. Ballou, 391 F. Supp. 806 (W.D. Va. 1975) (sufficiency of evidence, truthfulness
of witnesses' testimony and voluntariness of guilty plea), aff'd, 551 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977)
(table); Curley v. Bryan, 362 F. Supp. 48 (D.S.C. 1973) (evidence obtained pursuant to illegal
search and seizure); United States ex rel. Kopystecki v. Lamb, 321 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (validity of guilty plea). See generally Note, A Comparison, supra note 6, at 1328
("Claims of unconstitutional procedure during the criminal trial itself fall under habeas corpus,
since such claims challenge the fact of confinement.").
273. With respect to the difficulties involved in deciphering pro se prisoner complaints, see
supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
274. 556 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1977).
275. Id. at 335. See also Caldwell v. Line, 679 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1982) (claim that state
criminal court judge was without authority to try case brings into play the validity of the
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The Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. PoweP 76 presents a special
section 1983-federal habeas corpus problem when a state inmate contests
a conviction on fourth amendment grounds. In Stone, the Supreme Court
determined that a state court criminal defendant who was afforded a full
and fair opportunity to litigate a fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim
in state court may not litigate this claim in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.277 Absent the unusual situation where a state court did not afford
a fair opportunity to litigate an exclusionary rule claim, 278 federal habeas
corpus is not available to test the exclusionary rule issue. In these circum-
stances there is no overlap with section 1983. However, it does not necessarily
follow that section 1983 is available to litigate the fourth amendment claim.
In fact, in at least one instance, section 1983 is not available to test the
fourth amendment issue even though habeas corpus also is not available.
Where the inmate contests a conviction on fourth amendment grounds and
seeks immediate or earlier release, the utilization of section 1983 would allow
the prisoner to circumvent the rule in Stone as well as the habeas corpus
exhaustion requirement by simply substituting the label "section 1983" for
"habeas corpus." That result is disfavored by most courts. 279
Whether a state prisoner may assert a federal court claim for damages
under section 1983 based upon an allegedly unconstitutional search and
seizure of evidence employed in securing a conviction is a more difficult
question. This is an issue that suffers from the lack of Supreme Court
guidance on the basic relationship between section 1983 and federal habeas
corpus, including whether section 1983 should be available when federal
habeas corpus is not. This basic issue has arisen most frequently in the
context of challenges to "fine only" and expired sentence convictions, and
the courts have come to different conclusions. 280 The majority position is
that federal habeas corpus is the exclusive method to attack any conviction
or sentence. As a result, section 1983 is not available to attack "fine only"
or expired sentence convictions even where habeas corpus also is not avail-
able. 2 1 Under this view, section 1983 would not be available when damages
conviction despite plaintiff's claim that he was not challenging his conviction); Borning v. Cain,
754 F.2d 1151, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985) (because claimed denial of inadequate access to law library
"draws into question the validity of his conviction and is the basis for the petitioner's assertion
that he was denied his right to an effective appeal" it "should not be addressed until the
petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.").
276. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
277. The decision in Stone rests on prudential rather than jurisdictional grounds. Kimmelman
v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 n.4 (1986).
278. The circuit courts of appeals routinely reject claims that the state courts did not provide
a full and fair hearing to litigate fourth amendment claims. WRIGHT, MLLER & COOPER, supra
note 32, § 4263, at 620-21. "Indeed most of the opinions of the courts of appeals merely
announce the conclusion that the prisoner had a full and fair opportunity for a hearing without
discussion of what this means or what occurred in the particular case." Id. at 622.
279. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 319-45 and accompanying text.
281. See infra note 328.
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are sought for a conviction allegedly resulting from a violation of the
exclusionary rule. In addition, it has been persuasively argued that "allowing
a prisoner to bring a federal [section] 1983 suit on a Fourth Amendment
claim might well permit circumvention of Stone, since a prisoner could secure
a federal determination of the search and seizure issue and use a favorable
decision to affect release in state habeas corpus. 282
On the other hand, the few courts which have determined that the section
1983 remedy should be available when federal habeas corpus is not, and
which thus allow section 1983 to be used to attack "fine only" and expired
sentence convictions,u 3 presumably would also allow a section 1983 claim
for damages for an exclusionary rule violation. The Fifth Circuit in Delaney
v. Giarrusso,2 4 tentatively stated without analysis that a prisoner who claims
a fourth amendment violation and is precluded from federal habeas relief
under Stone "may then be able to press his claim for damages under section
1983 in the federal courts after showing that he has exhausted his state-court
remedies . .." But in the very same sentence the court took away what it
granted, stating that "the defendants may be able to invoke collateral
estoppel as an affirmative defense if . . the state courts [determined] that
there was no violation of ... Fourth Amendment rights. 285
The collateral estoppel issue is probably a significant reason why the
interplay of Stone and Preiser has arisen so infrequently. Even absent the
requirement imposed by Delaney that state remedies be exhausted before the
section 1983 claim is filed, a ruling on the fourth amendment claim in the
state criminal trial will normally operate to preclude a section 1983 claim.
The Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. McCurry 2 6 provides an instructive
example of how collateral estoppel can be used to avoid the difficult interplay
of Stone and Preiser. McCurry was a defendant in a Missouri criminal
proceeding who moved to suppress evidence under the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. The motion was denied and McCurry was ultimately
convicted. He then commenced a federal court section 1983 action for
damages based upon an alleged fourth amendment violation. Applying the
full faith and credit statute, 287 the Supreme Court ruled that the preclusive
effect of the state court judgment must be determined by reference to the
Missouri law of preclusion. If a claim for damages arising out of the fourth
282. See Note, The Aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, supra note 6, at 751 n.66. See also
Feaster v. Miksch, 846 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1988) (Younger doctrine requires stay of section 1983
claim for damages based upon fourth amendment violation).
283. See infra note 325.
284. 633 F.2d 1126 (5th Cit. 1981).
285. Id. at 1128. Accord Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Of course, section 1983 is
clearly available without any exhaustion requirement if only damages are sought for a claimed
violation of fourth amendment rights and the claim does not call into play the validity of the
state court conviction. Tarantino v. North Carolina, 639 F. Supp. 661, 671-72 (W.D.N.C.
1986).
286. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
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amendment would be barred under Missouri law, the federal section 1983
claim would be barred as well, so long as the state proceedings provided a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal claim.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically rejected
McCurry's argument that "since Stone v. Powell had removed McCurry's
right to a hearing of his fourth amendment claim in federal habeas corpus,
collateral estoppel should not deprive him of a federal judicial hearing of
that claim in a [section] 1983 suit. 28s The Court reasoned that Stone
"concerns only the prudent exercise of federal-court jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 2254" and, therefore, had "no bearing on [section] 1983 suits or on
the question of the preclusive effect of state-court judgments." 289 More
fundamentally, McCurry's argument assumed incorrectly that every violation
of a federal right may be litigated in a federal district court, "regardless of
the legal posture in which the federal claim arises. ' '290
Stone's virtual elimination of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for
exclusionary rule claims provides a compelling reason for recognizing the
section 1983 damages remedy. Nevertheless, collateral estoppel is an obstacle
to the efficacy of the section 1983 remedy in this context. It is not, however,
the only obstacle. The right of state inmates to seek section 1983 damages
for exclusionary rule violations raises the broader question of whether a
section 1983 claim for damages ever may be based upon an allegedly un-
constitutional conviction or sentence. It is this question to which we now
turn.
a. Damages claims for unconstitutional conviction or sentence when
prisoner is in custody
Having learned from Preiser that prisoners may not secure immediate or
speedier release from confinement by challenging the constitutionality of
their convictions or sentences under section 1983, but having also read in
Preiser that "a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under
[section] 1983 in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion
of state remedies,''291 many prisoners tried a different stratagem. They began
to seek damages under section 1983 based upon claims that their convictions
or sentences were unconstitutional because, for example: they were denied
effective assistance of counsel; their right to a speedy trial was violated;
their jury was selected in an unconstitutional manner; evidence was uncon-
288. 449 U.S. at 103.
289. Id.
290. Id. The Court found that "nothing in the legislative history of § 1983 reveals any
purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in
state civil proceedings." Id. at 103-04. The majority thus was unmoved by the dissenting
opinion's argument that "[a] state criminal defendant cannot be held to have chosen 'voluntarily'
to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state court." Id. at 115 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
291. 411 U.S. at 494.
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stitutionally introduced; exculpatory evidence was withheld; or they entered
involuntary guilty pleas. 292
When asserted by confined prisoners, the lower federal courts generally
have viewed these claims for damages as an attempted "end around" the
federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. To allow a state prisoner to
test the constitutionality of a conviction without exhausting state remedies
would frustrate the federalism concerns that underlie the habeas corpus
exhaustion requirement because a state prisoner could simply "state a viable
civil rights claim .. .by postponing a claim for release until his substantive
rights have been adjudicated in a federal forum." 293 The state prisoner could
then go to state court and assert the federal finding of an unconstitutional
conviction as the basis for securing release or reduction in the sentence. 294
In order to prevent this from occurring, the lower federal courts have rather
consistently ruled that a state prisoner may not seek damages under section
1983 for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence, at least until state
remedies have been exhausted. 295 To reach this result, it is necessary to (1)
292. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Preiser predicted that prisoners might seek to
avoid the Court's ruling by seeking only damages under section 1983. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 272.
293. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1981);
Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976) ("a thinly disguised circumvention of state
remedies"), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
294. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982);
Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp 312 (D. Nev.
1984). See also Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981). As the Fifth Circuit has
explained, "[t]here would be no authority under which a person serving a term in prison
resulting from the criminal conviction could be retained in custody once there was an author-
itative determination that the conviction could not stand." Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646
F.2d 151, 157 (5th Cir. 1981). Some courts have also relied upon their inherent power to fashion
appropriate relief, regardless of the relief requested, Hamlin, 664 F.2d at 30-32, and upon the
notion that in a habeas corpus proceeding the court can afford the "best relief-namely release
from custody." Smith v. Logan, 311 F. Supp. 898, 899 (W.D. Va. 1970). Accord Alexander
v. Emerson, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973); Moore v. Frazier, 316 F. Supp 318 (D. Neb. 1970).
The last three cited cases were decided prior to the decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973).
295. Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985); Caldwell v. Line, 679 F.2d 494 (5th
Cir. 1982); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982);
Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981); Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362
(8th Cir. 1981); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1981); Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Merola,
532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.. 1976); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550
F.2d 342 (1977) (en banc); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), adhered to, 550 F.2d
345 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d
1249 (1st Cir. 1974); Burgess v. Brown, 652 F. Supp. 1426 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Richards v.
Giscome, 597 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985); Barnes v.
Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984); Flaherty v. Nadjari, 548 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); Matos v. Quealy, 524 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carter v. Newburgh Police Dep't,
523 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Doe v. Russotti, 503 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Barksdale
v. Ryan, 398 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1011 (1975). See also Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1986); Monk v. Secretary
of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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reject a literal reading of the broad dicta in Preiser concerning damages, (2)
read Wolff v. McDonnell29 as having authorized the section 1983 damages
claim for violations of procedural due process rights, 297 and (3) conclude, as
most courts do, that the relief sought does not itself control the section
1983-federal habeas corpus issue.298
In the leading case of Fulford v. Klein,299 the Fifth Circuit, after finding
that a section 1983 claim for damages could not be asserted to test the
constitutionality of a conviction prior to exhausting state remedies, concluded
that "habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action where the basis
of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction."
While the Fulford Court expressly declined to determine whether a section
1983 claim for damages may be based upon an unconstitutional conviction
or sentence after state remedies have been exhausted, most courts have
indicated that they would allow the damages claim following the exhaustion
of state remedies.3a° Requiring that state remedies first be exhausted, however,
not only delays the damages claim but invariably dooms it to failure, because
the state court ruling normally will operate to collaterally estop the section
1983 claim.30
296. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
297. See supra notes 223-32 and accompanying text. The lower federal courts typically read
Wolff to allow a section 1983 claim for damages for the violation of procedural due process
rights rather than for the deprivation of good-time credits. See, e.g., In re United States Parole
Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir
1986); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984).
298. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
299. 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
300. See Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1986) (damages for denial of
parole release: "Before Crump may properly maintain a 1983 action for damages arising out
of his allegedly illegal confinement, he must first exhaust his state court remedies .... ");
Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir.
1985); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982);
Burgess v. Brown, 652 F. Supp. 1426 (W.D.N.C. 1987). See also Davis v. Rendell, 659 F.2d
374 (3d Cir. 1981) (section 1983 claim for damages permitted where there was only a remote
possibility that there was anything left to exhaust which would affect the conviction after
defendant pleaded nolo contendere).
301. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974) (dicta); Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 509 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Ijf all of the federal claims must be
held in abeyance pending exhaustion of state remedies, a prisoner's subsequent effort to assert
a damages claim under 1983 might arguably be barred by principles of res judicata."); Battieste
v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1984); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d
273 (4th Cir. 1977); Cender v. Peters, 548 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pueschel v. Leuba,
383 F. Supp. 576 (D. Conn. 1974). The Supreme Court has made it clear that state court
rulings in state criminal proceedings are entitled to the same preclusive effect in federal section
1983 actions that they would receive in state court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). A
claim for damages in this context might also be defeated by absolute prosecutorial or judicial
immunity. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d
ed.) 419 (Supp. 1981). See also Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1977); Doe v. Russotti,
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The claim for damages may also run into Younger v. Harris02 abstention
problems. In fact, the Supreme Court, which has never determined whether
a section 1983 damages claim may be based upon an allegedly unconstitu-
tional conviction,30 has described the issue in abstention terms, i.e., whether
a district court should "abstain from deciding a section 1983 suit for damages
stemming from an unlawful conviction pending the collateral exhaustion of
state court attacks on the conviction itself." 3°4
The lower federal court cases conflict over whether Younger abstention
applies to federal claims for damages. 05 There are several indications that
if faced with the issue, the Supreme Court may well apply Younger to claims
for damages. First, the Court has ruled that the Younger doctrine applies
not only to federal court relief against pending state proceedings, but also
to federal relief that would overturn state court judgments. 3°0 While this
holding is not dispositive of the Younger-damages issues, it is significant
because the damages claim is most likely to arise after state proceedings are
completed. Until that time, the criminal defendant might not have suffered
the actual injury that provides a basis for a claim of compensatory dam-
ages. 307
Moreover, the Court has indicated that a claim for damages based upon
the unconstitutionality of state practices is, in effect, a request for a declar-
atory judgment of the constitutionality of the practices. In Fair Assessment
Real Estate Association v. McNary,a0 s the Court ruled that a section 1983
claim for damages based upon an allegedly unconstitutional state tax scheme
was barred by principles of comity and federalism because the federal court
would first have to determine the constitutionality of the tax practice or
policy in order to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to damages. 3°9
503 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Conner, the court, after finding the judge and prosecutor
protected by absolute immunity, stated that "it is not equally clear that the dismissal of
Conner's damage claims against the police officers was correct." 552 F.2d at 587. Police officers
generally are entitled to qualified good faith immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
302. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
303. See supra note 265.
304. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984).
305. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLiN, supra note 4, § 12.7, at 253 n.80.
306. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 107
S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
307. The Supreme Court has taken the position that absent a showing of actual injury, only
nominal damages may be awarded for the violation of a constitutionally protected right.
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (first amendment); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In an appropriate case, punitive damages may also be awarded.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
308. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
309. Fair Assessment dealt with the principles of federalism and comity that underlie the
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). By basing its ruling on principles of comity and
federalism, the Court in Fair Assessment was able to avoid the issue of whether or not a claim
for damages was barred by section 1341, which prohibits a federal court from "enjoin[ing],
suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where
a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
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The Court stated, "[tihe recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act
first requires a 'declaration' or determination of unconstitutionality of a
state tax scheme that would halt its operation." ' 10 This analysis is significant
to the Younger-damages issue because for Younger purposes the Supreme
Court generally equates federal injunctive and declaratory relief."'
Several lower federal court decisions have relied at least in part upon the
policies of the Younger doctrine to conclude that a section 1983 claim for
damages may not be based upon an unconstitutional conviction., 2 In Guerro
v. Mulhearn,31 3 the First Circuit provided the following analysis:
Despite the difference in the form of the relief being sought, a suit for
damages under section 1983 may also have a substantially disruptive effect
upon contemporary state criminal proceedings, and may also undermine
the integrity of the writ of habeas corpus. Where the federal court, in
dealing with the question of damages caused by violation of civil rights,
would have to make rulings by virtue of which the validity of a conviction
in contemporary state proceedings would be called in question, the potential
for federal-state friction is obvious. The federal rulings would embarrass,
and could even intrude into, the state proceedings.-
The court in Guerro also recognized, however, that constitutionally protected
rights may be denied prior to trial and might be irrelevant to the criminal
conviction or sentence." 5 For example, false arrests, illegal searches and
seizures, or wiretaps, may constitute compensable wrongs while not "un-
dergirding the validity of the criminal conviction to which it might be
related.'316
Guerro thus properly emphasized the distinction between claims for dam-
ages that implicate the constitutionality of state convictions, and claims for
damages based upon allegedly unconstitutional law enforcement practices
which do not implicate the constitutionality of convictions. The former types
of claims clash with the federalism policies behind Preiser and Younger while
the latter types of claims do not. a' 7
310. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115 (1981).
311. When the Younger doctrine bars federal court injunctive relief, it generally bars federal
court declaratory relief as well. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971). Cf. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory relief not barred by Younger when no criminal
prosecution is pending).
312. See Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985); Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d
775 (10th Cir. 1981); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976); Guerro v. Mulhearn,
498 F.2d 1249 (Ist Cir. 1974); Richards v. Giscome, 597 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd,
762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984); Matos v.
Quealy, 524 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
313. 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974).
314. Id. at 1253 (footnote omitted).
315. Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1253. See also Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1976),
adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
316. 498 F.2d at 1253.
317. It is settled that state prisoner damages claims that do not stem from the constitutionality
[Vol. 37:85
19881 THE PREISER PUZZLE
b. "Fine only" and expired sentence convictions
Because a petitioner must be "in custody" in order to commence a federal
habeas corpus proceeding,31 an individual who is not in custody may not
test the constitutionality of a state court conviction in a habeas corpus
proceeding. While recent Supreme Court decisions have substantially liber-
alized the concept of "custody," 31 9 courts still require a showing that a
habeas corpus petitioner is subject to some form of serious restraint of
liberty. Thus, the right to institute a federal habeas corpus proceeding is
denied to those subject to "fine only" convictions, 320 as well as to those
who have been fully discharged following expiration of their terms of
imprisonment,3 2 1 probation,
322 
or parole. 323
of a conviction or sentence or otherwise relate to the fact or duration of confinement may be
asserted under section 1983. See Mack v. Verelas, 835 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1987); Slayton v.
Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984); Bodeker v. Dyson, 544 F.2d 861, 862 (5th
Cir. 1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1254 (1st Cir. 1974); Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F.
Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
319. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
320. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1982); Waste Management of Wis. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1060 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591
F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1970) (fine
and revocation of driver's license are not custody). In Hanson, the Court held "that the ordinary
collateral consequences or civil disabilities flowing from a fine-only conviction, although they
may be restraints on liberty, are not severe enough to put the convicted person in custody
within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute." 591 F.2d at 407. Based upon this reasoning,
"a corporate petitioner can never secure habeas corpus review ... because a corporation's
entity status precludes it from ever being incarcerated or otherwise held in custody." Waste
Management, 614 F.2d at 140. That an arrest warrant has been issued because of failure to
pay a fine does not satisfy the custody requirement, Caldwell, 692 F.2d at 994, although custody
would exist if a petitioner was incarcerated for failure to pay the fine. See Duvallon v. Florida,
691 F.2d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 1982). The Caldwell court stated, in dictum, that "different factors
must be considered" in cases of indigence or inability to pay the fine. 692 F.2d at 999 n.6.
321. Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1987). See Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 546
F.2d 1100, 1102 (3d Cir. 1977); Carter v. Hardy, 526 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 838 (1976); Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 911 (1976). See also, Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1984) (dicta). The
fact that one suffers collateral consequences from a conviction does not satisfy the custody
requirement. See supra note 50.
322. Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1984). The Tinder court ruled that requiring
restitution payment as a pre-condition for probation release did not constitute "custody."
Restitution, like a fine, is not a serious restraint on liberty and the possibility that probation
will be extended because of a failure to satisfy the court ordered restitution is not sufficient to
place the individual in custody. Id.
323. Siano v. Justices, 698 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983). See also
Tinder, 725 F.2d at 803 (dicta). As the First Circuit has stated:
After the expiration of a term of imprisonment, parole or probation, however, the
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The question thus arises whether one who is not in custody and therefore
unable to contest the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding may do so in a federal court section 1983 action.
Judge Newman has described the competing arguments:
It might be contended that Congress, in enacting the habeas corpus remedy,
not only intended it to be the exclusive vehicle for district court collateral
inquiry into the validity of state convictions but also intended that those
convictions not subject to a habeas remedy, i.e., without custody conse-
quences, should be immune from district court collateral inquiry. In the
absence of helpful legislative history, it seems at least as plausible to argue
that the unavailability of habeas corpus to attack a sentence involving
only a fine is a sufficient reason for permitting collateral inquiry via
§1983.32
Recent case law is inconclusive as to which route courts are likely to take.
Some courts have ruled that when a conviction cannot be attacked in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding because the petitioner is not in custody,
the conviction may be attacked in a federal court section 1983 action. 325
Proponents argue that section 1983 should be available because when federal
habeas corpus is not available, the more specific habeas corpus remedy
cannot be said to preempt the more general section 1983 remedy. 326 Since
Preiser was based upon a perceived necessity to reconcile potentially over-
lapping federal remedies, if the remedies do not in fact overlap, there simply
state no longer has special supervisory authority over the person. Thus, a sentence
that has been fully served does not satisfy the custody requirement of the habeas
statute, despite the collateral consequences that generally attend a criminal convic-
tion.
Tinder, 725 F.2d at 803. If one is in custody when the habeas corpus proceeding is commenced
but is subsequently released, the proceeding is not moot so long as statutory collateral conse-
quences flow from the contested conviction. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 234-35 (1968).
Cf. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (expiration of sentence rendered attack on sentence
moot where no demonstration of statutory collateral consequences). A proposed American Bar
Association standard would eliminate the custody requirement entirely and permit a collateral
attack upon a conviction "even though the applicant has completely served the challenged
sentence" or "even though the challenged sentence did not commit the applicant to prison but
was rather a fine, probation or suspended sentence." IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Standard 22-2.3 (1982 Supplement).
324. Pueschel v. Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Conn. 1974). The court in Pueschel did
not resolve the issue but decided the case on collateral estoppel grounds. Id. at 578.
325. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d
70 (4th Cir. 1983); Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909
(1982); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978); Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.
1977); Freeman v. Fuller, 623 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Fla. 1985). See also Richardson v. Fleming,
651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum). The Fifth Circuit, in Battieste, recognized that it
was in conflict with its prior decision in Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978), but stated
that "Cavett has never been subsequently cited by this court in support of the district court's
position [prohibiting the use of section 1983 by one not 'in custody' to challenge a conviction]
and is in direct contravention of the other cases of this circuit . . . cited in this opinion."
Battieste, 732 F.2d at 441 n.l.
326. Schwartz, Challenging State Convictions, supra note 6, at 290.
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is no need to reconcile these remedies. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has
argued that:
In Fulford we held that once a state conviction is final 'habeas corpus is
the exclusive initial cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to
the constitutionality of the state court conviction.' (citation omitted) Of
course this bow to the integrity of state judicial administration is unnec-
essary where a Section 1983 plaintiff is ineligible for habeas relief for
reasons having nothing to do with the merits of his contention that his
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.-
Two circuit courts have argued persuasively that Congress did not intend
that section 1983 be available to attack the constitutionality of a conviction
even when federal habeas corpus is not available because the criminal
defendant is not in custody. 38 In Hanson v. Circuit Court, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that because Congress intended for habeas
corpus to provide "not only the exclusive federal remedy for those in custody,
but also the exclusive federal remedy for all who seek to attack state court
judgments of convictions," convictions not subject to habeas attack "are
immune from collateral inquiry by the federal courts. 3 29 The Hanson court
adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Cavett v. Ellis330 that a plaintiff's
section 1983 action was not meant to be a substitute for habeas corpus when
there is no custody present. Courts have authority to grant habeas corpus
relief to persons in custody pursuant to judgments of state courts, but have
refused to extend habeas relief to those not in custody. The Cavett court
refused to make a petitioner's section 1983 action the "greater writ" by
indirectly avoiding the custody requirement of section 2254. 311 To rule oth-
erwise "would be to expand the scope of section 1983 beyond that contem-
plated by Congress." 332 Viewing federal habeas corpus as the exclusive federal
remedy to attack state court convictions is consistent with federal court
principles of federalism and comity. 333
In Waste Management of Wisconsin v. Fokakis, 3 4 the Seventh Circuit
applied its holding in Hanson to a corporation that had been subject to a
327. Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 325 for a
description of Fifth Circuit decisional law.
328. Waste Management of Wis. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1060 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978). See also
Siano v. Justices, 698 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983). The
Fifth Circuit in Battieste indicated that it would no longer follow the holding in Cavett. 732
F.2d 441 n.1. See supra note 325.
329. 591 F.2d 404, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979).
330. 578 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1978). Cavett appears to have been overruled by Battieste,
732 F.2d at 441 n.l. See supra note 325.
331. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
332. Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979).
333. Id. at 410.
334. 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1060 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960
(1981).
1988]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
"fine only" conviction. The corporation had argued that because corpora-
tions could never satisfy the habeas custody requirement, they would be
deprived of their only federal remedy if they were not permitted to utilize
section 1983 to attack a conviction. The Seventh Circuit found the corpor-
ation's argument foreclosed by the holding in Hanson that section 2254 is
"the sole avenue of collateral attack of state convictions." 3" Like Hanson,
Waste Management stressed principles of federalism, and found that attack-
ing the validity of state court convictions in a collateral federal court
proceeding is an extraordinary intrusion on the independent functioning of
the state judicial system.336 The court further found that the federal habeas
corpus statute represented the balance Congress struck between an indivi-
dual's interest in freedom from unlawful intrusions on his or her physical
freedom and the state courts' interest in freedom from federal interference
with final state court judgments.337 To allow individuals who are not in
custody, and whose personal interests are not as compelling as those who
are in custody, to contest their convictions in a federal section 1983 action
would upset this balance.33
The Waste Management Corporation had relied upon the Eighth Circuit's
decision in McCurry v. Allen,' 9 to support its argument that section 1983
should be available when federal habeas corpus is not.3"° The Seventh Circuit
found that its decision in Hanson precluded it from accepting Waste Man-
agement's attempt to analogize from McCurry.14 1 Moreover, after Waste
Management was decided, the Supreme Court reversed McCurry, thereby
lending further support to the validity of the Waste Management decision.31 2
In McCurry, the Supreme Court found no authority to support the Eighth
Circuit's position "that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to
one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district
court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises.
Neither the Constitution nor section 1983 supports such a conclusion. 343
335. Id. at 141.
336. Id. at 140.
337. Id. at 140-41.
338. Id. at 141.
339. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
340. 614 F.2d at 141. In McCurry, the Eigth Circuit ruled that a state court's rejection of a
criminal defendant's fourth amendment claim in a suppression hearing did not preclude a
section 1983 claim for damages based upon that fourth amendment violation. The McCurry
court allowed the section 1983 claim because the doctrine of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
494, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976), precluded the litigant from bringing the fourth
amendment claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. McCurry, 606 F.2d at 799. To allow
otherwise would have left the litigant no other forum in which to bring his claim. See supra
notes 277-91 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of Stone.
341. 614 F.2d at 141.
342. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980).
343. The Court also held that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982),
governs the preclusive effect of state court judgments in federal section 1983 actions. 449 U.S.
at 99. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it was not likely that
the 42nd Congress, which drafted the original version of section 1983,
considered it a substitute for federal habeas corpus, "the purpose of which
is not to redress civil injury, but to release the applicant from unlawful
physical confinement.., particularly in light of the extremely narrow scope
of federal habeas relief for state prisoners in 1871." 144
If faced with the issue, this author believes the present Supreme Court
would disallow the use of section 1983 to challenge "fine only" and expired
sentence convictions. In the context of ambiguous legislative intent, the
Court's paramount concern for principles of federalism and comity would
probably lead it to agree with the Seventh Circuit that "direct review by the
United States Supreme Court is sufficient to preserve the role of the federal
courts as the ultimate guardians of federally guaranteed rights.
3 4
2. Challenges to pre-trial custody, probation, parole, and good-time
credit determinations
The decisions in Preiser and Wolff establish that a state prisoner who asks
a federal court to order immediate or earlier release must bring a federal
habeas corpus proceeding rather than a section 1983 claim. Thus, habeas
corpus is the exclusive federal remedy to assert claims seeking release from
pre-trial custody,346 immediate or speedier release on parole,3 47 or a resto-
ration or recalculation of good-time credits) 48 Similarly, habeas corpus is
the exclusive remedy to contest reincarceration resulting from the revocation
of parole.3 49 In Smallwood v. Board of Probation and Parole,' 0 the Eighth
344. 449 U.S. at 104-05.
345. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 907 (1979)). Even if section 1983 is found to be available to attack fine only and expired
sentence convictions, such attacks would be countered with several other significant non-merit
defenses, such as collateral estoppel, judicial or prosecutorial immunity, or by the Younger
abstention doctrine. See supra note 301.
346. Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Aldarondo v. Supreme Court
of P.R., 369 F. Supp. 1173, 1176 (D.P.R. 1974).
347. Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1984); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d
1215 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Winter, 730 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Torres,
717 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1010 (1984); Pope v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1981); Schuemann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole,
624 F.2d 172, 173 n.1 (10th Cir. 1980); Smallwood v. Board of Probation and Parole, 587
F.2d 369, 370 (8th Cir. 1978); Douglas v. Muncy, 570 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1978); Cruz v. Skelton,
502 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1974); Ringenberg v. Cox, 524 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Va. 1981); Thomas
v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981). See also Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.
1984) (claim that term of imprisonment should include possibility of parole is within federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction); Faheem-EI v. Klincar, 600 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (with-
drawal of parole revocation charge).
348. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973);
Hayes v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1985); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.
1983); Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. 111. 1981).
349. 411 U.S. at 486 (dictum) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 474 (1972)).
350. 587 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Circuit concluded that a request for an order compelling reconsideration of
a decision denying parole is, in effect, a request for release from confinement
and, therefore, within the scope of habeas corpus and not section 1983. 31'
In Alexander v. Johnson,352 the Fourth Circuit stated that a prisoner could
not contest the requirement that he pay the costs of assigned counsel in
order to be released on parole under section 1983. The court held that this
claim came instead within the scope of habeas corpus because the prisoner
was seeking to be relieved of a restraint which would hasten his release on
parole. Similarly, in Drollinger v. Milligan,353 the Seventh Circuit determined
that a constitutional challenge to certain conditions of probation was within
the exclusive scope of habeas corpus. While such a claim might seem to
challenge conditions of confinement, and thereby come within the parameter
of section 1983, the court held that this was not so. Since the terms of
probation include not only its length, but also specifies prohibited and
required conduct while on probation, and since "probation is by its nature
less confining than incarceration, the distinction between the fact of con-
finement and the conditions thereof is necessarily blurred. ' 3 4 In this context,
eliminating a condition of probation diminishes the extent of custody; "fig-
uratively speaking, one of the 'bars' would be removed from the cell. '355
Therefore, an attempt to secure release from custody, even if partial, falls
within the traditional function of habeas corpus and is not actionable under
section 1983.356
There is authority stating that an injunction mandating immediate parole
review or reconsideration of a decision denying parole falls within the
exclusive scope of habeas corpus.157 This argument appears to be erroneous,
however, because such relief does not constitute a determination that a
prisoner is entitled to immediate or speedier release. As discussed below in
conjunction with procedural due process claims, 358 a claim that certain
procedures or criteria be followed or that a speedier parole determination
be made requires neither immediate nor speedier release but, instead, leaves
that decision with the relevant officials. These procedural-type claims, there-
fore, are commonly held to be within the scope of section 1983.119 In Walker
351. See also Brown v. Vermillion, 593 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1979) (request for new parole
release hearing construed as request for release from confinement).
352. 742 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1984).
353. 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977).
354. Id. at 1225. Accord Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 998 (5th Cir. 1987) (concurring
opinion).
355. Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1225.
356. Id.
357. Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 651 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Thomas v. Dietz, 518
F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981).
358. See infra notes 421-35 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Faheem-El v. Klincar, 814 F.2d 461, 465 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987) (challenge to
policy of denying all parolees any consideration for release on bail pending final parole
revocation hearing lies under section 1983); In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338
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v. Prisoner Review Board,316 the prisoner claimed that he had been given
insufficient reasons for the denial of his parole application, that the Board
erroneously regarded his sentences as consecutive rather than concurrent,
and that he was not allowed to review the entire record. Because he contested
only the manner in which parole was denied, and because he did not seek
release on parole but only a rehearing in accordance with due process,
leaving the ultimate release decision within the Board's discretion, the court
found that the claims could be asserted under section 1983.361
A number of decisions deal with the question of whether or not a section
1983 claim for damages may be asserted based upon an allegedly unconsti-
tutional denial of good-time credits or parole. Resolution of this issue
depends in part upon whether the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v.
McDonnel 62 recognized a section 1983 damages claim for the denial of
good-time credits or whether it recognized a section 1983 damages claim
only for the deprivation of procedural due process rights. Most of the lower
federal courts have read Wolff, as this author does, to recognize a section
1983 damages claim for the deprivation of due process, and not for the loss
of good-time credits.363 In a cogent analysis of the issue, the Fifth Circuit
stated that the Supreme Court in Wolff:
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (request for ruling on constitutionality of parole guideline not restricted to
habeas corpus); In re Chatman-Bey, 718 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (claim by federal prisoner
challenging parole eligibility date may, but need not be, brought as a habeas corpus proceeding);
Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978) (length of sentence not an issue); Schwindlig v.
Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224, 225 (E.D. Ark. 1984) ("The fact that one is classified as eligible for
parole does not necessarily mean that he will be released from prison before his sentence is
served."). But see Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981) (court ruled that claim
for earlier date to appear before parole board was within habeas corpus because, under state
law, strong presumption existed that one eligible for parole will actually be released). "For all
intents and purposes, therefore, a prisoner in New Jersey seeking an earlier parole eligibility
date states a claim for an earlier release from confinement, a claim which lies at the core of
habeas corpus." Id. at 796.
360. 694 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982), subsequent history, 769 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1065 (1986).
361. Id. at 501. In a subsequent decision, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Walker to allow a
claim stating that the reasons given for parole denial were 'too broad and general to comply
with due process' under section 1983 "as well as habeas corpus." Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798
F.2d 203, 204 (7th Cir. 1986). Walker, however, did not address the availability of habeas
corpus, only the availability of section 1983.
362. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See supra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
363. See In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Todd v.
Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered
to, 550 F.2d 342 (1977) (en banc); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash.
1983); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794
(D.N.J. 1981); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980). But see Partee v. Lane,
528 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. III. 1981) (restoration of good-time credits curtailed in disciplinary
proceeding cannot be sought through section 1983 claim); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp.
1252 (N.D. I11. 1974); Note, Preiser v. Rodriguez in Retrospect, supra note 6, at 1080 (claims
for damages dismissed under habeas action). The decision in Edwards v. Illinois Dep't of
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authorized the district court to examine the constitutionality of the state
prison procedure, and to award damages which were incidental to an
invalid proceeding. Since the district court was expressly forbidden to enter
an injunction concerning the merits of the issue before the state admin-
istrative body (i.e., the proper length of confinement), however, it follows
as a matter of logic that the district court was similarly prohibited from
awarding damages for excessive confinement .1
This reading of Wolff is consistent with the majority view that the nature
of the claim asserted, rather than the specific relief requested, is the most
important factor in resolving the section 1983-federal habeas corpus con-
flict. a6 Thus, most lower federal courts have concluded that prior to ex-
haustion of state remedies, a section 1983 claim for damages does not lie to
contest the deprivation of good-time credits3' or the denial or revocation of
parole.3 67 Of course, a section 1983 claimant who awaits the exhaustion of
state remedies must face the danger of being precluded by that state court
determination. 368
3. Challenges to conditions of confinement
In Preiser, the Supreme Court referred to its prior decisions that upheld
"the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights actions to challenge
the conditions of their confinement. '3 69 Preiser's discussion of challenges to
Corrections, 514 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1975), is unclear as to whether the court recognized the
section 1983 damages claim for the violation of procedural due process rights or for the
revocation of good-time credits.
364. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (1977)
(en banc).
365. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
366. Jones v. Smith, 835 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1987); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.
1987); Wilson v. Foti, 832 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1987); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.
1986); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th
Cir. 1977). Contra Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. I11. 19AI) (claim for damages for
restoration of good-time credits may proceed under section 1983); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F.
Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (prisoner may maintain damages action for violation of good-time
credits under section 1983). In Love v. Black, 597 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Mo. 1984), the court
recognized a section 1983 claim for damages based upon the discontinuance of a merit release
program.
367. Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986); Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394 (7th
Cir. 1986); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1977); Ringenberg v. Cox, 524 F. Supp.
112 (E.D. Va. 1981); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981); Derrow v. Shields,
482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980). In Harper, the court ruled that a claim for damages for
the alleged unconstitutional denial of parole lies under section 1983, but the action should be
stayed pending the exhaustion of state remedies. 808 F.2d at 281.
368. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Claims for damages against parole officials
might be defeated by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See M. SCHWARTz & J. KIRKLIN, supra
note 4, at § 7.6.
369. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498, 499 n.14. The Court cited the following cases for this
proposition: Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972) (solitary
confinement); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) (living conditions and
disciplinary measures while in maximum security); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)
(confiscation of legal materials); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (denial of right to purchase
religious publications and other privileges because of prisoner's religious beliefs).
[Vol. 37:85
19881 THE PREISER PUZZLE
conditions of confinement, although dicta, reflects the uncontestable prop-
osition that state prisoners may contest the conditions of their confinement,
as opposed to its fact or length, under section 1983.370 State prisoners have
in fact utilized section 1983 "to contest a broad range of prison conditions ' 37'
and, since Preiser, numerous Supreme Court cases have either explicitly or
implicitly recognized the propriety of a state prisoner's use of this remedy
to attack such conditions. 72
An attack on segregated or other disciplinary confinement falls within
section 1983 because it does not seek release from confinement, but only a
change in the conditions of confinement.3 73 In Wright v. Cuyler,37 4 the Third
Circuit distinguished between furloughs and the good-time credits at issue
in Preiser. The Wright court ruled that a prisoner could challenge the state's
failure to admit him into the home furlough program under section 1983
because he had challenged the conditions of his confinement, rather than
attacked the ultimate duration of confinement. 375
370. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499.
371. As Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[pirisoner grievances
relating to conditions of confinement, food, privacy, heat, mail, hair length, work details,
segregation from the prison population, religious practices, and rehabilitation have all become
issues of federal litigation under section 1983." Lay, supra note 10, at 936 n.4. Likewise, as
the Court stated in Preiser, "[f]or state prisoners eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working
and playing are all done under the watchful eye of the State .... What for a private citizen
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or
with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 492.
372. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (denial of contact visits and
irregularly scheduled shakedown searches); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prison
searches and seizures of property); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (double ceiling);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (outgoing mail); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (punitive isolation), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prohibition against prisoners soliciting inmates
to join a union); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (legal research facilities); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, (medical care), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974) (prohibition on press and media interviews with inmates); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (censorship of mail and prohibition against use of law students or
paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews).
Justice Blackmun has suggested that "improvements in prison conditions of recent years are
traceable in large part, and perhaps primarily, to actions under § 1983 challenging those
conditions." Blackmun, supra note 19, at 21.
373. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (solitary confinement), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); McKinnis v. Mosely, 693
F.2d 1054, 1057 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("Even if McKinnis prevails on all of his claims and receives
all the relief he demands, the duration of his sentence will not be shortened by one moment.");
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pre-trial detention facility); Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (segregated confinement), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972).
374. 624 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1980).
375. The court reasoned that:
[allthough a prisoner's total number of days actually spent behind bars can tech-
nically be reduced by the number of days during which he is out of prison on
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There are some situations, however, where a challenge to conditions of
confinement is so intimately connected to the length or fact of confinement
that it is found to be encompassed by habeas corpus. In Brennan v. Cun-
ningham,37 6 the prisoner challenged his removal from a work release program.
The prisoner argued that the claim was within federal habeas corpus, pre-
sumably in order to avoid the preclusive effect of an adverse state court
determination. 377 The inmate's claim appeared, like the claim in Wright, to
challenge conditions of confinement. Under the applicable state law, how-
ever, participation in a work release program is so closely related to an
inmate's pending release that it could be asserted in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.1
7
Where a challenge to prison conditions is derivative of the length of
confinement, it may be asserted only in a habeas corpus proceeding and not
under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in Dixon v.
Alexander.37 9 In Dixon, the prisoner sought to enforce a plea bargain pur-
suant to which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment with the
possibility of parole. Despite this agreement, the State Department of Cor-
rections refused to treat the prisoner as eligible for parole. The Sixth Circuit
ruled that the claim to enforce the plea agreement was a habeas corpus claim
that should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 310
furloughs, it cannot be said that occasional short furloughs such as these reduce
the duration of confinement in the same way as did the good time credits at issue
in Preiser, where the credits would have had the effect of terminating the prisoner's
sentence at an earlier calendar date. We therefore hold that the eligibility or lack
of eligibility for temporary home furloughs in Pennsylvania is a condition of one's
confinement, which may be challenged directly in a section 1983 action without
resort to habeas corpus and its attendant requirement for exhaustion of state
remedies.
Id. at 458 (footnotes omitted). See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1981)
(challenge to lack of work release program is within section 1983). The Wright court noted that
Wright's demand for fair application of the furlough eligibility criteria constitutes a procedural
challenge that is within the scope of section 1983. Wright, 624 F.2d at 458 n.5. See infra notes
413-35 and accompanying text. The court cited five district court opinions, including four
within the Third Circuit, with which it disagreed. Wright, 624 F.2d at 458 n.6 (citing Austin
v. Armstrong, 473 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (D. Nev. 1979); Thomas v. Cuyler, 467 F. Supp. 1000,
1001-02 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Bullock v. Cuyler, 463 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Winsett
v. McGinnes, 425 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (D. Del. 1976); Parson v. Keve, 413 F. Supp. 111, 112-
13 (D. Del. 1976)).
376. 813 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
377. See supra note 160.
378. The state work release program "considers for admission only those inmates who are
within eight months of parole." 813 F.2d at 4. The Brennan court also stated that even if the
claim was characterized as a challenge to conditions of confinement, it could be asserted either
under section 1983 or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 4. See infra notes 382-96 and
accompanying text.
379. 741 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1984).
380. We previously questioned whether a claim of entitlement only to be considered for
parole is within habeas corpus. See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
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The prisoner in Dixon argued that his status as a prisoner not eligible for
parole denied him the possibility of work release and other privileges accorded
to prisoners "being 'held with the possibility of parole.""'3 ' The court
acknowledged that while normally a prisoner could challenge the constitu-
tionality of prison conditions under section 1983, this prisoner's claims
related to conditions of confinement that were "simply derivative of the
possibility-of-parole claim, i.e., the length of his confinement ... [and were]
... completely subsumed by the possibility of parole claim. 38 2 Thus, under
these specific circumstances, the conditions of confinement claim could not
be asserted under section 1983.383
Brennan and Dixon aside, state prisoner condition of confinement claims
may almost always be asserted under section 1983. The question then arises
whether or not these claims are also within the scope of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction.3 4 This issue can be especially important where the in-
mate's conditions claim has been rejected by the state court and the inmate
seeks to avoid the preclusive effect of the state judgment by seeking relief
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 5
Habeas corpus was at one time available only to seek release from custody3 6
and it was considered "an inappropriate method for challenging prison
conditions. 38 7 However, in its 1969 decision in Johnson v. Avery,388 the
Supreme Court seemed to agree with the district court's treatment of the
prisoner's challenge to his transfer to maximum security for preparing legal
papers in violation of prison regulations as a petition for habeas corpus. In
Wilwording v. Swenson 8 9 the Supreme Court, citing Johnson, stated that a
state prisoner's challenge to "living conditions and disciplinary measures
while confined in maximum security ... " is "cognizable in habeas corpus,"
as well as under section 1983.
381. 741 F.2d at 125.
382. Id.
383. See also Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982) (challenges to denial of adequate
medical care and emergency reprieves arise out of challenge to legality of detainers and are
within the scope of habeas corpus).
384. The number of prisoner habeas corpus petitions challenging prison conditions appears
to be small. Turner, supra note 245, at 612 n.20.
385. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
386. Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1370; Note, Developments, supra note 32,
at 1079.
387. Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1974). The Willis court noted that
[t]his restrictive view was premised primarily upon the same belief that gave rise to
the more general 'hands off' doctrine, that is, that prisoner complaints relating to
conditions of confinement could only be addressed to those prison authorities who
had responsibility for those conditions.
Id.
388. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Johnson.
389. 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).
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The Supreme Court in Preiser followed Johnson and Wilwording and
recognized that habeas corpus may "be available to challenge such prison
conditions. ' ' 390 The Court was far from committal, however, stating that
"[w]hen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints
during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove
the restraints making the custody illegal." 3 91 It then specifically disclaimed
any intent to explore the limits of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy
to a section 1983 claim. 92 More recently, the Court explicitly left open
whether habeas corpus may be used to review the constitutionality of con-
ditions of confinement. 393
In contrast to the Supreme Court's noncommittal stance, the weight of
circuit court authority supports the use of federal habeas corpus to test the
constitutionality of conditions of confinement.3 94 When a federal court finds
a condition of confinement to be unconstitutional, it may order release from
the unconstitutional custody "subject to imposition of the potential lawful
custody." 39 The prisoner's duration of confinement is thereby not affected
390. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973).
391. Id. (citing Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1084). Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Preiser takes the position that a state prisoner who attacks conditions of confinement
may utilize section 1983 or federal habeas corpus. 411 U.S. at 504-06, 508 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) ("The Court has already
recognized instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed under either form
of relief.").
392. 411 U.S. at 500 ("But we need not in this case explore the appropriate limits of habeas
corpus as an alternative remedy to a proper action under § 1983.").
393. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979) (suit by federal pre-trial detainees).
394. See Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1987); Coates v. Smith, 746 F.2d 393
(7th Cir. 1984); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, reh'g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Yeager v. Wilkinson, 464
U.S. 861 (1983); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982); Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d
1126 (3d Cir. 1980) (implicit holding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Warren v. Cardwell,
621 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1980); Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980); Roba v. United
States, 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J., concurring); Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720, 726 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975); Willis v.
Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974); Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1209 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1974). Contra Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing petition challenging
terms and conditions of confinement); United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1979)
(refusing to vacate sentence where trial court failed to advise defendant of possibility that
special parole term could be lifetime); Cook v. Hanberry, 592 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.) (alleged
mistreatment of prisoner not grounds for release from prison), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932
(1979); Rhodes v. Craven, 425 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1970) (habeas corpus not proper remedy for
prisoner who sought access to legal books); Granville v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969) (no
allegation of facts showing either discrimination or conspiracy). The Fifth Circuit decision in
Granville appears to be superceded by its more recent decision in Streeter, 618 F.2d 1178. The
Ninth Circuit decisions in Rhodes and Crawford appear to be superceded by the decision in
Warren, 621 F.2d 319.
395. Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1082. See also Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d
943, 946 (7th Cir.) ("[H]abeas corpus is the proper remedy for getting from a more to a less
restrictive custody . . ."), cert denied sub nom. Yeager v. Wilkinson, 464 U.S. 861 (1983).
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by the judicial relief. Current decisional law thus takes the correct position
that condition of confinement claims may be asserted by state prisoners
either under section 1983 or federal habeas corpus. 396
4. Challenges to the place of confinement
There are two types of prisoner challenges to the place of confinement:
(1) intra-prison challenges to solitary, segregated, or other disciplinary con-
finement seeking transfer back to the general prison population; and (2)
inter-prison challenges to confinement in the present institution seeking
transfer to another institution. The first type of claims generally are treated
as attacks on the conditions of -confinement within the scope of section
1983.197 Whether. these claims are also within the scope of habeas corpus
depends upon whether or not habeas may be employed to contest conditions
of confinement. 39
396. See supra note 394.
397. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (challenging solitary conefinement), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); Toussaint v.
McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1986) (challenging relocation of prisoners within
same facility), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987); McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057
(11th Cir. 1982) ("Even if McKinnis prevails on all of his claims and receives all the relief he
demands, the duration of his sentence will not be shortened by one moment."); Campbell v.
McGuider, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pre-trial detainee facility); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (segregated confinement), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
Contra Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum) ("Plaintiffs' original
complaint, seeking release from the imposition of administrative segregation without due process,
would be appropriately treated as a habeas corpus petition, requiring exhaustion of state judicial
remedies.").
The Ninth Circuit in Toussaint describes Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1111-12, reh'g
denied, 737 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984), as having "held that habeas corpus provided the exclusive
remedy for obtaining an order compelling release from administrative detention." Toussaint,
801 F.2d at 1103 n.24. In Boudin, however, habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy and federal
habeas corpus was not available because "[tlhe prison officials were not acting under color of
state law for the purposes of Boudin's complaint." Boudin, 732 F.2d at 1112 n.2. A transfer
of a state prisoner within a prison does not work a deprivation of a liberty interest unless the
state law specifies that transfers will not occur absent specified substantive predicates. Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) ("It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable
and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement
ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.").
398. See supra notes 384-95. For cases holding that federal habeas corpus is available to
prisoners who seek release from solitary or disciplinary confinement and transfer back to the
general prison population, see, e.g., Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, reh'g denied, 737 F.2d
261 (2d Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Yeager
v. Wilkinson, 464 U.S. 861 (1983); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982). Contra
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We do not believe that such
relief falls within the traditional core of habeas corpus."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987).
Boudin, Jackson, and McCollum involved federal prisoners. McCollum makes the point that
if confinement within a certain prison unit is unconstitutional, "the prisoner ought to have a
remedy that gets him out of it, and habeas corpus is the normal remedy for one unlawfully
confined." 695 F.2d at 1046.
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It is established that the second type of claim may be asserted in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding3 because a claim of unlawful confinement in the
wrong institution is a claim of unlawful physical restraint. The more difficult
issue is whether or not such a claim also may be asserted under section
1983.40 In Humphrey v. Cady,40' a pre-Preiser case, the Supreme Court
stated that the petitioner's claim that he was unlawfully committed to a state
prison rather than a mental hospital was properly brought within the scope
of federal habeas corpus402 With respect to the use of section 1983, the
Court stated ambiguously that "some or all of petitioner's claims may be
entitled to be treated as claims for relief under . . .section 1983, in which
case no exhaustion is required." 43
The few lower court decisions on this issue have reached different results.
Of the decisions taking the position that section 1983 is available, one was
decided pre-Preiser,4 another contains virtually no analysis, 45 and two
others are limited to their specific circumstances.4 In Villa v. Frazen,407 a
prisoner was placed in a state medical facility following his conviction and
sentencing. He claimed that he was receiving inadequate treatment and sought
transfer to an adequate state medical facility. Under these specific circum-
stances, the district court found that the prisoner's claim could be asserted
under section 1983 because his request did "not necessarily involve release
from the state's custody, but rather placement in any constitutionally suf-
ficient facility." 4°s The court read the plaintiff's complaint to contest the
"conditions rather than the propriety of his custody."
A similar approach was taken in Swansey v. Elrod,41 0 where prisoners
sought transfer to another institution. While recognizing that there was
399. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486 (dictum); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re
Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); Neal v. Director, 684 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Warren v.
Cardwell, 621 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1980); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Kearney
v. Dalsheim, 586 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Parson v. Keve, 413 F. Supp. 111 (D. Del.
1976); Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 341 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973).
400. In dicta, the Preiser Court stated that a prisoner's claim "that he is unlawfully confined
in the wrong institution" is a grievance "that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical
restraint" for which federal habeas corpus is available. 411 U.S. at 486 (citing In re Bonner,
151 U.S. 242 (1894) and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)).
401. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
402. The Court's recognition that the claim was properly asserted in a federal habeas
proceeding is implicit in its discussion of the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.
Preiser cites Humphrey as an example of a habeas corpus proceeding. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486.
403. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 516 n.18.
404. Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 77 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
405. Cooper v. Elrod, 622 F. Supp. 373, 374 n.1 (N.D. I11. 1985).
406. Villa v. Franzen, 511 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. I11. 1981); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp.
1138, 1142 (N.D. I11. 1975).
407. 511 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. I11. 1981).
408. Id. at 234 (emphasis in original).
409. Id.
410. 386 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D. I11. 1975).
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authority stating that habeas corpus was the proper remedy for prisoner
challenges to the location of incarceration, the court found that the requested
transfer was an incidental form of relief which was requested only if the
conditions could not be corrected in the present place of confinement. If
the conditions could be corrected in the existing institution the constitutional
violations could be rectified without the necessity of transfer to another
institution. Under these circumstances the court construed the complaint as
an attack on the conditions of confinement within the scope of section 1983.
Villa and Swansey are limited by their specific circumstances and, thus, do
not answer the general question as to the availability of section 1983 to
contest confinement in a particular penal institution.
Three other district court decisions take the contrary position and hold
that prisoner claims for the right to be transferred to another institution fall
within the scope of habeas corpus and not section 1983.41 This position is
supported by dicta in the Preiser opinion.412 While the Court did not spe-
cifically state that habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy in these
circumstances, the fact that it regards the relief as a form of release from
confinement indicates that it views the claim as being within the "core" of
habeas corpus and, therefore, beyond the scope of section 1983. Under this
view, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy to seek a transfer to
another institution, except perhaps where a prisoner's request for transfer is
merely incidental to an attack on prison conditions.
There is, however, a strong argument that section 1983 should be available
to secure transfer to a different penal facility, at least when such a transfer
would not bring about a loss of the state's jurisdiction to confine. Under
these circumstances, the transfer would not result in either immediate or
speedier release from confinement, but merely change the geographical lo-
cation of confinement. Viewed in this light, the claim is analogous to an
attack upon the conditions of confinement.
The significance of section 1983 to contest confinement in a particular
prison has been greatly diminished as a result of three Supreme Court
decisions. 413 In each case the Court recognized, without discussion, that
section 1983 was the appropriate remedy for a prisoner allegedly deprived
of procedural due process rights arising from the transfer from one institution
to another. 41 4 In Montanye and Meachum, the Court ruled that "absent
411. Kearney v. Dalsheim, 586 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Parson v. Keve, 413 F. Supp.
111 (D. Del. 1976); Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1401 (5th
Cir. 1974).
412. The Court stated that when a prisoner claims, "that he is unlawfully confined in the
wrong institution .... his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical constraint,
and ... habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from such
confinement." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973). See supra note 398.
413. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 288 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). See also Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (intra-prison nonpunitive transfers).
414. The availability of section 1983 to litigate prisoner procedural due process claims is
discussed in the text, Section A(5) infra, at p. 70-74.
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some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be
transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified
events," the transfer of a prisoner does not work to deprive him of a
protected liberty interest. 415 Because "[clonfinement in any of the State's
institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the con-
viction has authorized the State to impose," prison transfers do not deprive
a prisoner of a liberty interest created directly by the Constitution.416 The
Olim court extended the rationale of Meachum and Montanye, which in-
volved intra-state transfers, to inter-state transfers.4 1 7
The liberty interests protected by procedural due process may be created
by the Constitution or by state law, while "substantive due process rights
are created only by the Constitution. '41s Therefore, while Meachum, Mon-
tanye, and Olim deal with procedural due process claims, those cases support
the conclusion that inmates have no substantive due process right to be
confined in any particular penal facility. These decisions have thus drastically
limited the constitutional claims that prisoners may lodge against inter-prison
transfers.419
5. Procedural due process claims
A substantial portion of federal court prisoners' rights litigation consists
of claims involving administrative procedural protections, including stan-
415. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-26; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242.
416. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
417. "Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any
particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated
in any particular State." Olim, 461 U.S. at 245.
Prison transfers can create serious harm. As one expert has observed:
Few things cause a prisoner greater grief. Such a transfer may send him far from
home, family, and lawyers. Equally important, it may move him out of a prison
where he has learned how to survive, what can get him into trouble, which guards
and inmates to avoid, which are friends and allies; he may be in a useful educational
or other program that is not available to him elsewhere or may have worked himself
into a good job.
H. SCHWARTZ, THE BURGER YEARS 184 (Viking 1987).
418. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
419. See Turner, supra note 245, at 630 (after Meachum and Montanye, most section 1983
prison transfer cases are summarily dismissed). A prisoner who has been transferred from a
prison to a mental hospital is deprived of a protected liberty interest. In Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980), the Court recognized, in the context of a section 1983 procedural due process
claim, that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital works a deprivation of liberty as
defined by the Constitution because "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within
the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual." Id.
at 493 (citations omitted). Additionally, a prisoner who asserts that a prison transfer was in
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right states a proper constitutional claim. See
Montayne, 427 U.S. at 242, 244 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to transfers "not otherwise
violative of the Constitution..."); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1098 n.13 (7th Cir. 1982);
McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979); Hohman v. Hogan, 597 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1979); Garland v. Polley, 594 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1979); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 916 (1979); Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.
1976).
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dards, notice and a hearing, and reasons for adverse determinations. These
claims arise out of a wide variety of circumstances including the denial or
revocation of good-time credits, denial or revocation of parole, revocation
of probation, prison classification, denial of work release or home furloughs,
segregated confinement, and transfers to other prisons.
420
In Preiser, two of the three plaintiffs claimed that they were denied their
right to procedural due process when their good-time credits were revoked.4 2'
The district court ordered the good-time credits restored, which entitled the
prisoners to immediate release on parole. 422 While the Court held that this
relief was within the exclusive domain of federal habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court's subsequent decisions in Wolff v. McDonnel4 23 and Gerstein v.
Pugh424 provide substantial, if not conclusive, support for the proposition
that procedural due process claims that do not seek immediate or speedier
release from prison may be asserted under section 1983.425
The overwhelming weight of lower federal court authority supports this
conclusion.4 26 In Williams v. Ward,427 Judge Friendly persuasively presented
420. The Supreme Court has granted prisoners procedural due process protections in a variety
of contexts. See, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987) (parole release);
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole release); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (rescission of good-time credits); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(parole revocation); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (probation revocation). The
Court's decisions in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981), which hold that in cases of random and unauthorized deprivations adequate state
judicial remedies satisfy procedural due process, have made it more difficult for prisoners to
succeed on their procedural due process claims.
421. Plaintiff Rodriguez asserted that he received no notice or hearing on the charges for
which he had been punished and plaintiff Kritsky alleged that his summary punishment deprived
him of good-time credits without due process of law. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 478,
481 (1973).
422. Id. at 481.
423. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
424. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Wolff and Gerstein.
425. In addition, a number of other Supreme Court decisions concerning the procedural due
process rights of state prisoners seem to assume, without discussion, that the action was properly
filed under section 1983. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980); Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), aff'g, 467 F. Supp. 397 (N.D.
Cal 1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976); Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). Two procedural due
process actions were brought as habeas corpus proceedings, but the Court did not discuss the
section 1983-habeas corpus issue in either case. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See also Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848,
852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978) (referring to habeas corpus as a "viable alternative"). Preiser refers to
Morrisey as a claim within the scope of habeas corpus because the prisoner contested the
revocation of probation which resulted in reincarceration, but Preiser did not analyze the
procedural due process nature of the claim presented in Morrisey. 411 U.S. at 486.
426. Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1986);
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a rationale in support of the availability of section 1983 to contest the
constitutionality of prison procedures:
Although the relief sought by petitioner [i.e., procedures employed on
applications for parole release] may improve his chances for parole, the
question of his release and of the length of his confinement still lies within
the sound discretion of the [parole] board, unlike Preiser where the
restoration of good-conduct-time credits would have resulted automatically
in the shortening of the prisoners' confinement.428
Prisoner claims that contest the absence or the sufficiency of the standards
used by prison officials in making determinations, challenge the manner in
which those determinations are made and, if successful, do not automatically
terminate or shorten the length of confinement.4 29 Most courts, therefore,
properly treat these claims as procedural due process claims that may be
asserted under section 1983.430
There is a minority view that a claim for procedural protections is within
the scope of habeas corpus because the procedural relief sought "[is] pre-
paratory to the ultimate relief sought . . . release from confinement itself."
43
'
Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 694 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982); Pope v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1981); Chancery Clerk of Chicksaw County, Miss. v. Wallace,
646 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1981); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1981); Fernandez v. Trias
Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978); Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex
v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Haymes v.
Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400, 406 n.8 (4th Cir. 1975);
Hiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1975); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir.
1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925
(2d Cir. 1974) (statement of reasons for denial of parole), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
427. 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
428. Id. at 1150. See also Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1986); In re United
States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d
1078 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1986); Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 694
F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1982); Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1974); McCray v. Dietz, 517 F. Supp. 787
(D.N.J. 1980); Haymes v. Regan, 394 F. Supp. 711, 713 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd as modified, 525
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). Judge Friendly also took the position that a request for new procedural
protections is a remedy outside the scope of federal habeas corpus. Williams, 556 F.2d at 1150-
51. But see Huggins, 798 F.2d at 204.
429. See In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (federal
prisoner's challenge to parole release guidelines is not within the exclusive scope of federal
habeas corpus).
430. Wright v. Cuyler, 624 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1980); Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th
Cir. 1978); Tunin v. Ward, 78 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp.
1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
431. Baskins v. Moore, 362 F. Supp. 187, 191 (D.S.C. 1973). Accord Huggins v. Isenbarger,
798 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519
F.2d 728, 736 (4th Cir.) (Bryan, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). In
Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 1984), the court relied on the fact that "the
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This view, however, misses the essential points: (1) that a prisoner who seeks
procedural protections is not asking for immediate or speedier release; and
(2) that the adjudication of the sufficiency of the procedural due process
requirements does not attack the constitutionality of a prisoner's confine-
ment.4 3 2 In addition, as one commentator has observed, "[t]he 'ultimate
object' ellipsis provide[s] no guidance, for every prisoner hopes at some
point to secure his freedom. ' 433
Some courts, principally in the Fifth Circuit, have taken a middle position
and allow facial attacks on state procedures within the scope of section 1983.
These courts, however, disallow claims for deficient procedures in a particular
prisoner's case unless brought in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 43 4 These
courts support this middle position as a "workable balance between Preiser
and Wolff," and an acknowledgement that it is often difficult to determine
"from the usual petition not only precisely what relief is sought but also
what would be the result of that relief." ' 43 This reasoning fails to recognize,
however, that when procedural due process relief is sought, "as applied"
procedural challenges, like facial procedural challenges, do not seek or
require adjudications of entitlement to immediate or speedier release because
ultimate relief this petitioner seeks is release," in order to find the constitutional challenge to
a state's post-conviction procedures within federal habeas corpus. The section 1983-federal
habeas corpus distinction in the context of challenges to post-conviction procedures is discussed,
infra notes 436-37 and accompanying text.
432. However, if the procedural relief requested will for "all intents and purposes" be
tantamount to ordering release on parole, the claim might properly be considered one for
habeas corpus. Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D.N.J. 1981).
433. Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1382.
434. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1987); Johnson v.
Pfeiffer, 821 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1983); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1980); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1979); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th
Cir. 1977); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Derrow v. Shields,
482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980). But see Williams v. McCall, 531 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1976)
(claim of denial of interview to particular applicant for parole is within the scope of section
1983).
In Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982), the
court ruled that while claims of deficient procedures as applied to particular cases generally are
within the scope of habeas corpus, section 1983 was available in the case at bar because the
plaintiff had been released on parole and could not obtain effective relief in a habeas corpus
proceeding. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
435. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1987); Derrow
v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (W.D. Va. 1980). The Fifth Circuit employed similar
reasoning in Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975). The Leonard court allowed plaintiffs to challenge the use of
disciplinary records to determine parole release and other classifications in a section 1983 class
action because "the specific and concrete effect of such an injunction on the status of each
prisoner is highly speculative." Id. at 824. The court did not decide the section 1983-habeas
corpus issue for the named plaintiff, noting only that the effect of granting the requested relief
on the named plaintiff might be different than the effect on the class. Id. at 824 n.5. See infra
notes 520-24 and accompanying text.
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they leave the question of release with the appropriate prison officials. Thus,
section 1983 should be available for both facial and "as applied" procedural
due process claims, so long as these claims do not seek immediate or quicker
release.
6. Challenge to post-conviction review procedures
Some prisoners have sought to challenge the constitutionality of a state's
post-conviction review procedures in federal court. The prevailing view is
that such claims are not within the jurisdiction of federal habeas corpus
because this remedy is intended to provide a vehicle for contesting the
constitutionality of state custody and does not authorize review of state post-
conviction proceedings. 436 An attack on the constitutional adequacy of a
post-conviction proceeding is not an attack on the fact or duration of
confinement because, even if successful, the prisoner would not be entitled
to immediate or speedier release but only to enhanced post-conviction pro-
cedures. 437
Because challenges to state post-conviction procedures are not within
federal habeas corpus, there is obviously no section 1983-habeas corpus
overlap to be reconciled. Moreover, there is no reason to exclude these
constitutional claims from section 1983.438 The prisoners in such cases seek
procedural due process protections from the federal courts, and thus the
claims should be a proper subject of a section 1983 suit. 43 9 In Quails v.
Shaw," O for example, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the prisoner's request for
436. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986); Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir. 1984); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990
(1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977); Quails v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th
Cir. 1976); Bradshaw v. Oklahoma, 398 F. Supp. 838, 843 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Stokley v.
Maryland, 301 F. Supp. 653 (D. Md. 1969).
437. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
990 (1981); Bradshaw v. Oklahoma, 398 F. Supp. 838, 843 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Stokley v.
Maryland, 301 F. Supp. 653, 657 (D. Md. 1969).
438. The Bradshaw court stated that complaints alleging defects in state post-conviction
proceedings did not raise federal constitutional questions because "Ithere is no federal consti-
tutional requirement that the state provide a means of post conviction review of state court
convictions." Bradshaw, 398 F. Supp. at 843. This overly broad statement ignores the fact that
errors of constitutional magnitude may occur in the course of post-conviction proceedings. See,
e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (constitutional right of indigent to assigned
counsel on appeal from judgment of conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(constitutional right of indigent to trial transcript necessary to take appeal).
439. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986) (ineffective assistance of counsel in
collateral post-conviction action); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985)
(failure to preserve police "street files"); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984)
(denial of transcript needed to appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977) (denial
of trial transcript needed to appeal); Quails v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976) (denial of
records to appeal).
440. 535 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1976).
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certain court records, allegedly necessary to institute collateral proceedings,
was within section 1983 because, even if the prisoner prevailed in the action,
"the court's opinion would not impinge in any manner on the validity of
his criminal conviction, and therefore habeas corpus is not an appropriate
remedy . . . .
The First Circuit, on the other hand, has reached the opposite result. In
Dickerson v. Walsh," 2 a prisoner challenged the constitutionality of the
state's post-conviction review procedure. In an unusual twist, the prisoner
asserted the claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding but the state
advocated the use of section 1983.4 3 The court found that the claim could
be asserted only in a habeas corpus proceeding after state remedies had been
exhausted because (1) the "ultimate relief" sought was release, and (2)
considerations of comity required that the state have the first opportunity
to correct its own criminal procedures. As noted above, the "ultimate
relief" rationale is not persuasive and comity, by itself, should not suffice
to place a claim within federal habeas corpus, especially where, as in Dick-
erson, the state itself advocated the use of section 1983.44
In Kirby v. Dutton,"6 the Sixth Circuit specifically and persuasively re-
jected the analysis of Dickerson. The Kirby court reasoned that to come
within the scope of habeas corpus
the petition must directly dispute the fact or duration of the confinement.
Though the ultimate goal . . . is release from confinement, the result of
habeas review of the specific issues before us [i.e., denial of effective
assistance of counsel in the post-conviction proceeding] is not in any way
related to the confinement." 7
It is true that granting the procedural relief requested will enable the
prisoner to pursue and perhaps enhance the chances of immediate or speedier
release. Any release, however, would not derive from the federal court order,
441. See also Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (claimed denial of a
transcript needed to appeal might be "characterized as a species of the conditions of confinement
cases").
442. 750 F.2d 150, 152 (Ist Cir. 1984).
443. Id. at 153 n.6. See supra note 161.
444. 750 F.2d at 153-54. See also Borning v. Cain, 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985) (viewed
claim of denial of effective direct appeal in state court as a result of inadequate access to law
library as attack on constitutionality of conviction).
445. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text for a disscussion of the ultimate relief
rationale. When dealing with abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the
Supreme Court has taken the position that "[i]f the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a
federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back
into the State's own system." Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471,
480 (1977). Accord Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978). See supra notes 260-67
and accompanying text for a discussion of federalism and comity under Younger.
446. 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986).
447. Id. at 248 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Accord Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d
318, 319 (5th Cir. 1976).
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but from a state court determination of the post-conviction proceeding."4
In this respect, challenges to state post-conviction procedures are analogous
to procedural due process claims against prison administrative determina-
tions. The one major difference between challenges to prison administrative
determinations and post-conviction review procedures is that the latter may
require federal court relief against the state judicial system, thereby bringing
the claim within the potential grasp of Younger v. Harris449 abstention. The
fact that a claim is within section 1983 does not of course mean that it is
appropriate to grant relief that operates against a pending state judicial
proceeding. A forceful argument can be made that Younger abstention
normally should preclude federal court relief that interferes with state post-
conviction proceedings. Under current Supreme Court decisional law, Younger
may require abstention because the state is a party to these proceedings and
especially important state interests concerning the proper functioning of a
state's criminal justice system are implicated.4 5 0
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Palmer v. City of Chicago45' demonstrates
how Preiser and Younger abstention interact in this area.4 2 In Palmer, the
plaintiffs in subclass A had been convicted of felonies and sentenced in state
court while the plaintiffs in subclass B were charged with felonies and were
awaiting trial. The complaint sought injunctive relief to restrain the con-
cealment and destruction of police "street files. '453 The Palmer court found
that the subclass A plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief to preserve the
"street files" did not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement
and thus fell within section 1983.414 The court noted, however, that once a
448. Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977). As the Seventh Circuit has
stated:
To argue that the provision of the transcript might have resulted in a successful
appeal of Lumbert's murder conviction, a new trial, and possible acquittal, and
thereby would have indirectly affected the fact of his confinement, is to speculate
in a Palsgrafian fashion that provides too tenuous a basis for the determination
whether an action properly is characterized as an exclusive habeas corpus action.
Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1984).
449. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 261.
451. 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985).
452. For a discussion of the interaction of Preiser and Younger, see supra notes 260-67 and
accompanying text.
453. The complaint specifically sought the following injunctive relief:
(a) to restrain the defendants from continuing their alleged practice of concealing
exculpatory evidence contained in 'street files'; and (b) to preserve the existing street
files, in order that the plaintiffs can meaningfully proceed with their post-conviction
remedies and felony trials in Illinois state court, as well as their attempt under
section 1983, to obtain a declaratory judgment, a permanent injuction, and damages.
755 F.2d at 569. A "street file" is a police investigative working file. Id. at 564.
454. Id. at 573. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), espoused a doctrine which
required a realistic threat of future injury in order to have standing to obtain prospective relief.
Under that doctrine, the subclass A plaintiffs were found to be without standing to challenge
the concealment of exculpatory evidence contained in the street files because it was too
speculative that they would be subjected to this practice in the future.
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prisoner obtained his "street file," any subsequent attack upon the fact or
duration of his imprisonment in federal court would be limited to habeas
corpus relief.4 " The subclass B plaintiffs who were awaiting trial did not
fare as well. The court denied their claims for injunctive relief because they
fell within the O'Shea v. Littleton4 6 branch of the Younger doctrine, which
forbade federal courts from granting relief that would require an "ongoing
federal audit" or "major continuing intrusion" into the daily conduct of
state criminal proceedings .4
In sum, while challenges to the constitutionality of state post-conviction
review procedures are not within the jurisdiction of federal habeas corpus
and should be within the scope of section 1983, these claims will normally
be denied under Younger abstention principles.
7. , Challenges to extradition
It has been settled since 1885 that prior to being removed to the demanding
state, a prisoner may employ a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of
extradition under the extradition clause of the Constitution and its imple-
menting statute.4 15 In Brown v. Nutsch,459 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
455. 755 F.2d at 573.
456. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
457. Id. at 500, 502. Judge Cudahy, in dissent, "fail[ed] to see how ordering the preservation
of the files can in any way interfere with ongoing state proceedings." 755 F.2d at 582 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
458. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885). See Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir.
1980). The extradition clause of the Constitution provides:
A Person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee
from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the crime.
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
The clause is implemented by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182
(1982). The clause is not self-executing because it does not specifically establish a procedure by
which inter-state extradition is to take place. California v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 2433,
2437-38 (1987). "Realizing that the procedural guidelines in the federal statute needed expli-
cations, fifty-two states ... adopted the [Uniform Criminal Extradition Act] which provides
additional extradition procedures." United States v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 F. Supp.
9, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The Supreme Court has stated that the extradition clause contemplates
a summary and mandatory executive proceeding .... Once the governor has granted
extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than
decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether
the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether
the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether
the petitioner is a fugitive.
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1978). Accord California v. Superior Court, 107 S.
Ct. 2433 (1987).
The Doran Court held that "once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition
for extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause
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federal habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy prior to extradition. The court
stated:
Prior to his removal to the demanding state, the charged party can only
challenge his confinement by the asylum state authorities through the writ
of habeas corpus. This would require exhaustion of state remedies. A
section 1983 action is not available.4
This analysis is consistent with Preiser's central theme that when federal
habeas corpus is available as a remedy, section 1983 is not. The specific
habeas corpus remedy overrides the more general section 1983 remedy. The
Brown court also recognized the-settled rules that "[o]nce the prisoner has
been returned to the demanding state, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available to challenge his confinement upon grounds arising from conduct
in the asylum state," ' 61 and that a prisoner may not "attack the validity of
his conviction in the demanding state on the basis of improper extradition." 462
Brown is in accord with the prevailing view in other circuit courts of
appeals which agree that a prisoner who has been returned to the demanding
state may assert a violation of the extradition safeguards guaranteed by the
extradition clause and its implementing statute pursuant to section 1983.463
existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state." 439 U.S. at
290. The concurring opinion in Doran pointed out that the majority failed to consider the
application of the fourth amendment in this context. Id. at 290-98 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRUMNMA PROCEDURE § 3.1(), at 94 (1984). The extradition
clause and its implementing statute do not give courts in the asylum state authority to inquire
into the prison conditions of the demanding state. Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980), reh'g
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
459. 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980).
460. Id. at 763 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973)). The pages referred
to in Preiser do not discuss the extradition issue.
461. 619 F.2d at 763 (citing Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 706-08 (1888)). Accord Siegel
v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351
(W.D. Mo. 1970).
462. 619 F.2d at 763 (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436, 444 (1886)). In Frisbie, the Court restated "the rule announced in Ker .. .that the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."' 342 U.S. at 522.
463. Good v. Allain, 823 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1987); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 649-
50 (3d Cir. 1981); Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d
758 (8th Cir. 1980); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d
319 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th
Cir. 1974). Contra Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987); Adams v. Cuyler, 441 F.
Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated and remanded, 592 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449
U.S. 433 (1981); Raffone v. Sullivan, 436 F. Supp. 939 (D. Conn. 1977), remanded, 595 F.2d
1209 (2d Cir. 1979); Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v. Buie,
312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Va. 1970). The decisions recognizing the availability of section 1983
in this context have not focused upon the type of relief requested and apparently contemplate
claims for money damages. After recognizing that extradition challenges may be asserted under
section 1983, the court in Good v. Allain, 823 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1987), without explanation,
stated that "challenges to extradition must be made by petition for a writ of habeas corpus
where the permissible scope of the challenge is very narrow." Id. at 67.
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Because habeas corpus is not available in these circumstances, to rule oth-
erwise would effectively foreclose a prisoner "from any method of enforcing
the extradition safeguards recognized by the availability of the writ of habeas
corpus in the asylum state."' 6
The Preiser issue has not been discussed in the decisions dealing with the
availability of section 1983 after removal of a prisoner to the demanding
state.45 Rather, these decisions have focused on whether the extradition
clause and its implementing statute create rights that a prisoner may enforce.
The prevailing view in the federal appellate courts is that these provisions
do create judicially enforceable federal rights. "
8. Challenges to detainers
Constitutional challenges to the imposition of detainers that affect the
duration of confinement are within federal habeas corpus and not section
1983.61 By contrast, challenges to detainers that affect only the conditions
of confinement may be asserted under section 1983.46
464. Brown, 619 F.2d at 763. This part of Brown, however, relied in part upon the Eighth
Circuit's decision in McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1980), which was subsequently
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Allen
rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that "every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one
unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court .... " 449 U.S. at
103. A more persuasive reason for recognizing the availability of section 1983 in this context
is that if federal habeas corpus is not available, there is no overlap with section 1983 and no
Preiser puzzle to solve.
465. But see Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1987) (claim challenging validity
of extradition which was carried out does not lie under section 1983 but "is a thinly disguised
version of his unresolved habeas petition").
466. See supra note 463. Violations of the procedural rights set forth in the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, supra note 458, provide a basis for a section 1983 claim only when they also
constitute violations of federal law. Giano v. Martino, 673 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); United
States v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 F. Supp. 9, 16 (E.D. Pa. 1982). One authority has
held "that the conviction of a fugitive for the crime for which he was extradited bars any
action that he might otherwise have under Section 1983." Martin v. Sams, 600 F. Supp. 71,
72-73 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). A few decisions take the minority view that the extradition clause
and its implementing statute were designed to benefit only the states and not the individual.
See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum); Giano v. Martino,
673 F. Supp. at 94.
467. Veneri v. Missouri, 734 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1984); Mokone v. Fenton, 710 F.2d 998 (3d
Cir. 1983); Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982). It has been noted that "[a] detainer
is a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that, after
the prisoner has completed his present term, he will be available to the authority which has
placed the detainer." Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1081 n.44. See also United States
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 222 n.2 (5th Cir.
1987). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that failure to accord a prisoner the procedural
protections afforded by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is actionable under section 1983
because the Agreement is a federal law within the meaning of section 1983. Cuyler v. Adams,
449 U.S. 433 (1981).
468. Stevens, 674 F.2d 320.
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In Veneri v. Missouri,469 the Eighth Circuit ruled that a claim for injunctive
relief to remove a detainer in the form of a parole violation warrant is
cognizable only in a habeas corpus proceeding and not under section 1983
because removal of the detainer affected the length of confinement. In
Mokone v. Fenton,470 a prisoner who had been incarcerated in New Jersey
was the subject of a detainer based upon a New York State court conviction.
The prisoner sought injunctive relief to prohibit his transfer from New Jersey
to New York after the conclusion of his New Jersey sentence on the ground
that his New York conviction was invalid. The Third Circuit ruled that the
claim sought speedier release and was within federal habeas corpus because
the prisoner sought release from future confinement. The court observed in
a footnote that section 1983 relief would be available where a detainer results
in adverse prison conditions.47'
The Fifth Circuit carefully analyzed a series of detainer-conditions issues
in Stevens v. Heard.4 72 In Stevens, a prisoner who had been convicted and
confined contested two detainers that had been lodged against him as a
result of two other convictions. The sentences for the other convictions
would not begin to run until he had served his present sentence. The prisoner
claimed that the detainers were "improperly lodged against him because the
sentences which the detainers represent should have already run," and that
he had been denied adequate medical care, emergency reprieves, and the
opportunity to participate in various prison programs because of the out-
standing detainers. 413 He sought, inter alia, expungement of the detainers,
promotion to the status of "State Approved Trusty, Class III," an award
of "retroactive overtime," adequate medical care, damages for the denial
of "emergency reprieves," and an injunction prohibiting the prison officials
from considering the existence of any detainer in determining eligibility for
prison programs. 474
The Fifth Circuit ruled that: (1) the request to expunge the detainers clearly
challenged future confinement and, therefore, could be raised only in a
habeas corpus proceeding; 475 (2) the requests for promotion to the specified
trusty status and application of retroactive overtime also should be raised in
a habeas proceeding because, if granted, they would have the effect of
shortening the prisoner's confinement; (3) the claims for "emergency re-
prieves" and adequate medical care were within the scope of habeas corpus
because they too would require the court to determine the validity of the
469. 734 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1984).
470. 710 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1983).
471. Id. at 1002 n.12 (dictum).
472. 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982).
473. Id. at 323.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 323-24. For a discussion of expungement as a form of relief, see infra notes 504-
18 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37:85
1988] THE PREISER PUZZLE
detainers;476 but, (4) the request to enjoin prison officials from considering
the detainers in determining eligibility for prison programs was within section
1983 because it did not contest the validity of the detainers but rather "the
practice of considering any detainers in determining eligibility for prison
programs, such as work release or trusty programs. '477 Stevens thus correctly
recognized the distinction between challenges to detainers that may affect
the fact or duration of confinement, which fall within the exclusive domain
of habeas corpus, and those that relate to conditions of confinement, which
are within the scope of section 1983.
9. Other confinements: civil contempt, juvenile delinquents, mental
patients
The same principles that govern the section 1983-habeas corpus distinc-
tion for state prisoners also apply to constitutional claims asserted by those
who have been held in civil contempt, 478 juvenile delinquents, 479 and mental
patients .480 Because federal habeas corpus relief is available to contest custody
growing out of civil proceedings, 48' the potential overlap with section 1983
applies whenever a person in "civil custody" asserts a constitutional claim
that affects the fact or duration of confinement. As the Fourth Circuit has
stated, "[a]lthough Preiser involved a criminal prison term, its holding is
equally applicable to imprisonment for civil contempt.' '482
Claims by mental patients warrant separate discussion. It is well established
that federal habeas corpus is available to seek release from a mental insti-
476. The Stevens court also ruled that the claim for damages relating to these claims "should
be brought only after he has sought habeas relief in state court to determine the validity of the
detainers." 674 F.2d at 324. This is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's position, which reflects
the majority view, that the nature of the relief sought should not control the section 1983-
federal habeas corpus issue. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
477. 674 F.2d at 324.
478. Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1986).
479. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1978); Mercado v. Rock-
efeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Elrod, 622 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Coleman v. Stanziani, 570 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal dismissed, 735 F.2d 118 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F.
Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
480. See, e.g., Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Robinson,
509 F.2d 395, 397 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dictum); Project Release v. Prevost, 463 F. Supp. 1033
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (three judge court); Gomez
v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (three judge court), aff'd, 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
481. Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838, 840 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986). Federal habeas corpus
has been held inapplicable to claims of child custody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's
Servs., 458 U.S. 502 (1982); Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430, 431 (4th Cir. 1986); Anderson v.
Colorado, 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986).
482. Leonard, 804 F.2d at 840 n.2.
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tution .41 Thus, when this relief is sought, habeas corpus is the exclusive
federal remedy. 48 4 The Supreme Court, without discussing the Preiser issue,
has impliedly sanctioned the use of section 1983 by mental patients who seek
damages for unconstitutional confinement in mental institutions, 489 or who
contest the conditions of confinement in such institutionss4 6 or who challenge
the procedures surrounding civil commitment. 47 Lower federal court deci-
sions that discuss the section 1983-habeas corpus issue have sanctioned the
use of section 1983 to contest the procedures or standards employed in
determining whether or not an individual should be committed to a mental
institution.
48
1
The most extensive analysis of the Preiser issue in the civil commitment
context is contained in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chancery Clerk v.
Wallace.4 19 In that case, the plaintiffs lodged a constitutional challenge
against procedures the state employed to involuntarily commit individuals
to state mental institutions. The court ruled that involuntarily confined
patients may challenge the constitutionality of those procedures under section
1983 because the challenge is not a claim "which ask[s], or, if successful,
would result in automatic release from confinement. ' '4 90 The court acknowl-
edged, however, that when the patient's claim does seek release from con-
finement, federal habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy and section
1983 may not be employed.4 91
483. See Buthy v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 818 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1987); Souder v.
McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Robinson, 509 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Hartman v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965); United States ex rel. Antczak v. Superintendent, 354
F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Dalton, 231 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956); Bension v. Meredith,
455 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1978); Miller v. Director, 146 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd,
243 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1957).
One commentator has argued that the restraints imposed by civil commitment "such as
physical confinement or required regular visits to a doctor, are essentially similar to impris-
onment or parole in their effect on the petitioner." Note, Developments, supra note 32, at
1073 n.5.
484. See Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1981).
485. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
486. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
487. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
488. Chancery Clerk, 646 F.2d at 157; Project Release v. Prevost, 463 F. Supp. 1033, 1038-
39 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (three judge court);
Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (three judge court), aff'd, 412 U.S. 914
(1973). Gomez was decided by the district court pre-Preiser but was affirmed by the Supreme
Court post-Preiser. See Note, Preiser v. Rodriguez in Retrospect, supra note 6, at 1074. In
Goldy, the court stated that "[b]ecause plaintiffs in this case do not request release from
custody, they are not required to proceed by habeas corpus." 429 F. Supp. at 646.
489. 646 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1981).
490. Id. at 157.
491. The Chancery Clerk court stated:
Specific challenges to the constitutionality of confinement in state institutions fall
within the ambit of habeas corpus procedures, 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). This statutory
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The Chancery Clerk court's analysis distinguished challenges to civil com-
mitment from challenges to state court convictions. Once a court determines
that a criminal conviction is unconstitutional, there is no authority for
continuing to retain the defendant in custody. The court observed, on the
other hand, that involuntary commitment is not final, like a criminal judg-
ment would be, but is part of a continuing process and that a patient is
entitled to release only when he or she is no longer mentally ill.492 The
Chancery Clerk court cited no authority to support those statements and at
least some of the broad pronouncements that accompanied the court's
conclusion are of questionable validity.4 93 The results reached by the Chancery
Clerk court nevertheless, were correct, namely: (1) that a mental patient's
request for release from confinement is exclusively within federal habeas
corpus; and (2) that, like prisoners, mental patients who seek procedural
protections are contesting neither the fact nor the duration of their confine-
ment and, therefore, may assert those claims under section 1983.
B. Nature of Relief Requested
We have seen that either the nature of the relief sought or the nature of
the claim asserted may bring a claim within the exclusive purview of federal
habeas corpus. A claim for immediate or speedier release is, under Preiser
and its multifarious progeny, within the exclusive realm of federal habeas
corpus. Additionally, a claim that brings into question the validity of con-
provision requires that state remedies must be exhausted before release from con-
finement can be considered by the federal court.
Id. at 155. Section 1983 is thus unavailable if the challenge is "to the legality of the confinement
as such." Id. at 155-56.
492. The court reasoned as follows:
[By] contrast, there can be no absolute right to be released from confinement in a
mental institution for a person found to have been committed under procedures
which violate the inmate's civil rights. Equating the invalidty of a criminal conviction
with a finding that involuntary commitment procedures are invalid overlooks a
salient and controlling consideration. A criminal conviction results in a final and
settled binding judgment. Confinement of those who are victims of mental illness
is not a final and binding event; it is part of a process. There is no sentence and
there is no specific duration of confinement. A person who has been involuntarily
confined for mental illness is entitled to release when he or she is no longer mentally
ill. The law also recognizes there can be confinements of the mentally ill under
most summary procedures when it is necessary to protect a person from self injury
or injury to others.
Id. at 157.
493. Chancery Clerk implies that a state may continue to confine an individual who has been
confined in violation of her procedural due process rights. Other than in emergency circum-
stances, however, a state may not summarily confine an individual in a mental institution. See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-96 (1980) (requiring notice and a hearing.when a
prisoner is transferred to a mental hospital); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-29 (1979)
(due process requires that standard of proof in civil commitment proceeding be greater than
preponderance of the evidence standard); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)
(commitment to a mental hospital works a "massive curtailment of liberty").
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finement, though not requesting immediate or speedier release, falls within
federal habeas corpus under the majority view which focuses on the nature
of the claim rather than on the specific relief requested. 494 We have seen
that most courts take the position that claims for damages that implicate
the constitutionality of confinement may not be asserted under section 1983
until the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement has been satisfied. 495
Examination of three specific types of claims for relief warrent separate
treatment: declaratory relief, the expungement of records, and class action
relief.
1. Declaratory relief
A request for a declaratory judgment that a conviction, sentence detainer,
or denial of good-time credits is unconstitutional calls into question the
validity of the fact or length of confinement and may be asserted only in a
habeas corpus proceeding. 49 s For example, in Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird,497
the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that his constitutional right to
receive exculpatory Brady49a materials had been violated. The court ruled
that this claim was outside the scope of section 1983 and within federal
habeas corpus because the Brady claim called into question the constitution-
ality of the conviction. While the plaintiff did not specifically request release
from confinement, declaratory relief in plaintiff's favor would show that
release was required.4 99
494. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, the section
1983 damages claim might be barred by resjudicata if a person first exhausts all of his or her
state remedies. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
496. See Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987); Feeney v. Auger, 808 F.2d 1279
(8th Cir. 1986) (length of sentence); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986) (good time
credits); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 1984); Stevens v. Heard,
674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982) (length of sentence); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978)
(conviction); Wiggins v. Hess, 531 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1976) (sentence); Riley v. Kaye, 664 F.
Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1987) (indictment and conviction); Flaherty v. Nadjari, 548 F. Supp. 1127
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (conviction); Fast v. Wead, 509 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (attack on
trial procedures). See also Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declaratory
judgment not availabe to test constitutionality of court martial conviction; habeas corpus is
exclusive remedy).
There is a split of opinion on whether a declaratory judgment that a conviction is unconsti-
tutional may be issued under section 1983 when the federal court plaintiff is not in custody,
as in cases of expired sentence and fine only convictions. Compare Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d
567 (5th Cir. 1978) (declaratory judgment under section 1983 available) with Hanson v. Circuit
Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979) (section 1983 action unavailable).
For a full discussion of the availability of section 1983 to test the constitutionality of a
conviction when the federal plaintiff is not in custody, see supra notes 319-45 and accompanying
text.
497. 723 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1984).
498. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
499. Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 682.
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On the other hand, in Wolff v. McDonnell,5°° the Supreme Court ruled
that a federal court may issue a declaratory judgment under section 1983,
"as a predicate to a damage award" based on the unconstitutionality of the
procedures used in a prison disciplinary case. There is no reason, however,
to allow a declaratory judgment only when it is a predicate to a damages
award. Other language in Wolff supports the conclusion that a declaratory
judgment determining the constitutionality of prison administrative proce-
dures may be sought under section 1983.501
Under the majority approach, which focuses on the nature of the prisoner's
claim, a request for declaratory relief that a conviction, sentence, or denial
of good-time credits is unconstitutional may not be litigated under section
1983 because the relief implicates the fact or length of confinement.
0 2
Conversely, prisoner claims for declaratory relief which do not implicate the
fact or length of confinement, such as those which contest procedural
deficiencies or the conditions of confinement, may be asserted under section
1983.
2. Expungement
It is established that the federal courts have the inherent power to order
the expungement of arrest records, convictions, and other records relating
to criminal proceedings,0 3 and that this may be an appropriate form of
equitable relief under section 1983.104 There are circumstances, however,
500. 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974).
501. The Court stated that a federal court, in a section 1983 action, may "determine the
validity of the procedures for revoking good-time credits and . . . fashion appropriate remedies
for any constitutional violations ascertained, short of ordering the actual restoration of good-
time already cancelled." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). See supra notes 291-
317 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wolff.
502. See supra note 496.
503. See Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978);
United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836
(1975). The power to expunge should be exercised only in narrow circumstances. Bromley, 561
F.2d at 1364; Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972). For examples of cases
granting expungement, see United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (arrest
records expunged where arrests made to disrupt voter registration drives); Bilick v. Dudley, 356
F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (arrests violated freedom of speech and freedom of association);
Wheeler v. Goodmann, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three judge court) (arrest record
expunged where arrest made pursuant to unconstitutional vagrancy statute), vacated, 401 U.S.
987 (1971); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (arrest records expunged where
arrests designed to harass those with unpopular ideologies). For examples of cases denying
expungement, see United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Slaughter,
469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972).
504. See Maurer v. Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't, 691 F.2d 434, 437 (9th
Cir. 1982); Hall v. Unknown Named Agents, 647 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1987); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three judge court), vacated, 401 U.S.
987 (1971); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968); C. ANTEAu, FEDERAL Csvn.
RIGHTS ACTS 378 (2d ed. 1980).
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where a state prisoner's request to expunge a record may be made only in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
A request to expunge a record of conviction, detainer, or prison discipli-
nary record which, if granted, will terminate or shorten confinement, may
be made only in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 505 In Crow v. Kelly, °
the Eighth Circuit considered a petition for mandamus to order the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to remove the prisoner's state court
conviction and arrest record that the petitioner claimed were unconstitutional.
The Crow court ruled that the petitioner must first exhaust state remedies,
because the prayer for relief implicated the constitutionality of a state court
conviction and comity required that the state authorities be given the first
opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of the conviction. 07
In Stevens v. Heard,108 the Fifth Circuit ruled that the prisoner's request
to expunge two detainers that had been lodged against him as a result of
two convictions must be asserted in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The
sentences for those two convictions were not to begin until the prisoner had
completed his present sentence. Stevens urged, however, that the later two
sentences should have started to run when the convictions were entered. 5 9
The court determined that habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy because
Stevens's request "clearly" challenged any future confinement arising from
the two convictions.510
Two Seventh Circuit decisions written by Judge Posner analyzed requests
to expunge prison disciplinary records. In McCollum v. Miller, 5 1 three federal
prisoners sought to have their disciplinary infractions expunged because they
were concerned that the infractions might delay their release on parole.
Under federal regulations, it is within the Parole Board's discretion to
determine whether a disciplinary infraction should delay parole.512 The section
1983-habeas corpus Preiser issue was not directly involved because the case
involved federal rather than state prisoners. However, the McCollum court's
analysis is pertinent to the Preiser issue in the context of state prisoners. If
the court had determined that habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy
for federal prisoners because the expungement related to the duration of
confinement, then it would also be the appropriate remedy for state prisoners.
505. Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1987); Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982);
McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982); Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir.
1975).
506. 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1975).
507: The Crow court cited Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), preceded simply by a
"cf." signal. 512 F.2d at 755 n.6. The Crow opinion did not address whether the requested
expungement would affect confinement.
508. 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982).
509. Id. at 321.
510. Id. at 323-24.
511. 695. F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982).
512. 28 C.F.R. § 2.36(b) (1987).
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This would preclude state prisoners from utilizing section 1983 for a similar
challenge.
In fact, the McCollum court analyzed the issue by reference to Preiser
principles but did not definitively resolve it. The court found the case
somewhat similar to the procedural due process-parole release cases which
take the position that section 1983 is the appropriate remedy because, while
the procedures sought might enhance the prisoner's chances for parole, the
release decision remains with the parole board." 3 The court indicated, on
the other hand, that the procedural due process cases might be distinguishable
because the McCollum regulations, which specifically authorized the Parole
Board to consider disciplinary infractions, made it "likely, though not
certain, that getting a disciplinary finding expunged will accelerate a prison-
er's eligibility for parole and hence the date when he is paroled." 51 4
The Seventh Circuit asserted that the availability of habeas corpus should
depend upon the probability that expunging the disciplinary infraction will
shorten the period of confinement. The record was not sufficiently developed
on this point, so the court remanded the action to the district court for a
determination of the probable impact of an expungement on the length of
imprisonment." 5
In the Seventh Circuit's subsequent decision, Larsen v. Sielaffj16 the court
observed that while expungement of prison disciplinary records had been
ordered in at least one section 1983 case, albeit without discussion,5" 1 7 it was
more commonly ordered in habeas corpus proceedings. Moreover, the court
ruled that federal habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy where, as in Larsen,
"the plaintiff wants to expunge the disciplinary proceeding from his record
in order to shorten his present or future imprisonment." '5 "
513. The McCollum court quoted from the decision in Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977). For a full analysis of the procedural due
process cases, see supra notes 421-35 and accompanying text.
514. 695 F.2d at 1047.
515. "The McCullom court concluded:
If the evidence developed on remand shows that the outcome of the disciplinary
proceedings against these three inmates are reasonably likely to delay their parole
and thus lengthen their imprisonment, then presumably, by analogy to Preiser, their
suits can be maintained as habeas corpus proceedings.
Id. A Lexis search uncovered no proceedings on remand.
516. 702 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
517. McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1055 (lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam). In McDonnell
v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
the Eigth Circuit stated that it would be appropriate for the district court to order the
expungement of prison misconduct determinations that were arrived at in violation of procedural
due process rights. The Supreme Court did not specifically address the expungement issue, but
did state that the district court could fashion "appropriate remedies" for any constitutional
violations other than the actual restoration of good-time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555 (1974).
518. Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). In
Hall v. Unknown Named Agents, 647 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in
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3. Class action relief
There are few cases that discuss the effect of a class action on the Preiser
issue. This perhaps is due to the fact that the section 1983-habeas corpus
puzzle should be solved in the same manner in both class and individual
actions. It seems apparent that if the relief sought by a class of inmates
requires a determination of the validity of the fact or duration of confine-
ment, under Preiser the claim could not be litigated under section 1983, but
only in a habeas corpus proceeding. 1 9 There may be cases, however, where
the named plaintiff's claim implicates the validity of the fact or duration of
confinement though the claims of the class do not. In Leonard v. State
Probation and Parole Board,520 the plaintiffs challenged the use of discipli-
nary records to determine whether or not a prisoner was eligible for parole
release, work release, and other classifications. The Fifth Circuit found that
at least insofar as the unnamed class members were concerned, the action
was properly brought under section 1983 because "the specific and concrete
effect" of class injuctive relief on each prisoner's fact or length of confine-
ment "is highly speculative." 52 '
With respect to named plaintiff Leonard's individual claims, the court
recognized that because the effect of injunctive relief in his particular case
might be different than its effect on the class "[a]rguably, the principle
stated in Preiser may affect the relief to which Leonard would, individually,
be entitled in this case.' ' 2 2 The Leonard court found it unnecessary to reach
this point because the court ruled against the plaintiffs on the merits. It did
determine, however, that the fact that Leonard might not be entitled to relief
under section 1983 did not mean that he could not represent a class of
prisoners seeking relief under section 1983.523
part, 825 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1987), the court held that section 1983 was the appropriate remedy
to expunge a prison disciplinary record. The court reasoned that there was "no request for
transfer or for an amendment of the duration of the confinement, nor [was] there any
circumvention of the requirements for a habeas corpus petition." Id. at 141.
519. On the question of class habeas relief, see supra note 137. If class habeas relief was
allowed, it would be, presumably, limited only to those persons who satisfied the federal habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement. To rule otherwise would thwart the comity concerns behind the
exhaustion rule.
520. 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975).
521. Id. at 824. See also Tucker v. Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 501
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (dictum) ("Even if Tucker's suit is viewed as more in the nature of a habeas
corpus claim, his status as class representative permits him to proceed under 1983 on behalf of
the class.").
522. 509 F.2d at 824. See also Project Release v. Prevost, 463 F. Supp. 1033, 1039 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (because habeas corpus was not available to those class members who may be committed
in the future, section 1983 found proper).
523. The Leonard court analogized the situation to one in which a named plaintiff is permitted
to represent a class even though she is not entitled to individual relief because her claim became
moot after the action was commenced. 509 F.2d at 824 n.5. See United States Parole Comm'n
v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna
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The Leonard court's distinction between the individual and class claims
resulted from its emphasis on the probable impact of the relief requested
upon the fact or duration of confinement. 24 Because this impact may well
differ for the named plaintiff and the class, a court faced with a Preiser
issue in a class action context should inquire into whether or not the
individual and class claims require a separate analysis.
C. Preiser in the State Courts
Because the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts
over section 1983 claims,5 25 the issue may arise whether a state prisoner may
proceed under section 1983 or must proceed by a state habeas corpus
proceeding. This raises the basic question of whether or not Preiser principles
apply to state court actions. The decision in Preiser does not directly apply
to state court proceedings. The Supreme Court in Preiser plainly viewed the
case as requiring the reconciliation of two federal court remedies and relied
heavily upon the federalism-comity concerns that underlie the federal habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement. These concerns, which are implicated when
a federal court is asked to grant relief that affects the fact or duration of
state confinement, are simply not present when a state prisoner seeks relief
in state court.
This does not necessarily mean that all state prisoner constitutional claims
may be asserted in a state court section 1983 action. For one thing, certain
state prisoner constitutional claims are not within the scope of section 1983.
We have seen, for example, that release from confinement is not a form of
relief available under section 1983. 526 In addition, even where a prisoner does
not seek release from confinement, but seeks only monetary relief, there is
substantial authority that Congress intended federal habeas corpus as the
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
The fact that the effect of the relief upon the named plaintiff significantly differs from the
effect upon the class may raise questions as to whether or not the plaintiff is a member of the
class which she seeks to represent, whether the plaintiff is an adequate class representative, and
whether the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class. FED. R. Cirv. P.
23(a)(3), (4). That the named plaintiff must be a member of the class she purports to represent
is not explicitly mentioned in Rule 23 but is generally thought to be "self-evident." 7A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1761, 132-33 (1986).
524. The distinction drawn by the Leonard court between the individual and class claims
seems similar to the Fifth Circuit's distinction between facial procedural due process challenges,
which it finds to be within the scope of section 1983, and individual "as applied" procedural
due process claims, which it holds are not within section 1983. See supra notes 434-35 and
accompanying text. In both the class action and procedural due process contexts, the Fifth
Circuit's distinction is based upon the probable impact of the requested relief on the fact or
duration of confinement.
525. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
283 n.7 (1980). For an extensive analysis of state court section 1983 actions, see Steinglass, The
Emerging State Court 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAM L. REV. 381 (1984).
526. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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exclusive congressional remedy to attack state convictions.", Under this view,
a state court section 1983 claim would not lie to contest the constitutionality
of a state court conviction. It is also arguable that the states have sufficient
interests in requiring that claims relating to the fact or duration of confine-
ment be asserted in a state court habeas corpus proceeding, the procedure
historically employed to resolve such claims, rather than in a civil rights
action. 528
Few state court decisions discuss the section 1983-state habeas corpus
issue. Those that do rely upon Preiser to resolve the conflict.129 For example,
the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that the revocation of good-time
credits may not be challenged under section 1983 because Preiser held that
the proper method by which a prisoner could challenge the revocations as a
violation of due process is through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 30
Three other state courts have ruled, consistent with Preiser, that section 1983
is available to contest the conditions of confinement.53'
527. See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
528. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 191 (citing, Steinglass, supra note 525,
at 513-14). Professor Steinglass distinguishes state court attacks on convictions and sentences,
where the state interest in requiring the utilization of habeas corpus is greatest, from attacks
on administrative action, where he argues that the state interest in requiring resort to habeas
corpus is insufficient to outweigh the interest in making section 1983 available to vindicate
constitutional wrongs. Steinglass, supra note 525, at 514.
529. William v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643
P.2d 807 (1982); Beaver v. Chaffee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 364, 579 P.2d 1217 (1978); Mitchem v.
Melton, 167 W. Va. 21, 277 S.E.2d 895 (1981). Courts have relied upon Preiser to hold that
requests for good-time credits must be made in a state habeas corpus proceeding rather than
in a declaratory judgment action, Polsgrove v. Bureau of Corrections, 549 S.W.2d 834 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977); that a challenge to a disciplinary penalty that may affect eligibility for parole
is within the scope of state habeas corpus, Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976);
that a prisoner's claim for wrongful detention of his money is not within state habeas corpus,
Foster v. Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 565 P.2d 285 (1977); and that state administrative remedies
must be exhausted before resort is made to a state habeas corpus proceeding, In re Muszalski,
52 Cal. App. 3d 125, 125 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1975).
529. William v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643
P.2d 807 (1982); Beaver v. Chaffee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 364, 579 P.2d 1217 (1978); Mitchem v.
Melton, 167 W. Va. 21, 277 S.E.2d 895 (1981). Courts have relied upon Preiser to hold that
requests for good-time credits must be made in a state habeas corpus proceeding rather than
in a declaratory judgment action, Polsgrove v. Bureau of Corrections, 549 S.W.2d 834 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977); that a challenge to a disciplinary penalty that may affect eligibility for parole
is within the scope of state habeas corpus, Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976);
that a prisoner's claim for wrongful detention of his money is not within state habeas corpus,
Foster v. Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 565 P.2d 285 (1977); and that state administrative remedies
must be exhausted before resort is made to a state habeas corpus proceeding, In re Muszalski,
52 Cal. App. 3d 125, 125 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1975).
530. Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1980).
531. State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 113-14, 643 P.2d 807, 813 (1982); Beaver v. Chaffee,
2 Kan. App. 2d 364, 368, 579 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1978) (challenge to conditions of confinement
may be made "by way of injunction or declaratory judgment as well as by habeas corpus");
Mitchem v. Melton, 167 W. Va. 21, 24, 277 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1981) ("Thus, Preiser may be
viewed as establishing that ordinarily a 1983 action is appropriate where complaint is made to
the conditions of confinement and not it's duration.").
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VII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: RES JUDICATA AND THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
The section 1983-federal habeas corpus dichotomy has given rise to
specific procedural problems concerning res judicata and the statute of
limitations. While principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are gen-
erally applicable in federal court section 1983 actions, it is settled law that
res judicata does not apply in federal habeas corpus proceedings.532 The
Preiser issue has given rise to three specific preclusion issues: (1) the effect
of a state court habeas corpus ruling on a federal court section 1983 claim;
(2) the effect of a federal court federal habeas corpus ruling on a section
1983 claim; and (3) the collateral estoppel impact of a federal habeas corpus
ruling that favors a state inmate upon the prior state criminal conviction
and adverse state habeas corpus determination.
If a claim is found to be within the scope of federal habeas corpus, a
prisoner must first exhaust state remedies. Once the exhaustion requirement
is satisfied, a prisoner may not only pursue the federal habeas corpus remedy
in order to secure immediate or quicker release, but may also be able to
seek damages in federal court under section 1983.133 If a prisoner seeks relief
under section 1983, an issue may arise as to the preclusive effect of the state
habeas corpus ruling on the section 1983 claim.
The little authority that exists takes the position that a state court habeas
corpus ruling may be entitled to preclusive effect in a federal section 1983
action. This is the position taken by Justice Brennan in his Preiser dissent,5 34
in dictum in Wolff v. McDonnell,513 and in the one circuit court decision
that has given the issue serious consideration.53 6 The Ninth Circuit determined
in Silverton v. Department of Treasury5 37 that there is no reason to give
state habeas corpus decisions less preclusive effect than any other state court
532. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
533. One caveat is that the prisoner's claim must be within the scope of section 1983.
534. "[f traditional principles of res judicata are applicable to suits under 1983 . . . the
prior conclusion of the state court suit would effectively set at naught the entire federal court
proceeding." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
535. "[O]ne would anticipate that normal principles of res judicata would apply in such
circumstances." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 529, 555 n.12 (1974) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S.
at 499 n.14, where the Court expressly contemplated simultaneous litigation of claims properly
brought under section 1983 in federal court while fact or length of confinement claims are
litigated in state court habeas corpus proceedings).
536. Silverton v. Department of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981). Accord Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 35 (4th Cir. 1981) (Winter, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Coe v. Ziegler, 657 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Rullo
v. Rodriguez, 604 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1353.
Of course, because resjudicata does not apply in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a section
1983 judgment is not entitled to preclusive effect in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Heirens
v. Mizell, 729 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984); Maggard v. Moore, 613
F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
537. 644 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
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decision because state habeas corpus courts should be presumed to apply
appropriate constitutional standards, at least where there was a full and fair
hearing.3
Under the full faith and credit statute,3 9 the extent to which the state
habeas decision is entitled preclusive effect in a federal section 1983 action
depends upon the state law of preclusion. 4 Thus, in Rullo v. Rodriguez,5 41
the court ruled that a New York state court denial of a habeas corpus
petition barred a federal section 1983 claim where the prisoner sought to
litigate the same constitutional claim in each proceeding. The state court
ruling barred the section 1983 claim because, under New York's law of
preclusion, differences in legal theory and remedy do not deprive the initial
ruling of res judicata effect.542
A federal habeas corpus ruling also may be entitled to preclusive effect in
a federal section 1983 action.5 4 In Williams v. Ward,5" Judge Friendly
concluded that a judgment in a federal habeas corpus proceeding may be
entitled to preclusive effect in a section 1983 action as to the issues litigated
and determined in the habeas corpus proceeding. 45 Unlike federal habeas
corpus proceedings which are exempt from res judicata, there is no coun-
terpart rule that exempts the determinations in federal habeas proceedings
from preclusive effect in section 1983 actions.146
538. The Silverton court stated:
that because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually
rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent
section 1983 action if the state court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the
issue to be heard and determined under federal standards .... The mere difference
in the form of relief is unimportant.
Id. at 1347.
539. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
540. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
541. 604 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Accord Coe v. Ziegler, 657 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio
1987).
542. See Migra, 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
543. Warren v. McCall, 709 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Lucien v. Seidenfeld, 584 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Comment, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 120, at 1505.
While not discussing the issue in terms of preclusion, dicta in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 428 n.27 (1976), indicates that a ruling in favor of a state prisoner in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding should not operate in his favor in a section 1983 suit because "using habeas
corpus as a 'door opener' for a subsequent civil rights action would create the risk of injecting
extraneous concerns into that proceeding." Id. There may be other reasons for finding offensive
collateral estoppel inapplicable to the ruling in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Garza
v. Henderson, 779 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying offensive collateral estoppel effect to
federal habeas corpus ruling in federal court section 1983 action because defendants in the 1983
action were not parties to the habeas corpus proceeding).
544. 556 F.2d 1143, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
545. The fact that the remedies sought in the two proceedings are different "does not alone
suffice to differentiate the underlying claims." Williams, 556 F.2d at 1154.
546. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980). Because the Williams court had doubts
as to whether the claims in the two sections were identical, it decided to rest its decision on
the merits rather than resjudicata. Williams, 556 F.2d at 1155.
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If a state court habeas corpus ruling is adverse to the prisoner, but the
prisoner subsequently prevails in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, there
is authority that the federal judgment would "relieve him of the collateral
estoppel effect of the state judgment with respect to an ancillary civil rights
claim. '5 47 In fact, offensive collateral estoppel might attach to a federal
habeas corpus ruling in the prisoner's favor in a subsequent section 1983
action.4 1
Under the majority view, which focuses on the nature of the claim rather
than the specific relief sought, a claim for damages that calls into question
the validity of the fact or duration of confinement may not be litigated
under section 1983 until state remedies have been exhausted.5 49 When a claim
is within federal habeas corpus and a state prisoner has failed to exhaust
state remedies, the proper disposition is normally dismissal of the federal
proceeding. 50 There is a danger, however, that while a prisoner is pursuing
state remedies, the statute of limitations may be running on the section 1983
damages claim."' The courts uniformly agree that some action must be taken
by the federal district court to guard against the running of the limitations
period. The courts do not agree, however, on the nature of the appropriate
action. "I
There are a number of circuit court decisions which instruct the district
courts to decide whether, in light of the applicable state statute of limitations
rules, the section 1983 action should be dismissed without prejudice or held
in abeyance pending the exhaustion of state remedies. 513 Some courts take
547. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982);
Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 799 (D.N.J. 1981); Comment, Collateral Estoppel, supra
note 120, at 1502-03. The Hamlin court reasoned that "[w]hen applicable, the doctrine [of
collateral estoppel] precludes relitigation; however, if relitigation of the substantive issues is not
precluded the doctrine does not prevent a grant of any appropriate remedy." Hamlin, 664 F.2d
at 32.
548. But see supra note 543.
549. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
550. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838, 843 (4th
Cir. 1986).
551. Because there is no federal limitations period for section 1983 claims, the federal courts
borrow the governing period from state law that applies to state personal injury actions. Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
552. See Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2177 (1987).
553. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987); Borning
v. Cain, 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983);
Clark v. Williams, 693 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Dallas County Comm'rs,
689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d
362, 364 (8th Cir. 1981); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); Watson v.
Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1977); Connor v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir.
1977); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc). See also Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S.
Ct. 2177 (1987); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985); Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d
326 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the position that the section 1983 action should be stayed,55 4 while others
hold that the claim should be dismissed without prejudice.555 In determining
whether to dismiss or to stay the action, the state's tolling rules are a crucial
consideration,1 6 because if the state rule tolls the section 1983 claim during
the pendency of the federal habeas corpus proceeding, there is no need to
hold the section 1983 action in abeyance." 7 A state limitations provision that
tolls the limitations period for an imprisoned individual "protect[s] plaintiff
against a statute of limitations bar as to any civil rights claims which he
may eventually wish to assert after full pursuit of habeas corpus relief."55
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Preiser opinion ranged far beyond the specific issue presented to the
Court and suggests a noble intent on the part of the Justices to assist the
lower federal courts in resolving future section 1983-federal habeas corpus
conflicts. Given the seemingly endless situations where the need to choose
between section 1983 and habeas corpus arises, it is not surprising, and
554. Jones v. Smith, 835 F.2d 175, 176 (8th Cir. 1987); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th
Cir. 1987); Bailey v. Ness, 733 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1984); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1252
(Ist Cir. 1974); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909
(1975); Flaherty v. Nadjari, 548 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp.
794, 800 (D.N.J. 1981).
In Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985), the court stated that the correct disposition
was to stay the section 1983 action, but nevertheless affirmed the district court's dismisssal
without leave "to refile his section 1983 claim if and when he establishes, through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, that he was denied [his constitutional rights.]" Id. at 516. For a
discussion of Hadley, see Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 905 (1987).
In a case involving the Younger doctrine, the Supreme Court recently ruled that "even if the
Younger doctrine requires abstention here, the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather
than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the [pending] state pro-
ceeding." Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 529 (1988).
555. Pheler v. Schoen, 537 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976); Still
v. Nichols, 412 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1969); Riley v. Kaye, 664 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1987);
Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
556. State tolling rules govern federal section 1983 actions, so long as they do not conflict
with the policies of section 1983. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
557. Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1401 n.8 (7th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d
93, 97 (7th Cir. 1986); Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v.
Dallas County Comm'rs, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983);
Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386
(5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Fulford
v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir 1977) (en banc);
Still v. Nichols, 412 F.2d 778 (Ist Cir. 1969).
558. Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Hernandez v.
Spencer, 780 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1986); Still v. Nichols, 412 F.2d 778 (Ist Cir. 1969). But see
Higley v. Department of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1987) (state rule tolling clalims
during imprisonment is inconsistent with section 1983).
THE PREISER PUZZLE
Preiser should not be faulted, for failing to forecast all or even most of the
specific issues.
The Supreme Court is at fault, however, for failing to establish a mean-
ingful framework and guidance for resolving the myriad of section 1983-
habeas corpus controversies. Fifteen years after Preiser, several fundamental
questions concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the interplay
between the section 1983 and habeas corpus remedies remain unresolved.
"Core," "essence," or "heart" of habeas corpus is not a sufficiently
instructive concept when the right to present a federal constitutional claim
to a federal court is at stake. As a result, litigators and the lower federal
courts have been trapped in a quagmire of confusing and inconsistent case
law. This is particularly unfortunate because clarity is so important when
the issues are the appropriate federal remedial device to secure redress for
a constitutional violation and the steps necessary to secure access to that
remedy.
The fault does not lie entirely at the Court's doorstep. Theoretically, the
solution to any Preiser puzzle, involving as it does the need to reconcile
overlapping federal remedies, should be found in congressional intent. But
such intent does not always exist and Congress has shown no inclination to
clear the waters. The courts are thus left to speculate as to what Congress
thought about issues it did not think about at all. When congressional intent
is not available, perhaps the best a court can do is to attempt to determine
whether, in a particular case, Congress's desire to provide immediate access
to the federal courts under section 1983, or its concerns for federalism and
comity underlying the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, should pre-
vail." 9
This Article has attempted to sort out the issues, analyze the case law,
identify the trouble spots, and suggest solutions. Fifteen years of uncertainty
and confusion is long enough. It is up to Congress and the Supreme Court
finally to provide the rosetta stone for solving Preiser puzzles.
559. See Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1262 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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